# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 49 JANUARY 1971 No. 2

## NEW TIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

*By William P. Bundy*

FOR THREE decades now, Southeast Asia has been the scene and cockpit of struggles among great powers. Can it now be moved away from this status—unenviable and totally unwanted by its peoples? Can one outline a picture of conditions there that meets the desires of Southeast Asians and is at the same time compatible with the basic interests of all the major powers? Are such conditions more realizable now than ever before? If so, how can one move from here to there, and in particular how, if they were made the ultimate goal, would this affect the play of the hand (in all quarters) in bringing the war in Indochina to a conclusion?

This is the broad and proper way to frame the problem. Indeed, it is the one that fits any thoughtful definition of U.S. national interests. What we care about, and should have always defined as our objective, can be simply stated as "conditions for lasting peace" there—or for that matter anywhere else in the world. This real goal should be seen affirmatively and above all in terms of the aspirations of the 250 million people whose hopes and fears, however inarticulate and vague, define the true tides of the future.

Before trying to outline "conditions for lasting peace" in Southeast Asia, and certainly before making any judgment as to the possibility of attaining them, let us look at what has happened there in the last five years. The picture is wholly different from what it was in the spring and summer of 1965, when the culminating series of major American decisions in Vietnam was taken.

Then, the great-power forces within the area were seen in starkly bipolar terms: the "East Wind" of China was blowing

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strongly and thrustingly versus a "West Wind" which was pretty much American alone. Indonesia was tilted far to the left, almost wholly aligned with China, and engaged in a struggle against Malaysia and Singapore in which the British and Commonwealth defenders could only hope to lose slowly. Then, if ever, a Hanoi takeover of South Vietnam seemed likely, in conjunction with other trends, to make probable not only North Vietnamese domination in the Indochina area but a wave of Chinese expansion into the rest of Southeast Asia.

The United States, with these wider stakes much in mind, decided, with the support of others, to stand in defense of South Vietnam. Indonesia went through a miraculous (and tragically bloody) change; and China, after a dramatic series of reverses worldwide in 1965, entered upon the cultural revolution in early 1966. Leave it to historians to trace the connections, if any, between these events. Suffice it to say that they changed the practical and psychological climate of Southeast Asia dramatically in a short space of time. In Indonesia, confrontation with neighboring states and snarling at "neo-colonialism" were replaced by peace within a new multilateral framework that included debt forgiveness from abroad and foreign aid. By 1967, internal chaos had eroded China's prestige and greatly reduced the pressures from the north, at least for the time being. To the American public, any major Chinese threat came to seem so remote that by late 1967 a reference to its long-term aspects by Secretary Rusk (in terms familiar to President Kennedy) was criticized as extremism and the invention of a new rationale.

The stakes *were* changing, and as early as 1966 one thoughtful American, George Kennan, had suggested that the change in Indonesia alone had removed one strong argument for the United States to stick it out in Vietnam. The point was not lost within the Administration, and if the South Vietnamese political troubles of the spring of 1966 had not been speedily redressed, it is just possible that it would have had real weight. Thereafter, and through 1967, there was no thought of change; the Southeast Asian picture appeared to Washington to be brightening steadily on almost every front although formidable costs were multiplying at home.

March of 1968 brought a turning point both in Southeast Asia and in American policy and politics. Not only the outcome in Vietnam but the willingness of the United States to remain en-

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gaged in Southeast Asia were suddenly seen to be in grave doubt. This is not to say that the promising elements of 1965–67 had disappeared. Economic growth of individual nations, regional coöperation and multilateral aid continued, and still continue. Indonesia and Thailand, in particular, have taken the lead in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the first grouping in this area for political and economic coöperation.

Nor are the changes that have occurred in the great-power situation seen as deeply threatening, at least as yet. The United States, scarred by the Vietnam experience, is determined to be less deeply involved in the area in the future, and China, though partially recovered from the cultural revolution, is still preoccupied by internal problems and by friction on its northern borders. Both have been cut down to size, and as "great powers" no longer stand alone. The immense growth in Japan's presence and effort is accompanied by its proclaimed intent to play "the leading role" in foreign aid; and with the lesser spread of Soviet economic activity there has come talk of security pacts and evidence of a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In itself, the idea that there may now be four great powers concerned with the area, and that there is no clearcut alignment even among these four, is wholly welcome. The same is true of the increased presence and interest of Australia and New Zealand, and the slowly growing economic activity of West European nations.

On the whole, save in Burma, the statesmen of Southeast Asia want more rather than fewer ties with the developed countries. The cry of "neo-colonialism" finds little echo today. To be sure, there remain basic concerns regarding the West. One grievance turns on the terms of trade for Southeast Asia's primary and industrial products; if allowed to become worse, this could fester into a really sharp antagonism. But the bogey of a new Western or American economic "imperialism" is largely a figment of the imagination of the New Left in the United States; one does not encounter it to any significant extent in Southeast Asia. Nor would the facts as to the scale and nature of U.S. economic activity in the area support it; and, most crucially, the host countries truly control the terms of access, in no small part because the developed countries are in competition with each other. (If the Philippines is cited as an exception, I would comment that the sooner the U.S.-Philippine relationship changes the better; and

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indeed, the United States has shown itself prepared to abandon its favored position at any time.) Ironically, over the next decade, the nearest to a single controlling economic position could become that of the U.S.S.R. as a buyer of Malaysian rubber.

In short, Southeast Asia has come a long way since 1965—and even more strikingly since 1955 and 1960. True, hardly any Southeast Asian nation appears to have found an enduring political form of government. On the whole, governments are generally more responsive than before, and no longer depend on the charisma of first-generation post-colonial leaders. But the combination of a firm structure and an institutional and personal base to run it exists almost nowhere save perhaps in Singapore.

Also true, as George Thomson[1] has pointed out, most boundaries in Southeast Asia are colonial in origin, which can produce claims like that made by the Philippines on the Malaysian territory of Sabah. Also, the sense of national identity is frequently weak, and not felt by minorities or tribal groups. But this is hardly unique. Further, local historical rivalries are still much alive, though muted compared to a decade ago.

All this indicates that substantial degrees of change are inevitable in Southeast Asia in the 25 years ahead, and human experience indicates that outbreaks of violence will not be avoided. Realistic "conditions for lasting peace" do not mean a static absence of change or an end to violence. They can mean only that violence is limited, above all that it does not engage the forces or the decisive supporting weight of major powers.

## II

What the last five to ten years have shown in Southeast Asia has been, in an underlying sense: that the individual nations have enough cohesion to stand on their own feet; that, though they face major problems, they can progress economically; that they have developed a new degree of "area spirit" and the beginnings of regional organization (as shown by ASEAN especially); and that they need ties to the great powers, though they do not wish to be a cockpit for any struggles among them.

The period has done even more than that, however. It also has shown that the real estate of the Southeast Asia mainland is not militarily crucial to any great nation, or vitally threatening to any other. This must affect particularly the Chinese view of an

[1] "The New World of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1969.

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American presence there. There was a time when eminent commentators thought that China's concern on this point constituted the whole essence of the Vietnam problem. I doubt if anyone in Peking thinks that today. I am inclined to think that, though they might never admit it, Mao and his colleagues have been impressed during the last five years by America's evident desire to avoid war with China; the whole experience is one of the elements that may make an easing of tension and growth of communication now possible. But in any event Peking must know both that American bases in Southeast Asia never really added to any threat to China—and that such bases are now to be reduced if not eliminated. It was always true that none of the four great powers could get at the vitals of any of the others via the geography of Southeast Asia. The truth may now be more deeply felt.

The economic resources of Southeast Asia are likewise important to all the powers but vital to none. Its export markets and import supplies have become much more healthily diversified in the last decade, as world trade has expanded. Again, realization of the facts has probably changed even more than the facts themselves. Who today thinks that the area could serve as the rice bowl of China? Or that Japan (much less the United States) would be "vitally" affected by the loss of investment opportunities, export markets or access to resources there?

Most recently, even the geographic importance of Southeast Asia may have been exaggerated. One tends to think of the Straits of Malacca as "vital." At least, it has been argued, hostile control of the whole Indonesian archipelago would be a drastic threat to Australia and New Zealand and would face Japan with an economic stranglehold on its oil supplies. As for the United States, even though it needs the route less, its interests would be seriously affected through the damage to its Pacific partners. And, no doubt, someone in Peking has drawn equally grave pictures of China fenced in from access to the southern seas. But is it so? Not in the view of some in Japan who have lately drawn up realistic assessments of what the cost would be of using the Sunda Strait, or even going clean around Indonesia. Painful and inconvenient it would be, but it can be done. After all, the world has adjusted to the closing of Suez.

The point of these changed perceptions is not that Southeast Asia has suddenly become unimportant, but rather that no great

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power really need fear another there. As Washington calculations from the 1950s on were based far less on any affirmative U.S. needs in the area than on what Chinese "control" of it would mean, so China must in turn have thought what U.S. "control" would mean. It was the interaction of these two sets of fears that made the situation acutely bipolar and explosive. Now, the degree of realistic concern as to what "worst cases" could mean must be less, so that there should be correspondingly less drive and reciprocal fear.

III

What, then, are the "conditions for lasting peace" that respond to the desires of Southeast Asians, while at the same time being compatible with the interests and interactions of the great powers?

First and foremost, the preservation of the independence of the individual nations.

Second, a continued and in many instances improved rate of economic progress. The economic success stories of the past decade—in Thailand, Malaysia, perhaps Singapore most notably—need to continue and to be joined by others. To be sure, what is progress for some may be a problem for others, as in the case of the "miracle rice" that has been of dramatic help to the Philippines and now Indonesia, but with at least temporary harm to the export markets of Thailand and Burma. There is already a need for major diversification and innovation, and most basically of all, to improve the worldwide terms of trade. The recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) resolution, promising reduced tariffs in the developed world, could mean much in Southeast Asia, though it will not solve the problem of free market pricing in key commodities. Only world pooling arrangements could do this, and these do not seem in the cards.

Third, the fullest possible coöperation among the Southeast Asian nations. One of ASEAN's prime virtues is that it is open-ended, and of course also without ideological coloring. The Asian Development Bank and the regional economic projects originated in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) are likewise practical and wise. For the moment, more is probably not needed; to develop to the full the projects that are now practicable and the sharing of experience in such

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fields as population control will be a considerable task. It is not in the nature of the economies of the area, essentially not complementary to one another, that anything in the way of a common market for the area could develop. What is essential is the experience of working and thinking together.

From this may emerge a fourth key element—what for lack of a better term might be called a "common law of change" in Southeast Asia. Something of this sort seems already to have happened in Africa (in the Congo and Biafra), and may be emerging in Latin America. What it means simply is that the nations of an area are the initial judges of whether change and the use of violence or force of any kind are or are not fair and tolerable —and thus are, or are not, to be opposed or supported by others in the area, or by outside nations in a pinch. This could—and should—mean that the area would take an attitude of laissez-faire toward many of the changes of government that appear possible, on any broad projection, over the next 25 years; conversely, it could mean a loud protest if there is offensive military action or interference by a great power or a neighbor. In between, an area grouping could enter a neutral judgment on a border dispute while seeking to arbitrate it (as ASEAN has in effect done on Sabah). Though Southeast Asians lack the voting weight of other less-populous areas in the United Nations, one ventures to think that the clear and strong verdict of a local jury would gain wide support, perhaps in the future as a basis for action.

One must add a fifth condition—correct behavior by the great powers. One would like to say that this should consist of a guarantee among interested outside powers that they will not interfere by military or subversive means in the area, and acting on the finding of the local jury, will join together against either an outside power or a local nation that does interfere. This is, of course, far simpler to state than to achieve, even if the will and trust were there. They are not there. Yet this solution must be saved as a goal.

The plain truth is that no security arrangement or combination of security arrangements can be designed in Southeast Asia that remotely covers conceivable forms of aggression. New direct pacts between any regional group and any outside group (on the SEATO model) are out of the question, whether with European, Pacific or northeast Asian outside membership. Any purely

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regional security grouping would require a build-up of military capabilities that would be diversionary from the main economic and social effort vital for independence and true "security." This is, I believe, the strong feeling of the most regionally minded Southeast Asian leaders. From this standpoint, the remaining outside commitments in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are transitional remnants, of crucial importance in getting through the next five to ten years, but not destined to last.

If a great-power guarantee is unrealistic, and other approaches to security are divisive, what contribution are the great powers required to make on behalf of peace?

Twofold, I think. First, a self-imposed "common law of behavior" comparable to Southeast Asia's own "common law of change." Such a code of conduct would at a minimum bar the obvious forms of aggression and pressure-cum-subversion. Ideally, it should in the long run exclude any form of political pressure or manipulation.

The second element might be described as "balance," were it not that in international affairs this has come too often to connote a see-saw with two ends, on which parties of somewhat fixed weights take their stand. Obviously, such a "balance" is far from being the situation of the four powers concerned, now or into the future. The most friendly pair, Japan and the United States, are likely to remain close partners in their broad views and, one hopes, in foreign aid; yet they are bound to assume different security roles and to deal with China quite differently for a time. Similarly, the most opposed pair of the four, China and the Soviet Union, will be (I venture) dancing to Hanoi's tune together, at least in terms of aid, for some time to come.

Rather, the requirement is "equilibrium"—and the fluid equilibrium of the gyroscope at that, for it must allow for major changes in the next 30 years. The absolute requirement is that no power, or any combination of powers, should threaten to dominate. The ideal, beyond that minimum, would be that no one great power should reach a position in any crucial sphere—whether military, economic, or political—where its mere size and presence, even within the code of conduct, are disruptive.

## IV

These conditions of peace add up to a truly neutral Southeast Asia. One would even use the word "neutralization" if it had

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not been booby-trapped by de Gaulle in 1963 so that it appeared to mean acceptance not only of predominant North Vietnamese influence in all of Indochina but of ultimate Chinese dominance in the rest of Southeast Asia. The objective is simple—that the area should develop as it sees fit, with such help as it desires from outside nations but with interference from none, and that it would accept the correlative obligation of not aligning itself.

How near, one asks, are both the Southeast Asian nations themselves and the external powers concerned with the area to behaving in accordance with these conditions?

For the Southeast Asian nations, the answer is surely that they are very close indeed. The kind of posture here described can be found over and over again in the statements of the leaders of Indonesia in particular, but with a high degree of concurrence among the other ASEAN nations also. Burma remains silent, but the central concept of neutrality has always guided her policy. Even among the nations caught up in the vortex of the war in Indochina, it has remained the stated posture of Laos and Cambodia, and the goal of South Vietnam. Thailand, which might once have been considered the most "aligned" of the mainland Southeast Asian nations, has in effect adopted a second string to its bow and is prepared to replace the first just as soon as possible.

Similarly, much of the behavior of external powers in Southeast Asia now fits largely into this pattern. The multilateral framework of aid to Indonesia is a vivid example, and it is of some note that every effort has been made for some time to keep the door open for Soviet participation within that framework. Similarly, the World Bank, perhaps conscious that it might at some point be accused of being an "aligned" agency, has recently reiterated its willingness to accept Soviet and East European membership.

As for the Soviet Union's own behavior, there has been a slowly emerging trend to treat Southeast Asia in the same manner as it deals with India and Pakistan and with the same basic fear of Chinese expansion as a major factor. In addition to their need for rubber, the Soviets have a natural interest in the free movement of their commercial shipping through the southern seas, and as time goes on this interest is bound to be reflected in some naval activity. Unless these activities lead to political meddling or a big flexing of naval muscle (to what real gain one finds it hard to see), Soviet behavior should not present a great prob-

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lem. The Soviet relationship to North Vietnam could become the most important element, and it is too early to say how this will take shape over time.

The big questions, as Southeast Asians see them, concern the behavior of the other three "great powers" in the new situation. They are different questions for each. Will China once again threaten pressure and subversion? Will Japan refrain from throwing its new economic weight about, and particularly from assuming a military role at some point? And will the United States remain engaged, in the new low security posture prescribed by the Nixon Doctrine, but with major activity in trade, investment and aid throughout the area?

Of course, the three questions are intertwined. In fact, they simply summarize the requirement of "equilibrium." For if the United States does remain substantially engaged, China is seen as much less likely to be tempted to interfere or Japan ever to assume anything resembling its former wartime image.

As Japan's economic interest in Southeast Asia grows, and its concern for maintaining free transit routes develops, it should become in these respects the leader there of the four great powers —by reason of geography and Japanese economic capacity. The Japanese undoubtedly do not want to see their constructive economic role lead on to excessive leverage in individual countries, political intervention or a significant Japanese military role or presence—and they know well that Southeast Asians fear such an evolution. Yet the pressures in these directions could become great if the United States pulls out and the Chinese threat remains.

Can China, with its deep historical and cultural ties to Southeast Asia, accept and live within the kind of blueprint here described? Any present answer must be uncertain so long as Mao's successor is not determined. One could find hope—or threat?—in the apparent return to quiet realism in Chinese foreign policy over the past year. Plainly, Peking is once again seriously concerned with Southeast Asia, as shown by active propaganda in Thailand and Malaysia, the building of new roads in northern Laos and the welcome given Prince Sihanouk as a guest. One is inclined to see in this a return simply to the old probing for weakness and readiness to act on opportunities rather than intentions to take initiatives. The real test will come over time and the answer will be known by a gradual trend in behavior rather than by any paper signed at a conference. Apart from internal

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preoccupations and border concerns, one element affecting China's decision will be the true nonalignment or nonhostility of the Southeast Asian nations, and a realization that peaceful ties are possible. An even greater factor will be that the other three great powers should not appear to be ganging up against her. And the greatest factor of all will be that Southeast Asia does not present a picture of weakness that tempts Peking to action.

China will bulk large in any event. Given these basic elements, one can be hopeful that China would accept and live with a new Southeast Asia that was public park rather than private preserve.

V

The most important question today in Southeast Asian minds is whether the United States will play its part. It will be little comfort if the 1950–62 period of the cold war (United States versus China and the Soviet Union), and the ensuing period of Sino-American rivalry (involving much less ideology) were now to be replaced by acute conflict in the area among any combination of China, Japan and the Soviet Union.

From a purely American standpoint, the suggested blueprint is wholly compatible with our national interests. But how much does it mean to the United States to help it come about and then to preserve it? Is it "vital" (worth fighting about), of great importance (worth a high priority in effort and attention), or merely desirable (worth some modest effort)? We have asked ourselves this question too little over the last 20 years, and not merely in this area.

Free economic access is a part of our interest, somewhat greater than it has been but, as always, essentially secondary. We can find substitutes for all we now get from Southeast Asia.

Of greater importance is our indirect interest—that Japan should have strong and mutually beneficial ties in the area. Assuming that our partnership with Japan is the cornerstone of a realistic East Asian policy, anything that affects Japan seriously or drives her inward is of real concern to us as well. This applies as much to a Japan that is excluded as to a Japan that thrusts out.

Broader still, we have a national interest that any major area in the developing world should move ahead in accordance with its own capacities. What failure to help achieve this would mean might not become clear for a generation. Both in principle and

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through years of association, we should care about Southeast Asians in the most basic sense, for their national independence and their progress.

All of these together would argue for a significant effort, though not for new commitments that carry any combat obligation. They certainly should warrant continuation of economic aid, mostly multilateral, and of the role we already play in meeting possible nuclear blackmail, under the U.N. resolution that followed the nonproliferation treaty.

But one must take the discussion a step further, if one is to derive any help from it on the importance of getting from here to there. Agree, to start with, that the word "vital" as used in the past (within the Executive Branch or in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of the Congress) was in some part rhetoric, and for the rest represented a fear of Chinese domination over most of the area to such an extent that the whole balance of power in East Asia would be changed. Historians will argue how far that fear had foundation in 1965. As of 1970, it is surely less substantial, both because the area is stronger and because countervailing great-power weight is now present, albeit still weakly.

Is it "vital," still, to avoid any form of Chinese domination in Southeast Asia? Perhaps it may be nearly "vital" that the United States should not have to decide. It is hard to imagine a more damaging situation than one in which the United States had to choose between acting with force ("commitment" or no) in Southeast Asia, and seeing a major country there taken over by external communist power with Peking heavily involved. If the former were the choice, the extent of last spring's outburst in the United States over the action taken in Cambodia tells us what might happen. However, if we simply stood aside, at any time in the next three to five years, there might be an equally great outcry and sense of national failure in a very large part of the American public.

So it may be, it seems to me, that the United States has a very great national interest in seeing Southeast Asia move on to the new basis as rapidly and completely as possible. One could put this in the form of a paradox: the United States should be "vitally" concerned to see that Southeast Asia now becomes an area where not the United States, nor China, nor any other great power, regards its interests there as "vital."

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VI

How does all this relate to the handling by the United States of the war in Indochina? Perhaps not very much, in view of other overriding domestic factors and the simple fact that our capacity to help militarily in South Vietnam is rapidly running its course. Over the past year, Hanoi has used its inner lines of communication to make gains in Laos. Having put pressures on Cambodia that, in fact though not in intent, contributed largely to Sihanouk's downfall, it has now established a strong position in Cambodia. The war has become more difficult and more indivisible. Both sides may be under strain, and it is just possible that Hanoi may be ready to negotiate seriously. Fundamentally, the United States is strategically on the defensive, and the outcome hinges on local strength and will in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

As they assess what the possible outcomes would mean for them, thoughtful Southeast Asians do not think or feel like "dominoes." They know that the United States has done a great deal, some would say too much. The real question for most is whether the United States, after Vietnam, will remain active in the area as a whole; those who sense the realities of American public opinion are aware that Americans could reach a point of disgust about Southeast Asia by staying too long in Vietnam.

This said, a precipitate withdrawal from Vietnam (or, in my own view, fixing unilaterally a date for withdrawal) would be regarded as a sure sign the United States was pulling out of the whole area. Southeast Asians would then act in ways likely to affect the American public and Congress so as to make that result even more likely. Once the fabric of reciprocal confidence, already strained, was really broken, there would almost certainly be a vicious downward spiral on both sides.

This can be avoided even under adverse outcomes in the countries of Indochina if the United States has played its hand reasonably well in the intervening period. The outcome in Indochina —which is Hanoi's show still—*can* be contained in terms of its effect in Southeast Asia, but not by pulling out regardless of consequences. If the independence of the countries of Indochina can be preserved, the sooner they are fitted into the new pattern for Southeast Asia the better. A wider Indochina conference must think in these terms, whoever attends.

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In the meantime, steps such as Mr. Nixon's indication that a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam will indeed be "total" are in the right direction. Moreover, the intervention undertaken by predominantly Southeast Asian nations, under Indonesian leadership, through the Djakarta conference of last spring remains a highly significant move despite its limited results. The grouping itself may be fragile, since Japan, one of the participants, belongs to the category of "great" rather than "local" powers. But the conference marked a first step toward establishing participation by the area in the Indochina situation, and it should certainly be a major goal of the peacekeeping provisions of any settlement of the situation to provide a role for Southeast Asian nations—perhaps even the sole role. That would be a long step indeed toward meeting the requirement of a "common law of change."

Foreign policy in the American democracy tends to swing between extremes—to prefer the simplification of slogans, tug-of-war not cat's cradle. It prefers to reject, rather than amend, directions that have led to trouble; it finds it hard to qualify, or be selective, or to take account of timing and transition. So it will not be easy to move with the new tides in Southeast Asia, and to do our part in channeling them toward peace. It may not be a catchy slogan, but perhaps we can take comfort in the simple but neglected notion of doing what the area itself wants.

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# THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS

*By Earl C. Ravenal*

EIGHTEEN months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.

The President's foreign policy declaration of February 1970 promised that "our interests, our foreign policy objectives, our strategies and our defense budgets are being brought into balance—with each other and with our overall national priorities."[1] After a decade of burgeoning military spending and entanglement in foreign conflict, the nation has welcomed the vision of lower defense budgets balanced by a reduction in American involvement overseas, particularly in Asia. Actually, however, the Administration's new policies and decision processes do not bring about the proposed balance; in fact, they create a more serious imbalance. Essentially we are to support the same level of potential involvement with smaller conventional forces. The specter of intervention will remain, but the risk of defeat or stalemate will be greater; or the nuclear threshold will be lower. The fundamental issues of interests, commitments and alliances are not resolved.

## II

The objectives of close-in military containment and the for-

[1] Richard Nixon, "U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace" (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, February 18, 1970).

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ward defense of our Asian allies present us with a series of bleak choices:

With regard to deterrence: (1) perpetuation of a high level of active conventional forces, conspicuously deployed or deployable; (2) fundamental and obvious reliance on nuclear weapons; or (3) acknowledgment of the higher probability of an enemy initiative.

With regard to initial defense: (1) maintenance or rapid deployment of large armies in Asia; (2) early recourse to tactical nuclear weapons; or (3) acceptance of the greater risk of losing allied territory.

With regard to terminating a war: (1) large commitments of troops and heavy casualties; (2) use of nuclear weapons, either tactical or strategic; or (3) resignation to an indefinite and wasting stalemate, tantamount to defeat.

The only solution that transcends the triangle of unsatisfactory choices is to reëvaluate our interests in Asia; restate those objectives that implicate us in the possibility of war on the Asian mainland and diminish our control over our actions; resist the grand and vapid formulas of our role in Asia—such as the existential platitude that "we are a Pacific power"—that perpetuate the illusion of paramountcy; retreat from the policy of military containment of China; and revise the alliances that have come to represent our commitment to containment.

But this course the President has consistently rejected: ". . . we will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow from them. . . . The United States will keep all its treaty commitments." Thus the root problem of the Nixon Doctrine is its abiding commitment to the containment of China. In the furtherance of this policy our government hopes to maintain all our present Asian alliances and de facto commitments, profiting from their deterrent value but avoiding their implications. Yet it also intends to scale down our conventional military capability. The result is that the Nixon Doctrine neither reduces our potential involvement in Asian conflicts nor resolves the resulting dilemma by providing convincingly for a defense that will obviate reliance on nuclear weapons.

Let us examine the prospect of the Nixon Doctrine as a relief from involvement in Asian contingencies. The trauma that has resulted from our inability to win decisively in Vietnam has caused our policy-makers to suggest a limitation of future in-

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volvement on the basis of a distinction between external or overt aggression on the one hand, and insurgency, political subversion and civil war on the other. The President attempts in this way to avoid the strategy dilemma by altering the criteria for intervention and thus understating the probability of involvement:

> . . . we cannot expect U. S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats facing allies or potential allies throughout the world. This is particularly true of subversion and guerrilla warfare, or "wars of national liberation." Experience has shown that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government.

But this is nothing more than a postulation that the unwished contingency will not arise. The hard question remains: What if these "best means" are not successful? Under *those* conditions what kind of solutions does the Nixon Doctrine envisage? Might the United States be impelled to intervene with combat forces? The President states:

> . . . a direct combat role for U. S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases, we shall weigh our interests and our commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of our allies, in determining our response.

But this formula for discrimination and discretion seems both unclear and unrealistic. At what point does an insurgency become "external aggression"? A definition sometimes proposed is the introduction of enemy main-force units, rather than mere individual fillers. But, even apart from the difficult question of verification, this event might be well beyond the point where our intervention became critical to the situation. The paradox is that in critical cases we might not wish to define the situation to preclude intervention; in less than critical cases we would not need to invoke nice distinctions to justify it. In any case, relying on formulas and distinctions misses the point: it is simply not credible that we would sacrifice our still-held objectives to the vagaries of circumstance.

Indeed, as long as our policy remains the containment of China and the repression of Asian communism, we are inclined to view even largely indigenous revolutions as objective instances of the purposes of Peking or Hanoi or Pyongyang. Consequently, if an insurgency in an allied or even a neutral country began to

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succeed, we would probably first increase logistical aid, then extend the role of advisers and provide air support. Since such moves might bring a countervailing response from the Asian communist sponsors of the insurgency, we might have to choose between sending ground forces and allowing an ally to lose by our default. In certain extremities we might be forced to the final choice among unlimited conventional escalation, defeat of our own forces, or "technological escalation" to the use of nuclear weapons.

Thus, with our formal or implied commitments and the President's open-ended prescription, the United States might yet be drawn into a land war on the Asian mainland or have to confront equally dire alternatives. In this respect the Nixon Doctrine does not improve on the policy that led to Vietnam. And, of course, our exposure to involvement in the case of more overt aggression, such as a Chinese-supported invasion in Korea or Southeast Asia, remains undiminished.

The only proposition that has become clear about the Nixon Doctrine is that its most advertised hope of resolving the strategy problem—both reducing the forces we maintain for Asian defense and avoiding involvement in conflict—is Asianization, *i.e.* the substitution of indigenous forces, equipped through enlarged U.S. military assistance, for American troops. The case for expanded military assistance has been stated with unprecedented urgency by Secretary Laird in preparation for vastly increased Military Assistance Program (MAP) budget requests for 1972 and succeeding fiscal years. Secretary Laird has characterized MAP as "the essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units."[2]

But the Secretary recognizes the declining level of popular and Congressional support for military assistance. His solution, considered perennially within the Defense and State Departments but proposed for the first time in a Secretarial posture statement to the Congress, is that "military assistance should be integrated into the Defense Budget so that we can plan more rationally and present to the Congress more fully an integrated program." Military aid for certain "forward defense countries," including South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, and consisting of

[2] Melvin R. Laird, "Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget" (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, March 2, 1970).

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about 80 percent of the total category "Support for Other Nations,"[3] is already meshed into the Defense Budget. This legislative ploy has not yet been applied to Korea or Taiwan, though the reduction of our troops in Korea and the insurance of Taiwan against communist pressure depend, in the judgment of this Administration, on the freedom to substitute U.S. matériel for manpower.

To merge military assistance entirely into the regular functional appropriation categories of the Defense Budget would be to institutionalize the dual rationale for military assistance that has become traditional in debate within the Department of Defense. The first element in this rationale is the argument from "trade-off"—a calculus that compares the costs of equal units of effectiveness of U. S. and foreign troops. This is essentially an assertion of "absolute advantage" and is the basic and obvious sense of Secretary Laird's statement: "A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces."

The second element is the argument from "comparative advantage," borrowed from the economic theory of international trade: "Each nation must do its share and contribute what it can appropriately provide—manpower from many of our allies; technology, material, and specialized skills from the United States." The proponents of military comparative advantage assert, by analogy, that the coöperating and specializing defense community can "consume" security at a higher level. It may be, however, that they can only consume more of the tangible intermediate trappings of security, *i.e.* the forces and arms. The essence of security, especially for the United States as the senior partner, might depend more on certain qualitative factors. In fact, there are several difficulties in the Administration's ostensibly neutral and technical arguments for military assistance.

First, both trade-off and comparative advantage assume and confirm the inevitability and relevance of the shared mission—that is, the forward defense of the ally's territory. But only if we cannot avoid this mission is it proper to confine the debate to the optimal distribution of roles and costs.

Second, the argument from comparative advantage, like the economic theory at its origin, stresses specialization. But the concomitant of specialization is interdependence. Thus a policy of selective reliance on allies, in order to be effective, implies auto-

[3] $2.443 billion out of $3.127 billion in the President's budget for fiscal year 1971.

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matic involvement from the earliest moments of a conflict.[4]

Third, early experience indicates that U.S. ground forces cannot simply be traded off with precisely calculated increments of military assistance. They must be politically ransomed by disproportionate grants, more conspicuous deployments and more fervent and explicit confirmations of our commitment.[5]

Fourth, from the diplomatic standpoint the substitution of massive infusions of modern arms for U.S. troops is anything but neutral. To the North Koreans and their sponsors, for example, the one and one-half billion dollars of support and new equipment we now intend to give South Korea might look very provocative and destabilizing. A new phase of the peninsular arms race could be the result, with a net loss to regional and U.S. security.

Finally, the legislative tactic of integrating the Military Assistance Program into the Defense Budget would remove military assistance as an object of the broader concerns of foreign policy and assign it to the jurisdiction of more narrowly defense-oriented Congressional committees. The debate would be less political and more technical. The focus would shift from the question of involvement to the question of relative costs. Thus Asianization, which is the keystone of the Nixon Doctrine, would substitute some Asian forces and resources, but along the same perimeter of interest. It affords a pretext for reducing expense, but it does not enhance our security or relieve us from involvement.

III

The basic question is whether the Nixon Doctrine is an honest policy that will fully fund the worldwide and Asian commitments it proposes to maintain, or whether it conceals a drift toward nuclear defense or an acceptance of greater risk of local

[4] After the decision to reduce the ceiling on U.S. troops in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000, our government moved to base permanently there a wing of F-4 fighter-bombers. An American official explained: "Our aim is to reassure the Koreans during this difficult period. Despite budgetary cuts, it shows we intend to maintain our relative air strength here. They know that the minute an air attack starts, we're involved." (*The New York Times*, August 17, 1970.)

[5] The Administration proposes special budget requests of $1 billion over a five-year period for Korean force modernization, in addition to about $700 million likely to be provided in the regular military assistance budget. Even then, the Republic of Korea is demanding $2–3 billion, plus public assurances of no further troop withdrawals until after five years and the actual completion of the promised modernization program.

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defeat. The most obvious change in our military posture is that the new formula provides conventional forces to counter a major communist thrust in Asia or Europe, but not simultaneously. As the President has explained:

> The stated basis of our conventional posture in the 1960's was the so-called "2½ war" principle. According to it, U.S. forces would be maintained for a three-month conventional forward defense of NATO, a defense of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a minor contingency —all simultaneously. These force levels were never reached.
>
> In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the "1½ war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.

What will be the ultimate force levels associated with the new 1½-war strategy, and how can we assess their implications for Asian defense? Peacetime forces are obviously entailed by the extent of our commitments, but in no precisely determined way. A most important intermediate term—which could account for wide differences in strategy and forces—is the probable simultaneity of contingencies.[6] The Nixon strategy of 1½ wars is explicitly founded on the improbability of two simultaneous major contingencies. Thus demands on the planned general purpose forces are to be considered alternative rather than additive.

Can we then expect a force reduction equivalent to the requirement for defending against the lesser of the major contingencies? To support the previous strategy of 2½ wars, the Baseline (or peacetime) Force Structure was thought to provide seven active divisions for Southeast Asia, two for Korea, eight for NATO, and two and one-third for a minor contingency and a strategic reserve—a total of 19-1/3. Since the present 1½-war doctrine includes only one major contingency, in NATO *or* Asia, one might derive an active ground force as low as 10-1/3 divisions.

Such a literal expectation, however, is confused by the President's desire to insure "against greater than expected threats by maintaining more than the forces required to meet conventional threats in one theater—such as NATO Europe;" the fact that certain types of divisions are inherently specialized for certain geographical contingencies, so that all eight of our armored and

[6] Other sources of uncertainty and wide variation are: the readiness of our reserve divisions, the amount of available airlift and sealift, and the effectiveness of allied forces.

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mechanized divisions will probably remain oriented to NATO and inapplicable to Asian defense; and finally, the judgments of both the President and Secretary Laird that the force levels necessary to implement the previous 2½-war policy "were never reached."

But it seems clear that the ultimate Baseline Force Structure under the Nixon Doctrine will contain even fewer divisions for the Asian requirement than the minimal proposals for a conventional defense.[7] The reduced conventional force is most significant as a reflection of the altered concept of Asian defense embodied in the Nixon Doctrine. The constituent propositions of this concept are: (1) the most likely threats to our Asian allies do not involve Chinese invasion, and (2) with greatly expanded military assistance our allies can largely provide the ground forces to counter such threats.

There is a third proposition, strongly implied by the logic of the problem and markedly signaled in the President's foreign policy statement: in a future Asian conflict, particularly if it does involve China, United States intervention is likely to carry with it the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

—the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies;
—the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces.

Though the "coördinated" attack described by the President is improbable, it should be noted that "theater nuclear forces" are prescribed as deterrents against the *single* contingency of a "Chinese attack on our Asian allies." Also, there are more plausible scenarios that would, in terms of their potential to immobilize U.S. forces, be the functional equivalent of a major attack: a Soviet military build-up and political pressure in central or southern Europe; or China's rendering massive logistical support to one of her Asian allies to the point where that ally could release overwhelming forces against a neighboring country; or

[7] About five to seven divisions have been considered the minimum to blunt and delay an attack along the main access routes in Southeast Asia, then fall back to a defensible perimeter. Against a communist invasion of Korea it was thought that the South Korean army alone could hold initially north of Seoul until reinforced by Korean reserves or U.S. units to be mobilized or diverted from other requirements.

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the imminent entry of China into a war where we or one of our allies might have provided the provocation. It is conceivable that two such lesser contingencies could arise, in Europe and Asia, and that one of them could develop to the point of a conflict. In that event we would be reluctant to consider our conventional forces for either theater available for the other. Motivated by illusions of decisive action and immunity from retaliation, we might be tempted to dispose of the Asian conflict by technological escalation.

Therefore, if we remain committed to the defense of interests in both theaters, but maintain conventional forces for only one large contingency, our strategy is biased toward the earlier use of nuclear weapons. Of course, there is no necessary continuum of escalation from conventional war to tactical nuclear war. But the 1½-war strategy provides the President with fewer alternatives and renders the resort to nuclear weapons a more compelling choice, as well as making nuclear threat a more obvious residual feature of our diplomacy.

And so the "balance" promised in the new security policy is achieved—but not by adjusting our commitments, restricting our objectives or modifying our conception of the interests of the United States. Rather, budgetary stringencies inspire a reduction in force levels; a "1½-war strategy" is tailored to fit the intractable realities; and a series of rationalizations is constructed to validate the new strategy—rationalizations that simply stipulate a reduced threat, count heavily on subsidized and coerced allied efforts at self-defense, and suggest an early nuclear reaction if our calculations prove insufficiently conservative.

Thus the Nixon Doctrine reveals an apparent contradiction between objectives and strategy. Are we seeing the beginning of a return to the defense posture of the 1950s, with unabated commitments to a collection of front-line client-states, but with limited options and a renewed flirtation with the fantasy of tactical nuclear warfare?

## IV

The new security policy not only shifts substantively down to a 1½-war strategy but also changes the model for determining defense requirements. Instead of the classic progression from the definition of foreign policy interests to the formulation of objec-

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tives, to the prescription of strategies, to the calculation of forces and their costs, we now see a constrained calculus that proceeds in reverse from limited budgets to trimmed forces to arbitrary strategies. The implications are not transmitted through the system to include a revision of objectives and interests. At best the system is balanced back from resources through strategies; the imbalance is shifted to a point between strategies and objectives.

But even the strategies and the forces may be out of balance. For the budget-constrained strategy revision is complemented by a fundamental change in the defense planning process. The previous system was requirements-oriented: there was, in theory, no prior budgetary restriction. Rather, planning began with the stated worldwide defense objective and resulted in forces and a budget which were recommended to the President and the Congress as systematically entailed by our defense objectives. Of course, the ideal system foundered on the institutional realities of weapons-systems and force creation. Indeed, the philosophy of unconstrained implementation of security objectives—"buy what you need"—encouraged inflated requirements within the framework of 2½ wars. And the attempts of the Secretary to limit forces only led the military to attempts to goldplate those prescribed forces, while keeping a ledger on the "shortfall" between the imposed strategy and the imposed force structure. But at least the direction and scope of the planning process compelled attention to the relevance and adequacy of the forces, and allowed the possibility of reasoning back from the rejection of excessive requirements to the questioning of overambitious strategies, extensive commitments and artificial interests.

By contrast, the new defense planning process begins simultaneously with "strategic guidance" and "fiscal guidance," established by the President and the National Security Council. The new procedure has attained certain efficiencies in managing the Pentagon budget cycle. But from the policy standpoint it is another matter: within the fiscal ceilings we will get the forces and weapons systems that the organization tends to produce—not the ones we might need. Of the two kinds of guidance, the fiscal is quantitative and unarguable; the strategic is verbal and elastic. If there is a coincidence of those forces and systems tailored to the fiscal guidance and those derived from the strategic guidance, it will be either accidental or contrived.

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More likely, the Services will interpret the new guidance as a set of parameters within which they can promote self-serving programs. Under conditions of budgetary stringency they will skimp on manpower, supplies, war reserve stocks, maintenance and transport, while preserving headquarters, cadres of units, research and development of large new systems, and sophisticated technological overhead. In effect they will tend, as in the 1950s, to sacrifice those items that maintain balance, readiness and sustainability of effort, and to insist on those items that insure morale, careers and the competitive position of each Service.

Thus the Administration's defense planning procedure allows a second contradiction: between strategy and forces. This country may well end the 1970s with the worst of both worlds: on the one hand, a full panoply of commitments and a strategy that continues to serve an ambitious policy of containment; on the other, a worldwide sprinkling of token deployments and a force structure that is still expensive, but unbalanced, unready and irrelevant to our security.

## V

The disabilities of the Nixon Doctrine follow from its insistence on the containment of China in face of budgetary pressures that arise not out of absolute scarcity of resources, but out of the nation's unwillingness to make large sacrifices for objectives that cannot be credibly invoked by its leadership. If the Administration is to be consistent in revising our defense posture and limiting defense budgets, it must consider a commensurate curtailment of our foreign policy objectives in Asia. Adjusting the intermediate-term strategies will not effect the reconciliation and will permit an honest implementation of the force and budget cuts.

But the Nixon Doctrine does not resolve the Asian defense problem in this fundamental way: rather, it appears as another formula for permanent confrontation with China. What are the issues that elude the perennial expressions of interest, by several administrations, in accommodating China? During the Johnson Administration the policy of containment ceded to a variant characterized as "containment without isolation." The shift, however, was accompanied by no tangible initiatives and induced no reciprocity from China. President Nixon entered office with a mandate—which he had created largely himself through his campaign emphasis—to bring about a reconciliation

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with China. His Administration has relaxed certain restrictions on trade and travel and revived the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. But such moves, though impressive as indications of enlightenment, do not touch on the essential concerns of China. However we ultimately conceive our interests, we might as well be realistic about the eventual price of a real accommodation with China.

This price would include three kinds of consideration: (1) diplomatic recognition and admission without qualification to the United Nations and the permanent Security Council seat; (2) affirmation of a one-China policy, even allowing the eventual accession of Taiwan to the mainland; (3) removal of the U.S. military presence on the mainland of Asia, without substituting a naval cordon, a ring of nearby island bases, a host of Asian mercenary armies, or a nuclear tripwire. The components of such a withdrawal would be: liquidation of the Vietnam war and removal of all U.S. forces there; retraction of all U.S. troops from other mainland Asian countries and Taiwan and closure of all bases; termination of military assistance to mainland states and cessation of efforts to create proxy forces to continue our mission; and dissolution of our security alliances with the "forward-defense" countries of Thailand, Taiwan and Korea.

Such a program would amount to a major diplomatic revolution. It might take a quarter of a century to implement, even with the most sophisticated public and political support within the United States. It would alienate client régimes, unsettle for long intervals our relations with the Soviets, and tax the understanding of major allies such as Japan and Australia. It would signify the renunciation of our efforts to control events in Asia; henceforth we would control only our responses to events.

But it is fair to ask whether we will not arrive at this disposition of affairs in Asia at some point, whether we will it or not. Should this occur after a quarter of a century of tension and devastation, or political manœuvre and diplomatic search? It is also fair to speculate that a more neutral, or even positive, relationship with China might give us a new scope of advantages. We might benefit eventually from a commercial relationship with China, rather than conceding the economic penetration of the mainland by Japan and Western Europe while we remain frozen in our historic impasse. We might also, simply through the dissolution of predictable enmity with China, make it more difficult for the Soviets to challenge us in other areas of the world.

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And we might find it useful to have a counterpoise to Japan, which is still our principal Pacific competitor, economic and potentially military, and a possible future partner of the U.S.S.R. in such common interests as counterbalancing China and developing eastern Siberia.

The tangible expression of containment is our security alliances and the other strong, though less formal, military commitments around the periphery of China. These commitments, it can be argued, create the threat to us by transforming otherwise neutral events into situations of relevance to our interests; perpetuate the confrontation with China that gives substance to the threat, by frustrating the essential motives of China; lock us into a posture of forward defense on the mainland of Asia; and dictate the requirement for large general purpose forces or equivalent means of deterrence and defense.

Our alliances in Asia do not form a coherent and comprehensive system such as NATO. Rather they are a collection of bilateral agreements, plus the multilateral SEATO pact, contracted separately from 1951 through 1962. Even the purposes served by these alliances, as seen at the time of their negotiation, were diverse. Containment of China might have been a concurrent motive, but it did not uniformly inspire the creation of the pacts. Quite apart from containing our enemies, several of the treaties exhibit motives of containing our allies as well.

The ANZUS and Philippine treaties of 1951, though signed against the backdrop of the Korean War, related more to the fear of Japan which these allies derived from World War II. The 1953 agreement with the Republic of Korea was, among other things, a price for Syngman Rhee's restraint from attempting to reunify the peninsula by force. Similarly the treaty with the Republic of China in 1955 was in part a quid pro quo for Chiang's acceptance of "re-leashing" during the Straits crisis of that year. The SEATO alliance of 1954, which extended protection to South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, arose less from the vision of true collective defense than the desire of the United States to have a legal basis for discretionary intervention under the nominal coloration of "united action." The bilateral U.S.-Thai adjunct to SEATO, negotiated by Rusk and Thanat in 1962, reassured the Thais, during the events that led to the Laos neutralization accords, that the U.S. would respond to a threat to Thai security, regardless of the reaction of other SEATO

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signatories; this agreement, too, was a price to secure the acquiescence of an ally in an arrangement that suited the interest of the United States. The 1960 Security Treaty with Japan, revising the original treaty of 1951, reaffirmed U.S. administration of Okinawa and perpetuated our use of bases in the Japanese home islands, subject to prior consultation for nuclear or direct combat deployments. (The Nixon-Sato communiqué of October 1969 pledged reversion of Okinawa to Japan by 1972, a status that implies removal of nuclear weapons and submission to the "homeland formula" for consultation on the use of bases.)

Though deterrence has always been the primary function of our alliances, their military content has changed profoundly from the time they were contracted. The Dulles policy, in the pacts of 1953–55, did not emphasize the actual defense of allied territory or contemplate the dispatch of U.S. ground forces to any point where the communist powers chose to apply military force. Rather, it aimed at nuclear deterrence of overt aggression. In this concept the alliances served to establish a territorial definition. The implied countermeasure was the discretionary application of American nuclear force against communist airfields, supply centers, ports and perhaps industries and cities. The concept was not clearly resolved: it was semi-strategic and semi-tactical, partially punitive and partially for direct military effect. Also, cases short of obvious aggression, such as subversion and support for internal revolutionary struggles, were acknowledged to be imprecise and difficult. In Indochina in 1954 the Eisenhower Administration could not identify an appropriate enemy or target to fit the massive nuclear response and narrowly declined to intervene. Of course, it also sensed the lack of formal alliance protection over Southeast Asia as an impediment to intervention and moved to create SEATO within two months of the partition of Vietnam.

The refinement of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons in the middle and later 1950s made conceivable the notion of actual nuclear defense confined to the theater of conflict. The Kennedy-McNamara policy of flexible response, including counter-insurgency techniques and large balanced conventional forces, provided the practical means of containing a wider spectrum of Chinese or Chinese-supported initiatives. Thus the policy of close-in containment of China—involving the actual forward defense of allied territory—acquired its content.

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There is a set of propositions that qualifies military deterrence: the more explicit and obvious our commitment, the more effective in preventing war, but the less effective in preventing our involvement in war; conversely, the more attenuated our commitment, the less certain our involvement, but the more probable a hostile initiative.

An administration with a more relaxed view of Asia might take the risk of the second proposition and look more neutrally on a communist probe. But this Administration appears likely to maintain its deterrent stance and take its chances on involvement in conflict. This would mean that it will not overtly diminish any commitment; indeed it is likely to reaffirm and reinforce any commitment that is beset by doubt. But to maintain the deterrent effect of our commitments in the face of reductions in budgets, forces and deployments, the Administration must replace deleted capabilities with some equivalent, such as increased rapid deployment ability or nuclear threat. This Administration could not count entirely on the mobility of our forces, which can be evidenced only by massive exercises and adequate lift resources, which are far from certain to be appropriated. Residually, it is forced to rely on nuclear deterrence, which need only be hinted. The point is that our mode of deterrence and our provisions for defense will now progressively diverge from the preferences of our treaty partners. Our proposed substitution of technology and threat for our manpower and presence might be equivalent from our point of view, but not from that of our allies.

None of our Asian defense arrangements is specific about the tangible support that might be evoked by an act of aggression. No joint defense force with agreed war plans and command structures exists. Our military concept could become, rather than the forward defense of all territory, a mobile defense, an enclave strategy, or even a nuclear tripwire. In another dimension, our commitment might be satisfied by various types of support, such as logistical, tactical air or nuclear fire. U.S. contingency plans are essentially unilateral and subject to uncommunicated change. And implementation of all treaties refers to our constitutional procedures, which are themselves in a phase of more stringent interpretation.

Because of this scope for manœuvre or evasion, our Asian allies will be correspondingly more sensitive to interpretive com-

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mentary by U.S. officials and to shifts in our military posture. Already they sense that the substantive content of our alliances is affected by the President's choice of worldwide strategy. The selected strategy is described as defending both Europe and Asia —though alternatively. But it is clear that Europe holds priority and claims virtually as many resources as previously; the major war case associated with the reduction in active forces is Asia. Although no alliances are formally disturbed, our Asian allies, as they count our divisions and analyze our posture statements and policy declarations, have cause for concern that behind the façade of ritualistic reiteration we might have altered our capability and specific intent to fulfill our treaty commitments.

Thus we can devalue the diplomatic and deterrent effect of our alliances without even gaining immunity from involvement, simply by shifting strategies, debating criteria for intervention and making arbitrary adjustments in force levels. In view of the liabilities of this course—which is the course of the present Administration—we might as well face the problem more directly and begin to consider the broader alternatives to containment, with their full implications for our alliances in Asia.

## VII

As long as we assert interests in Asia that (1) entail defending territory, (2) could plausibly be threatened by hostile actions and (3) are evidenced by alliances that dispose us to a military response, we are exposed to the contingency of involvement. If we maintain this exposure through insistence on our present Asian commitments, while adopting budget-constrained strategies, we risk a future defeat or stalemate, or we allow ourselves to be moved toward reliance on nuclear weapons.

To avoid these alternatives, two courses are available. One is heavy dependence on allied forces to fulfill defense requirements. This is the hope of Asianization, offered prominently by the Nixon Doctrine. But this policy binds us closely to the fate of our Asian clients and diminishes our control over our involvement; and there is still the liability that U.S. forces might be required to rescue the efforts of our allies.

The other course is a process of military readjustment and political accommodation that would make it far less likely that we would become involved every time there is some slippage in the extensive diplomatic "fault" that runs along the rim of Asia.

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This course is arduous and complex, and as little under our unilateral and absolute control as a course of military deterrence. But the consequences of not budging from our present set of ambitions and illusions—or of trifling with the unalterable purposes of China by limiting ourselves to insubstantial diplomatic initiatives—are far bleaker.

The situation calls not for a symbolic shift in strategy—such as the 1½-war doctrine—which is founded on the hope that the contingencies that would test it, to which we are still liable, might not occur. The situation is not amenable to purely instrumental solutions, such as the calculated equippage of allied armies or the reliance on technological escalation. The situation requires a fundamental questioning and revision of the containment of China.

The confusion that surrounds the Nixon Doctrine is appropriate to its conflicting message and incomplete intent. While pledging to honor all of our existing commitments, the President has placed them all in considerable doubt. While offering promise of avoiding involvement in future Asian conflicts, he has biased the nature of our participation. Thus, in the attempt to perpetuate our control of the destiny of Asia, the Nixon Doctrine may forfeit control of our own destiny in Asia.

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# HAZARDOUS COURSES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

*By George F. Kennan*

STRETCHING southward from the two great river systems of the Congo and the Zambesi to the confluence of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and thus comprising roughly the southern third of the African continent, there lies a vast area, about two-thirds the size of the United States, which constitutes in its entirety one of the principal problem-children of the world community. Consisting largely of an arid central plateau, with lower coastal strips only partially suitable for human habitation, this region harbors a population of some 41,000,000, of whom, in approximate terms, 34,000,000 might be of black African origin, 4,500,000 of European, and the remainder of mixed or other blood. It is made up of a number of highly disparate political entities: the great Portuguese dependencies of Angola and Mozambique, the highly controversial territories of Rhodesia and South West Africa, the Republic of South Africa, and the three former British High Commission territories, now independent: Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana.

With the exception of these last-named entities, which make up only a small portion of the whole, there is no part of this area which has not been in recent years the subject of violent discontent, debate, protest and conflict in the United Nations and in world opinion generally. Controversy has centered, of course, on the political relations existing there between people of European origin and the black Africans who constitute everywhere the majority. This is scarcely surprising. The area contains at least 90 percent of the entire white population of Africa, as against 11 percent of its Blacks. Of the white inhabitants, furthermore, a considerable proportion have been settled in Africa for many generations, having even in some instances come no later than did the Blacks to the settlement of the regions in which they are now residing. In these circumstances racial problems were bound to be of a different order—greater in scale, emotionally more acute—than elsewhere in Africa. It could scarcely have been otherwise. This distinction notwithstanding, the demands of the international community, particularly as formulated by the senior bodies of the United Nations, have tended to be no

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different than those previously raised with relation to the African countries farther north: *i.e.* immediate decolonization, in the case of the Portuguese territories, and the establishment everywhere of régimes drawn, whether by democratic means or otherwise, from the black African majorities.

Elsewhere in Africa these demands have been generally accepted. In southern Africa, aside from the three former High Commission territories, the controlling powers have resolutely refused to accept them, alleging them to be demagogically inspired, historically unjust, economically unrealistic and detrimental even to the interests of the black African populations involved. The resulting political conflict, massive and tragic, has now weighed heavily, over a period of several years, on the stability of international life: preëmpting large sections of U.N. debate, complicating relations among outside powers, interfering with normal cultural and commercial as well as political contacts throughout the region, reducing greatly the contribution this region, itself the seat of most of the industrial strength of Africa, could make to the life of the remainder of the continent and indeed to world affairs generally.

## II

It may be best, in tackling the bundle of problems that southern Africa presents, to go first to the one that is the most difficult and recalcitrant of all as well as being the one that involves the largest number of people, namely, South Africa itself.

It should perhaps be made clear at the outset that the present examination does not rest on any disposition to minimize the evils of South African apartheid. These are real, ubiquitous, shocking and depressing. It is idle to argue whether the fault proceeds from the nature of the theories these policies are designed to serve or from the manner in which the theories are put into execution. No merits of theory could justify, and no deficiencies of execution excuse, the inequities and inhumanities which the present system obviously produces. This is a painful indictment to make for one who has many South African friends whose goodwill he credits and whose feelings he respects. Candor, unfortunately, permits no other judgment.

One can accept, and even sympathize with, the theory that in a country which is a veritable jumble of cultures and races each of the cultural or racial groups should enjoy the privilege of

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retaining its traditional identity and developing its life in its own way. But none of this would seem to necessitate or to justify either the general condition of denial to the majority of the population of any effective voice in the shaping of the larger aspects of its own condition or a whole series of specific anomalies, injustices and hardships which the laws and practices of the South African régime now impose. Among these latter might be mentioned: the viciousness of the pass laws and their enforcement; the absurdities and extremisms of petty apartheid; the multitudinous hardships inflicted on the urban Bantu by the régime's insistence on clinging to the absurd theory of the temporary nature of their residence in the urban areas; the power and disposition of the police to ignore, almost at will, the protection afforded to the individual by an otherwise excellent judicial system; the magnitude of the disparities in wages and in public expenditure on education as between Whites and non-Whites; and the hardships worked by the recent inclusion under the strictures of apartheid of the Asians and the Cape Coloureds—the latter, in particular, a people, largely Afrikaans-speaking, who have no culture, no tongue and no remembered past other than those of the Whites who inflict these strictures upon them. (This listing is only illustrative, not inclusive.)

There are, on the other hand, a number of circumstances relative to this indictment, often ignored in Western opinion, which, while they do not excuse the conditions in question, go far to explain them and to make clear why suitable alternatives are not always easy to discover.

It should be recognized, first of all, that the South African Whites, and the Afrikaners in particular, are confronted with a very real problem when it comes to maintaining, in the face of a large black African majority, their own historical and cultural identity. It is a remarkable identity, forged and affirmed over the course of centuries, at times in struggle and adversity, and against a background of circumstances in some respects different from that which any other people has ever had to face. It is an identity in which, as in the case of the Israeli, national components are mixed, for better or for worse, with religious ones; and the Afrikaners are no more inclined to jeopardize it, by placing themselves entirely in the power of a surrounding foreign majority, than are their Middle Eastern counterparts. They would die rather than do so; and it is simply useless to come at

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them with demands which suggest that it is this that is expected of them.

Secondly, slight as may seem the prospects for any early change in the political situation of the non-Whites in South Africa, it cannot be said that their situation in other respects is unchanging or that its development does not have hopeful aspects. The Nationalists, when reproached over the evils of apartheid, often say in reply: "Give us time. The native will have, ultimately, no complaint. But we will do things in our own time and our own way." Whether the Nationalist concept of the end to be ultimately achieved is the same as that of the many foreign critics may be doubted; but the point made here is not entirely without substance. Real incomes among the urban Bantu, even allowing for inflationary tendencies, are increasing by about four percent per annum. Bantu are being brought into the labor market at a rate of about 2½ percent per annum. Educational opportunities, already in some respects far ahead of those existing in the black-ruled countries to the north, are showing steady improvement, particularly at the primary and trade school levels. The wage disparities, as between Whites and Blacks, are of course excessive and onerous and deserve prompt correction. But one must not forget that there are severe limits to the pace at which this correction could safely be effected. A sudden and complete removal of these disparities would unquestionably undermine the competitive viability of great sections of the South African mining and industrial establishment, which now give employment to hundreds of thousands of black Africans, and would in many instances force the closing of the enterprises, with consequences disastrous to black African living standards.

In judging South African conditions much depends, invariably, on the perspective of the viewer. It will thus be pointed out, in rebuttal of what has just been said, that if living standards among the Blacks are improving, those of the Whites are improving even faster; and a similar point will be made with respect to educational advancement. All this is true. But it would be wrong to ignore the extent to which the rapid economic development of the country is beginning to exert upon the white leadership an effective discipline in the direction of re-thinking some of the extremisms of apartheid. The severe shortage of white labor is compelling, in ever-increasing degree, the admission of Blacks into positions within the industrial structure

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which, under a strict interpretation of the apartheid concepts and regulations, they would not have been expected or permitted to occupy. The realization is steadily spreading, furthermore, among white business men and political leaders, that a great modern economy such as that of South Africa cannot continue to thrive or even to achieve a proper balance unless and until the majority of the population comes to command a strong purchasing power and to give proper dimensions to the consumers' market. In general, it may be said that there is a basic conflict between the concepts of separate development that now constitute the official ideology of the régime, on the one hand, and the needs of a successful and rapidly expanding industrial economy, on the other; and if the stormy pace of economic growth is continued, this conflict is bound to produce changes, and favorable ones, in the position of the non-white portions of the population.

Thirdly, it should be recognized that any sound and fair criticism of racial conditions in South Africa must bear in mind the position and interests not just of Whites and black Africans but also of the other racial groups, notably the Indians and the Cape Coloureds. It is by no means certain that their interests would be served by the sweeping, simplistic solutions to which the more emotional of the foreign critics are prone.

Finally, the foreign observer has to bear in mind that while a relaxation or removal of the present racial régime would presumably solve some of the problems of the native black South African, it would solve by no means all of them. Those that would remain would be problems of great seriousness, and ones that could not conceivably be solved except in intimate collaboration with the white community. There could be many illustrations of this; but a particularly vivid one might be found in the problem of the native "homelands"—the rural areas in which, ideally under the concepts of apartheid, the native Africans are eventually to find their permanent homes and to achieve complete autonomy and, in some instances, even independence.

It is true that these areas (and notably the greatest and most important of them—the Transkei), over-grazed, poor in resources, poor in capital, and overpopulated as they now are, would be quite incapable, in any foreseeable circumstances, of harboring successfully anything like the totality of the tribal groups theoretically assigned to them, many of whose members now reside in the large urban and industrial centers of the

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"white" area. To this extent the theory of apartheid is unrealistic as well as unjust. But it would be wrong to assume that the abolition of apartheid would produce anything resembling a solution of this problem.

The basic problem here is, as in other African countries that have no racial difficulty at all, sheer overpopulation. Present estimates are that instead of the expected 19,000,000 black Africans by the year 2,000, the figure on which governmental policies with respect to the homelands have heretofore been based, the actual figure will be closer to 35 to 40 million. The most optimistic estimates of the economic development of the homelands afford no reason to hope that these regions will be able to cope even with the existing black population, let alone anything resembling this increase. The existing program for construction of "border industries" just outside the homelands, to which the inhabitants of the latter could commute on a daily basis, will solve only a small part of the problem. The only other visible alternative is the continued residence of great masses of these people in the major urban areas, where the birth rate among them is only about one-half what it is in the rural areas, and where, theoretically at least, one might hope for a relative stabilization of their numbers.

But there are limits, as can easily be observed even in places remote from South Africa, to the rate at which any great city can successfully absorb immigrants from a primitive rural culture. And it is hard to conceive that any political régime could achieve much more in this respect than the present South African régime is achieving. One has to remember that the municipality of Johannesburg, South Africa's greatest city, has contrived to build on its own outskirts, just in the past two decades, a complete new city of individual homes, nearly 75,000 of them, complete with amenities such as schools, sport facilities and the greatest hospital in the Southern Hemisphere, to house over a half-million black Africans, many of whom previously resided in the most wretched sort of shantytowns. The position of the inhabitants of this vast native "township" leaves much to be desired in a number of respects, particularly as regards policing and transportation; but it would be unfair to the South African authorities not to recognize the magnitude of the effort they have put forward. A glance at the comparable records of great cities elsewhere should suffice to show that it is not likely that

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this sort of progress in the absorbing of a rural native population into urban areas could be much accelerated under any other conceivable régime.

The foreign critic, therefore, in weighing South Africa's problems, has to remember that the question of racial discrimination represents by no means the totality of them, and that there are some, including a few of the most profound and bitter ones, that could not possibly be mastered without the continued enthusiastic commitment—and this means in many respects the leadership—of the white South African community on whose shoulders the responsibilities of government now rest. The two communities are mutually dependent in a way that Whites and Blacks farther north in Africa never were; and the problems of neither can be solved by the destruction or permanent frustration of the other.

III

There is a sharp division of opinion among foreign observers and among well-informed South Africans themselves as to the present underlying trends and possibilities in the political life of the Republic. Some feel that the results of the recent election, repudiating the right wing of the Nationalist party and strengthening somewhat the position of its more moderate opponents, is the beginning of a trend in the direction of greater liberality and maturity of official policy—a trend bound to become strengthened as more young people come into the picture as voters. Others, seared perhaps too often by past disappointments, are skeptical. They see the Nationalist leaders as unshakable in their political monopoly, implacable in their commitment to the most unfeeling promulgation of apartheid, deaf to both outside and inside criticism.

The author, believing that no country in South Africa's position can live for long without change, and that change, in this instance, can hardly fail to be for the better, is himself inclined to the more optimistic of these analyses. But he is free to admit that there is, as yet, no adequate proof, one way or the other. It is entirely possible that he is wrong.

However this may be, the main determinants of change will be and must be, as in any other great country, internal. Over the long run no outside force can ever make great, lasting and beneficial changes in another country's life. This does not mean, however, that foreign reaction and opinion have, in the case of South

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Africa, no influence at all. They have some. There are few South African Whites who are not aware that not all things are as they should be in South Africa and who are not in some way sensitive to outside opinion with relation to these conditions. The manner in which such people react to foreign opinion may vary greatly, however, from positive response to the most violent and determined resistance, depending upon the tenor and spirit of the criticism to which they find themselves subjected. If white South Africans are given to feel that they are viewed with implacable hatred by the outside world, and that the demands made upon them are ones that could be satisfied only by their punishment and humiliation or by some sort of mass emigration, this will only get people's backs up, produce a feeling that safety lies only in a deeper commitment to the principles of white supremacy, and cause otherwise moderate and well-disposed elements to rally in despair around the most intractable nationalist leadership. If, on the other hand, they are confronted with a foreign reaction that takes some account of the measure, the reality and the uniqueness of their problems, they may be importantly aided, as well as stimulated, to find better solutions.

Neither Blacks nor white liberals nor any other South Africans are aided, for example, by demands for Western policies designed to damage the South African economy. Aside from the fact that no outside efforts in this direction are likely to have any appreciable success, they are conceptually wrong in the first place. The black man would be the first to suffer from any serious failure in the process of economic growth. His best chances for a relaxation of apartheid lie, on the contrary, precisely in the continuation of the present rapid economic development of the country. No thoughtful and informed friend of the black African population of South Africa could logically wish for the obstruction and failure of the country's economy.

Similarly, efforts to bring about the isolation of South Africa from the remainder of the world community are simply counterproductive. The country, separated as it is by thousands of miles from the remainder of the Western world, already suffers from an excess of isolation. Apartheid is to some extent the reflection of this isolation. The reactionary and racist tendencies within South African society positively thrive on it. Nothing, on the other hand, with the exception of the economic development, places a greater strain on those tendencies than does extensive

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personal contact between South Africans and reasonable people in other countries. Apartheid is simply one manifestation of a great national introversion, and why any opponent of that system would wish to intensify the very condition it feeds upon is difficult to imagine.

Finally, the well-meaning outside critic will do well to avoid specific advice to the South Africans as to the manner in which their problems might best be solved. It is all right for him to record, and to emphasize, his disbelief that better, more humane and more hopeful approaches could not be found to South Africa's problems than those that dominate official policy today. It is all right for him to use his influence, in a friendly but earnest way, to bring the white South Africans to a reëxamination of their own situation in a spirit larger and more compassionate, less dominated by petty anxieties and more cognizant of the community of fate that links them to their non-white fellow citizens, than the present inspiration of their policies. But the outsider will do well to avoid the responsibility he would incur by recommending specific courses of action.

The real state of mind of the South African native remains, so far as many of us can see, a book with seven seals. No one knows how this native would react to specific alternatives in the future course of South African policy. The hour is late. It may be too late. A relaxation of the present iron hand might open the way to a brighter period in South African life. But it might conceivably, on the other hand, set in motion uncontrollable forces whose play could end only in violence and disaster. The writer does not believe this last to be the case. He is inclined to think that the white establishment in South Africa still has options more hopeful than that. But he cannot know for sure; and there is no reason for him to make assumptions. No changes in official South African policy will ever be successful unless they spring in the main from the workings of the country's own public opinion and political process. It is inadvisable and unproductive for outsiders to relieve the South African authorities of even the smallest degree of their own responsibility by forcing their hand and trying to tell them what to do. Let the friends of the various South African peoples hold the white rulers of that country to the recognition that to the outside world the present pattern of South African apartheid is abhorrent in aspect and unconvincing in rationale; but beyond that let it be the task of those rulers,

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who know their own situation better than any outsider can, to find the conceivable alternatives.

IV

Nowhere is the conflict between the United Nations and the present ruling power in southern Africa so formal, so acute and so complete as in the case of South West Africa. Not just the General Assembly but in this case the Security Council as well has flatly demanded that South Africa withdraw immediately its administration of the territory and hand it over to the authority of the United Nations, and has threatened South Africa with "effective measures in accordance with the appropriate provisions . . . of the United Nations Charter" in the event of noncompliance. The South African rejection of these demands has been no less determined and categoric. The impasse is now complete. It is all the more dangerous because positions have been so formalized on both sides.

Bearing in mind that in international affairs all legal distinctions rest on infirm foundations, one can follow the legal arguments advanced by the United Nations in favor of the termination of the mandate and the establishment of its own authority in South West Africa. It is more difficult to see what the world organization would do with the territory if it had it. This vast arid region, as large as France and the German Federal Republic combined, is inhabited by only 610,000 people. Of these, approximately 96,000 are white South Africans—Afrikaners for the most part—of whom nearly 90 percent live in the administrative center of Windhoek, in the west-central part of the territory. The remaining population is made up of indigenous peoples comprising about half-a-dozen distinct ethnic groups. Of these, nearly 65 percent reside in the northern region of the territory, near the Portuguese border, some 500 miles north of Windhoek, where they are very little troubled by the proximity or competition of Whites. The majority of these northern natives (the majority, in fact, of the entire indigenous population of South West Africa), in the number of some 300,000, to be exact, are known as the Ovambos. They live in a native homeland—Ovamboland by name—which now enjoys fairly extensive rights of local autonomy. This is perhaps the only native "homeland" under South African control which would seem to have reasonably favorable prospects for progress under the existing concepts

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of "separate development." Much better watered than most of the rest of the territory, it is relatively ample in area and provides a home for at least 95 percent of the Ovambos. The South African official presence is neither numerous nor burdensome. (Of the territory's 102 policemen, for example, only 50—or about one to each 6,000 inhabitants—are white.) No Whites other than officials are permitted to reside or even normally to travel in the territory. Educational standards at the primary and secondary level compare with the best in Africa. Health and medical services are exemplary. Taxation of the natives, except locally and by their own administration, is negligible.

The overwhelming portion of the expense of maintaining and developing the territory is supplied by the South Africans. Their present contributions of $4,350,000 annually for budgetary expenditures and $12,420,000 in developmental capital run, together, to about $55.00 per capita, as compared with $6.10 in aid from all sources as the average for the black African countries farther north. This is in addition to a bevy of other services —water development, soil research, pest control, public health, meteorological service, etc.—which are extended automatically by virtual inclusion of the territory in the South African state, and could hardly be effectively provided by any other than a highly advanced, and preferably contiguous, country.

Things are not ideal for the Ovambos, and particularly not for those who aspire to higher education or who would like to play a role in public affairs outside their own territory. These, however, are a small minority. As for the remainder: it is difficult to believe that their material condition could be improved, or their capacities for self-government given more extensive scope for development, by any sort of U.N. administration.

This narrows the problem, essentially, to that of the remaining 200,000 non-Whites in the territory. These, for the most part, do not reside in the homelands tentatively marked out for them; most of them probably never will. They suffer indeed from all the restrictions of apartheid, although the atmosphere is perhaps somewhat less tense and cramped than in the Republic proper. If all that was involved in a South African withdrawal and a U.N. takeover was an alleviation of their situation in these respects, there might be much to be said for it, although the effect on the more fortunate Ovambos would still have to be considered. But one is obliged, regrettably, to consider not just

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the likely positive but also the predictable negative consequences of such a turn of events.

In the event of a forced South African withdrawal, the overwhelming majority of the existing white population of the territory could be expected to withdraw together with the South African authorities. All existing administrative and social services would simply cease to exist. The railways are South African. Their rolling-stock, in its entirety the property of the South African State Railways, would assuredly be removed. Without the railways, the great non-ferrous and diamond mines, employment in which provides a large part of the income of the native population, would close down. In the case of the non-ferrous ones, their pumps would at once cease to function; it would be months before they could be reopened. Agriculture, too, would be largely paralyzed. The territory's only significant port, Walfish Bay, the status of which as a complete South African coastal enclave has never been questioned, would remain under South African administration.

Worst of all, while it is possible to imagine certain of the remaining tribal elements, notably the Ovambos, administering themselves (albeit largely without money), it is not possible to imagine any of these elements collaborating in the administration of any of the others. These tribal entities live, in many instances, hundreds of miles apart; there is no intimacy and little affection among them; none, one suspects, would respond favorably to the appearance in its midst, as would-be administrators, of officials of another tribal affiliation. The United Nations would, in other words, have to create a new administration, largely foreign, to take the place of the South African one. It is easy to believe that such an administration would follow more liberal policies with respect to the status of the native than does the existing one. It is not easy to believe that it would be as efficient, or as well provided with funds; and it would almost certainly be years before it could expect to restore to this vast territory even a semblance of such good order and prosperity as it has now achieved.

One can understand the desire in U.N. circles to remove from South African control at least this one area which was once, and can still be construed to be, an international responsibility. But one wonders whether the practical consequences of such a step have been really thought through. Very few foreigners have

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visited South West Africa in recent years. Senior American officials do not, as a matter of policy, go there. An exchange in 1968 between the South African government and the U.N. Secretary-General about the possibility of the latter's sending a U.N. representative to the territory ended in misunderstanding, confusion and recrimination.

Would it not be better, one must ask, instead of continuing to press the South Africans to take a step which they will not take and cannot be compelled to take, and which, if taken, would only be likely to have unfortunate consequences for the people of the territory anyway—would it not be better for the United Nations to inform itself at first hand on conditions there and then to enter into normal contact with the South African authorities with a view to seeing whether some accommodation could not be found which would relieve the situation of that minority of black African inhabitants of the territory who live outside the homelands, and would at the same time relieve the South Africans of the continued burden of a grievous and dangerous conflict with most of the rest of the international community? This might bring at least limited benefits to the non-white portion of the South West African population; a continuation of the present threats and pressures will bring none at all. That support of the members of the Afro-Asian bloc, not to mention the communists, would not be easily had for such an approach is obvious; but this is no reason why, if it really represents the most hopeful line of possible solution, the Western powers should not support it.

## V

The situation in the great Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique differs fundamentally from that prevailing in South and South West Africa in that the central issue here is not that of race. Members of the insurgent movements now operating against the Portuguese administrations like to insinuate that Portuguese rule is really a concealed form of white supremacy; and such allegations find ready credence in Western-liberal, not to mention Afro-Asian, circles. Neither the personal observations of a detached visitor nor the literature of unbiased scholars who have addressed themselves to Portuguese African affairs afford much confirmation for such allegations. There have no doubt been periods of racial prejudice in the past; and

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there are no doubt individual manifestations of it here and there today; there always are some such manifestations when great numbers of people of different racial origin reside side by side. But there is no legal discrimination in residence, education or employment; and there is ample evidence that the absence of such discrimination is not just a formality. The tenor of everyday life in these Portuguese territories reflects less racial tension than can at times be observed in certain of the independent black African countries. It is useful to reflect that if one were able to have today in South Africa not only the legal basis but the living reality of what now exists in the Portuguese territories in the sense of interracial relationships, even the most sanguine liberal would surely feel that at least 95 percent of the problem of South African apartheid had been solved.

To say that the racial factor is not the issue is not to say that there are not other disparities and deficiencies in the Portuguese administration which have not been, and could not be today, the objects of more serious and legitimate challenge. It is also not to say that the material and social situation of the African portion of the population is equal, or anywhere near equal, to that of the European and the mixed elements. The differences that exist in this respect are primarily the reflection of educational and economic, not racial, disparities. The average black African Angolan or Mozambiquan, starting as he does from a lower economic and social level, tends to get off the educational ladder —with a view to beginning to earn his living—at a lower point than does the average youngster of European-Portuguese origin; and this finds its reflection in position and income. But this is a problem not peculiar to Angola and Mozambique.

This disparity in living standards and social position is the real focal point of much of the criticism of the Portuguese administrations. The demand is, in reality, for a greater degree of social egalitarianism—for a curtailment of the privileges and prerogatives of the rich, most of whom happen to be European-Portuguese, and for a more rapid elevation of the poor, most of whom are still black.

But this situation is now in a state of rapid evolution and change. This is not generally realized abroad. Members of the Portuguese administration in these territories make no bones of the fact that the armed challenge with which they have been confronted in recent years has stirred them, and, more im-

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portantly, has stirred the Lisbon authorities, to reforms and improvements that might otherwise have taken decades to complete. Nowhere have the changes been greater than in the educational field. The number of persons embraced in the primary school system in Angola has increased by some 500 percent in the last 15 years, and in the secondary school system by as much as 850 percent. In 1963, a university was established in Angola, where none existed before. The proportion of black Africans among the university students in Angola was, by 1970, up to 30 percent and growing. In a country where education, rather than race, is truly the key to position and prosperity, this represents no insignificant change.

It is difficult, furthermore, to believe that a triumph of the present insurgent pressures would produce any more rapid progress in educational opportunities and living standards for the African. In both of these respects the Portuguese territories are already well ahead of most of the black-ruled countries of Africa. The existence of privileged élites, after all, is not a peculiarity just of the white-ruled countries of Africa.

The reproach most commonly leveled against the Portuguese administrations of Angola and Mozambique is that they represent a colonial relationship. For those—and their number is not few—to whom the term "colonialism" is a negative semantic absolute, there can be no defense against this charge. The same will be true of those whose criteria are more than just semantic but who view as uniquely iniquitous any relationship of dependence that operates across a body of water or any in which a West European country, or the United States, figures as the metropolitan power. But these are subjective distinctions. They have no sanction, as yet, in any formal international determinations. In the absence of such determinations, the well-meaning foreign observer has no choice but to focus his judgment not on semantic distinctions but on the real interests of the peoples most immediately involved.

To what extent there is genuine popular discontent with Portuguese rule, as distinct from the restlessness of individual intellectuals ambitious to replace the Portuguese in the seats of power, is hard to judge. Even a plebiscite would not throw much light on this question. Self-determination, as the present Portuguese premier has pointed out, is not a matter of thrusting square pieces of paper into the hands of the man in the bush.

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Prior to the insurgent attack in 1961 (in which, incidentally, far more black Africans than Portuguese were killed), the vast territory of Angola, larger than Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico combined, was garrisoned by no more than two regimental combat units of 1,000 men each. This does not suggest great discontent with Portuguese rule. Militant insurgency, provoking as it always does punitive measures, making its own martyrs and causing people to hedge their statements as well as their bets, has a tendency of course to evoke discontent, or at least the semblance of it, even where there was none before. But this is something else again.

However that may be, it is hard to picture a happier future for the people of these territories being brought about by the further successful pursuit of those military pressures that have been brought to bear against the Portuguese since 1961. One has only to consider the likely consequences. The white population, in Angola in particular, is the greatest, proportionately, of any country in Africa after South Africa. Its numbers are heightened, in effect, by the fact that tens of thousands of people of mixed blood consider themselves, and are accepted as, Portuguese. This strong and vigorous element would not bow out of the picture. In addition to that, the insurgent forces operating against the régime in Angola are split into three competing factions, the differences running in some instances along tribal lines.

Finally, one must reckon with the South Africans. They have a keen interest in what takes place in the southern part of Angola where some of the border tribes are related to their neighbors, the Ovambos, not to mention in the southern part of Mozambique, which is important to South Africa from a number of standpoints. In the event of a disruption of the authority of the present Portuguese administrations, all of these various elements could be expected to compete for the heritage. The likelihood would be for a partition of both territories, certain portions falling to the South Africans, and the strong European factions, whose roots of residence and experience go back for hundreds of years, digging in for one form or another of a "Rhodesian" solution. It is possible to imagine that one or another of the insurgent leaders might find a partial satisfaction of his ambitions in such a state of affairs, though even this is not certain. It is harder to see how the mass of the African population would be benefited.

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As things now stand, these two Portuguese territories serve—with their relatively tolerant racial policies—to break the bipolarity between the north and south of the African continent. In the event of a removal of Portuguese authority and the triumph, even on limited portions of their territory, of the existing guerrilla-insurgent elements, the territories would cease to play this role. Quite the contrary. Bitterness, fear, and violence of feeling would be heightened on both sides. The area of South African control—the area of *real* racism, that is—would almost certainly be geographically increased. Not only that but the fires of racial discrimination in South Africa itself would be importantly fed. The reactionaries there would say: "You see what comes of the attempt to pursue moderate racial policies. The Portuguese pursued such policies. Did that save them? Is it not evident from their experience that the real motive behind the guerrilla pressures in southern Africa generally is not race at all—that this is merely the pretext? What reason is there to suppose that more moderate and tolerant racial policies on our part would have any effect in preserving us from the same sort of attack?" It is in this spirit, and under the influence of such arguments, that the South Africans would move to secure, if forced to, such areas in the countries north and east of them as they consider essential to the security of their own territory.

Whether the Portuguese will be able to hold out indefinitely against the military attacks now being pressed against them is, again, simply impossible to predict. For the moment, the situation has all the earmarks of a standoff. The Portuguese military would appear to have the capability of holding on indefinitely in the central districts of the country. The insurgents, on the other hand, would seem to have, presupposing a continuation of the present level of external support, an equally indefinite capability of continuing to infiltrate and to make trouble. The conflict, meanwhile, is consuming nearly half of both metropolitan and provincial budgets. It is devouring resources at least a good portion of which might be expected to be otherwise available for economic development. Never, surely, was there less reason for continuing a conflict, and more reason for attempting to compose it by negotiation and compromise. And never, surely, was there a conflict which it was less in the interests of the major Western powers, in particular, to exacerbate and to press to a violent conclusion.

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The Portuguese position in Africa rests, in contrast to the recent colonial positions of the other European powers, on several centuries of involvement and experience. In the depth of its roots as well as in the nature of relationships between European and African to which it has led it is unique. To try to liquidate it in exactly the same way, and under exactly the same assumptions, as in the case of other colonial relationships in that continent, is neither logical nor politically promising. Here, if anywhere, new ideas and new approaches are in order.

VI

Space does not permit a similar review of the situation in Rhodesia; nor do the Western powers have, in this instance, the same latitude of choice that they have with relation to the countries already discussed. It will suffice to note that here, too, a successful prosecution of the insurgent military pressures—of the attempt, that is, to solve the problem by external violence—would almost certainly lead to a greater involvement of the South Africans and to an expansion, rather than retraction, of the effective area of South African apartheid.

But there is another reason, too, why one's heart sinks at the prospect of a continuation of the attempt to solve the problems of this part of the world by violence. This is the situation of the three former High Commission territories of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. These new countries are in many respects the most hopeful places in southern Africa. Here, too, as in the Portuguese territories (but without the attendant issues of colonialism), efforts are being made to solve problems on a basis of racial amity and willing collaboration. Again, like the Portuguese territories, these countries stand as useful buffers between the black African countries of the north and the countries of white supremacy in the south.

Not only this, but they stand as symbolic tests of the principle that there can be ways of doing things in that part of the world which do not involve racial discrimination yet present no danger to any racial element or to any neighboring state. That they have found it possible in recent years to pursue an independent existence on the basis of this principle in intimate proximity to —in one instance even totally surrounded by—South Africa is one of the really encouraging features of the whole South African situation. It is of greatest importance that they not fail

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in their undertaking. Their example is of importance, in particular, for those of the South African homelands that are moving, at least in theory, toward independence. In many respects the physical and social problems of these two categories of regions are similar. The example of the successful cultivation of an independent national life, in these three countries, in a manner that poses no danger to South African interests, can have a significant effect on future South African attitudes and policies both in the homelands and elsewhere.

Yet there can be no doubt that the relentless pursuit of efforts to overthrow by military means all the so-called "white-ruled régimes" of the remainder of southern Africa will grievously complicate the relations of these countries to their neighbors and will jeopardize in many ways the achievements they already have to their credit. In a situation of gradual change, they have good prospects for establishing themselves and developing their independence. In a situation of extreme military tension and political polarization these prospects will inevitably suffer.

VII

The United States government and to some extent the other Western governments have wisely recognized the danger and sterility of the movements that purport to solve the problems of South Africa by military violence. Yet the political positions these governments have taken are in a number of instances ones that could conceivably be satisfied only by the very violence they profess to oppose. These positions have been conceived, no doubt, primarily as gestures of goodwill and solidarity addressed to the peoples and régimes of the remainder of the African continent. But if this was the point, it may be considered now as having been amply made; and there is nothing to suggest that the further belaboring of it is going to produce much more in the way of appreciation and confidence than has been forthcoming to date. The time has surely come for a reëxamination of Western policy toward this region from the primary standpoint of the interests of the peoples most immediately concerned, with a view to finding approaches which, while not endorsing or encouraging any form of racial discrimination or oppression, would hold out for those peoples prospects more favorable than those implicit in the present precarious deadlock.

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# SCIENCE AND POLICY FOR A NEW DECADE

*By Caryl P. Haskins*

IN a recent and prescient biography and analysis of Thomas Jefferson, its author emphasizes in his preface "Jefferson's *thrust beyond nationality to the cosmopolitan fraternity of science and philosophy,* his commitment to the civilizing arts, to education, to progress, to rationality in all things . . . ."[1] Direct quotations from Jefferson underline the same theme: "The societies of scientists . . . form a great fraternity spreading over the whole earth;" or, again, "The field of knowledge is the common property of all mankind, and any discoveries we can make in it will be for the benefit . . . of every other nation, as well as our own."

With all his gift of prophecy, Jefferson surely never imagined how contemporary those statements would appear nearly two centuries later. He might well have visualized that the spread of science and technology to virtually every nation of the globe would come to constitute a very special element in the basic movements of world civilization. But even a Jefferson could hardly have imagined the range and the power and the intricacy of consequence of the forces set in motion by that movement for our time: forces whose effects we are only beginning to truly appreciate—let alone understand. They will surely constitute major elements in shaping the world order, and our own, for the remainder of this century and probably beyond.

Those forces are operating at present with an unprecedented dynamism. Subtle as their individual impacts often are and sometimes difficult to recognize until unanticipated and irreversible changes have been wrought, their cumulative impact is already posing new and radical challenges to the world order. The evidence for this, for potential good and also for possible ill, is accumulating along many fronts. The explosive spread of modern technologies to many developing countries, for example, can prove—and sometimes is proving—a two-edged sword in their political growth and modernization. Too often, the technologies which are proffered, and which tend to be accepted,

[1] Merrill D. Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation." New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Italics inserted by the present author.

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can be grossly and expensively maladapted to the cultures to which they are transplanted.

There also is a deeper hazard. When too rapid, over-enthusiastic and under-critical adoption of technologies from the developed world is combined with a much slower pace in the growth of a truly rooted indigenous science and an accompanying understanding of it in the developing nations, there is real danger that an imbalance can develop that in the long run may seriously threaten the cultural, and even the political, integrity of recipient countries. A number of gifted and perceptive leaders in the newer nations have recently been emphasizing that it is not the burden of such ill-adapted technologies that actually concerns them most—not primarily the economic drain involved, or even the greater drain of a long commitment of their already scarce supplies of talented men and women to ends that may not prove ultimately viable—but rather the much more fundamental issue of the effects of such developments on the motivations, the world-view, the hopes and fears, the sense of identity and integrity of their peoples as a whole.

They have emphasized that advanced technologies must be truly understood and mastered by those who adopt them if indigenous cultures are to be protected. Further, a number of them believe that an indigenously developed science (unlike advanced technology rapidly adopted for purely pragmatic reasons in a cultural vacuum) is, or can become, a vital element in a developing society, not only for its practical contributions in enabling a new nation to monitor its course in an increasingly technological world, but in allowing it to draw on that technology with a strengthened cultural integrity. Several have perceived a subtle but vital circumstance not obvious to many in developed nations: that, at a profound level, science can be both the expression and the molder of a society and its culture; that, for all the universality of subject-matter and concern that marks science the world over and makes it a global language, the way that it is rooted in a particular culture and is understood and accepted and so supported by its peoples may be very different indeed in differing nations of the world.

These are vital questions for the developing nations, perceived by some, still unrecognized by many. And perception itself is but a short first step. For history makes it abundantly clear that if the climate of a society is not ready for science—

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if there is not the basis for its general acceptance and for at least a rudimentary understanding of its intellectual and its spiritual, as well as its practical values—it cannot flourish, and may, indeed, sink so far out of balance with the forces of a pragmatic and overwhelming technology that it, and a good modicum of overall cultural integrity as well, can be seriously jeopardized. How such a climate is to be developed is a burning question for the populations of much of the globe today. For our own humility in regarding this problem, it is worth recalling that it took Western Europe from before the time of Francis Bacon to the end of the Renaissance to achieve such a broadly based intellectual climate, despite the fact that both the philosophy and the practice of scientific research were well known long before, and despite the fact that in that world the dimension of time was not crucially important. For the developing countries, the time dimension in an already scientifically sophisticated outer world is precariously narrow, and the challenge even more formidable.

Quite a different set of questions and challenges is posed, on another and perhaps yet more urgent level, by the rapidly changing and evolving panorama of scientific and technological relations among the developed nations of the world. It is reasonable to expect that before the end of the new decade this evolution will have considerably affected the relationships of states throughout a large part of the Western world, as well as the world environment in which our own nation must operate, in significant ways not easy to project precisely today. Before the end of the century it may well have wrought major shifts in power patterns, markedly changing their configurations and even altering present concepts of the nature and the political significance of some nation-states.

Fundamentally convergent pressures immanent in the nature and structure of science and technology have, of course, for a very long time been channeling ever closer collaboration in these fields among developed nations—a trend that Jefferson himself recognized so clearly. In our day, those elementary pressures have been enormously accentuated by others of a more practical kind. Along many frontiers of science basic discoveries can still be wrested from nature with the aid of physical tools that even in their most sophisticated forms are not prohibitively expensive to design or develop and so may still lie within the productive capabilities of even relatively small nations. But the

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situation in some other vital scientific areas can be quite different. Highly sophisticated probing of the nature of matter, for instance, and ever deeper exploration of the cosmos, already depend upon instruments of a massiveness and costliness, and moreover requiring an order of advanced skill in design and construction, which today exceed the practical capacities of any but the superpowers and in the future may approach the limits even of their resources. It is quite likely that in a number of scientific fields intimate international collaboration among advanced nations in the building and use of such major instruments will have become a common practical necessity, as well as culturally desirable, long before the decade ends.

Again, the coming decade is sure to witness the continuing and dramatic evolution of another powerful force for international scientific and technical collaboration, one that could ultimately bring about an actual melding of scientific and technical resources among a number of developed nations: the further growth and proliferation of the great multinational corporations. Taking their modern form immediately after World War II, these now include an economy based on science and technology quite transcending the conventional political boundaries of nation-states. Indeed, it may already collectively rank third largest on the globe, yielding only to the economies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Future potentialities are obviously immense. Their development—perhaps the most striking event in the whole history of scientific and technological collaboration and consolidation among nations—introduces a factor wholly new in scale and in considerable measure new in kind. Amplifying its significance may be new departures in the European community over the next decade, currently brought to focus by the negotiations at Luxembourg last June looking to the ultimate entry of Britain, with Denmark, Norway and Ireland. If that evolution continues, the end of the decade could witness the formation of a 10-nation economic, scientific and technological community including some 250 million people, with an estimated annual productive capability of $550 billion—larger than the entire economy of the Soviet Union, second only to that of the United States.

Taken collectively, developments such as these promise perhaps the most rapid and radical changes of the world environment, for developed and developing nations alike, since World

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War II and its immediate aftermath. It is difficult to visualize even a fragment of their probable impact, since critical factors are both uncertain and inchoate. So far (as will be suggested in following sections) they have most visibly affected developed countries. But precisely because of this it may be the developing countries that will be most sensitive to these forces, and, in a social sense, ultimately most profoundly touched by them and most vulnerable to them. As Victor Basiuk[2] has recently pointed out, three regions of the world stand today somewhat apart from the drive toward global technological integration—the areas of underdevelopment, those that are still only lightly inhabited, such as the Amazon and the Arctic, and the ocean floors. And it is worth noting that already the Amazon is under renewed pressure for development, and that technology is beginning to be applied to the oceanic environment in new ways. The pressures on the less developed countries toward technological absorption will surely be greatly intensified over the next years.

Such trends can bring immensely increased efficiencies and will greatly accelerate progress on both economic and technological fronts. But from both social and political standpoints there are caveats. To the degree that we value plurality in the evolution of world civilization and are convinced that multipolar social and political growth, with all its richness, constitutes an invaluable resource for the future in a globally cosmopolitan society where such values will inevitably be hard-pressed, we may feel that one major task of the next decade will be to try to ensure that less developed societies are not overwhelmed by external pressures toward technological standardization. One of the most effective kinds of intangible foreign aid that the developed nations—particularly the United States—could render to such nations would be to assist them in maintaining a reasonable autonomy in scientific-technological growth and a balance between a structure of indigenous science and of transplanted technology. This balance, while encouraging the adoption of new practical approaches, should also protect the most important value of all for their future independence—the continuing integrity of their own intellectual growth. That is a very subtle kind of foreign assistance indeed, and it is not easy to visualize how it would come about.

One channel, however, is evident, and its mutual value may

[2] Victor Basiuk, "The Impact of Technology in the Next Decades," *Orbis*, Spring 1970.

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make it of particular interest. A number of the great movements in this area were pioneered by the knowledge, organizing ability and energy of the United States. We have exercised a predominant influence in creating a world technological climate that, over the next decades, will clearly pose more intensive competitive challenges to our own scientific-technological structure than we have ever known. From a purely practical standpoint, it will be necessary for us to sustain a vigorous national effort in science as well as in technology, to achieve modes of support for both of the most effective possible kinds, and to weigh and balance these efforts among the countless others that demand scarce men and women as well as scarce dollars in a scientific-technological economy. We do not always stop to reflect that we ourselves are rapidly becoming one of the "have-not" nations of the globe in many essential raw materials. This is a limitation new in our experience, and it faces us with special imperatives in the arena of science and technology: imperatives not unlike those of some of the newer, as well as several much older, states. It faces us with the prospect of a severe practical handicap which we will have to take into account in our strategies for the future.[3] This is the aspect of national self-interest.

In a wider frame, it is worth emphasis that one thing the leaders in the developing nations will surely do, as they struggle with their problems of growth, is to observe keenly the patterns of support and the "shape" of the growth of science and technology in the developed countries, noting especially how, and how well, balance is achieved and maintained: the balance between science and technology and the multifarious other commitments of the nation as a whole, and, most pertinently, the balance between technology and its own supporting scientific structure. Since the United States is both the historic and the contemporary leader in these areas (though our leadership will surely be heavily challenged in years to come by the Soviet Union and by a united Western Europe), it must inevitably serve as an important model during the next decade. That is one reason that we analyze our own stewardship, our own balance,

[3] In recent testimony before a Republican Task Force of the House, Dr. Raymond Ewell stated that, of 32 major raw materials for industry, the United States is already no longer self-sufficient in 25. The Soviet Union lacks self-sufficiency in only five of these. And Dr. Philip H. Abelson has pointed out that more than 90 percent of the needs for residual fuel oil in the northeastern United States is derived from foreign sources. The cost of residual fuel oil in New York, at this writing, has increased by more than half. (*Science,* September 25, 1970, p. 1267.)

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and our own prospects in these fields carefully and thoroughly. Another reason is our own competitive survival. But perhaps the most important reason of all has recently been stated by James Reston: "When our technology places upon us the highest responsibility in the world we must work toward a climate where the nobler instincts can flourish once again."[4]

II

Underlying all considerations of the growth and support of science and technology in the developing countries of the world is the perception of a fundamental distinction: the contrast, extending from the obvious to the subtle, between the nature, processes and social implications of science on the one hand, and of technology on the other. In modern developed societies, the two categories are frequently joined by functional connections so intimate and pervading that often they appear to constitute a seamless web. It is in fact a web of vitality and durability, reinforced by the interplay of innovation and development. Since it confers upon advanced industrial societies so much of their inventive resource and their material power the maintenance of its integrity and the appropriate proportioning of its warp and woof must be continuing and vital concerns.

Actually this intimate weaving of science and technology is historically both a rather recent and a distinctly localized development. It is important to bear this in mind in considering the evolution of both science and technology in the new nations. Modern archeological research leaves little room for doubt that the basic technological revolutions of mankind antedated the scientific revolution by many thousands of years. They had surely undergirded most of the ancient civilizations many centuries before the scientific revolution took place quite independently in a tiny and apparently unpromising corner of the Western world. It may have been during these early centuries, indeed, that indigenous Asian technology reached its height. The Chinese invention of paper seems to have been made as early as the first century A.D. The magnetic compass appears to have been invented by the third, and movable type by the eighth; by the fifteenth century districts and counties were equipped with moderately accurate rain gauges. The early invention of explo-

[4] James Reston, "Is Nuremberg Coming Back to Haunt Us?" *Saturday Review,* July 18, 1970.

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sives, the perfection of an accurate escapement for clock mechanisms, the engineering of bridges, the design of effective stern rudders for ships—all bear witness to the technological prowess and the high technological art of a great ancient people, achieved when the West was still essentially barbaric.

In that China there were skilled craftsmen in abundance; there was a wealthy and cultured segment of society with ample leisure for experiment and inquiry; through much of the period there was a good accumulation of capital; through much of the period there was a peaceful and orderly society, skillfully maintained. Superficially, it would seem that every condition prevailed for the fostering of a true scientific revolution.

Why did a truly indigenous Asian scientific revolution never come about? What was the critical missing ingredient? We can never certainly know. But it is worth observing that, throughout the whole history of their development, ancient and medieval Chinese science and technology apparently remained essentially pragmatic and utilitarian in their orientation. In sharp contrast, the experience of scientific advance in the West over the past three centuries has underscored again and again a cardinal point. Although a technology of distinction can evolve and can even reach notable heights in a society of wholly pragmatic outlook, a creative science cannot arise, or, if adopted from without, cannot long prosper in such an environment. Only in a cultural climate where the fundamental drives of curiosity and of the love of discovery for its own sake are understood and cultivated can a true science flourish. Paradoxically, it is only when such a science becomes deeply rooted as an element of high culture that a progressively innovative technology can be maintained over long periods, fusing eventually into the close partnership with which we are familiar today. And even when attained, that partnership can never be taken for granted. The maintenance of its health and vigor requires constant attention.

The cultivation of a vigorous indigenous science; the clear recognition of the paradox that, on the one hand, the basic motivations of science and the requirements for its healthy development are quite distinct from those of technology, yet that on the other a close and vital partnership must be built between the two; the formation and continuous cultivation of that partnership provide in combination a fundamental challenge to all the developing societies that are being caught up in the intense

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scientific-technological sweep of the world, and seek to survive in it. It is no less a vital contemporary challenge of our own.

Since World War II a number of the more advanced developing nations—in particular, perhaps, those with memories of earlier ties to the British Empire—have shown an intense concern with the domestic promotion of both scientific and technological revolutions. A number have organized and carried forward considerable programs of research and development, conceived in the general style of those in more advanced countries. They are commonly publicly supported, though in some countries private organization and support have been notable. In this connection it is striking to reflect, as Bernal has pointed out, that certain developing countries, once parts of the British Empire, may today commit larger sums to research and development in a matter of months than were expended for research in Great Britain during the whole of the nineteenth century.[5]

In many of the developing nations, however, grave problems could seriously endanger the health and growth of an indigenous science and might particularly threaten the achievement and maintenance of the delicate balance between science and technology so important for continuing social health. As government-supported research organizations in developing nations become more crystallized and bureaucratic with the years, and as their costs mount, cultures hungry for rapid social betterment and more conscious that it is attainable may come to judge long-range scientific efforts out of tune with their real needs. That hazard is reinforced by other circumstances common to many developing states. Among new nations that were once members of the British Commonwealth, for example, the common language of science, internally as well as externally, is, quite naturally, English. But in consequence, all too often a large segment of a public which should be supporting science is excluded from its very discourse. Moreover, among the fraction for whom language poses no barrier, an appreciation of the language of science, and even of the real nature of science itself is too often lacking.

When glittering technologies, demonstrably powerful in the Western world, suddenly become available to new nations, it is tempting for inexperienced administrators to jump to two fatal false conclusions. The first is that by embracing such technologies full-blown, all the long histories of hard-won successes in scien-

[5] J. D. Bernal, "Science in History." London: C. A. Watts and Penguin Books, 1969.

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tific investigation and technical development from which they sprang can be bypassed and impressive "instantaneous"—and incidentally prestige-laden—modernization accomplished. The second misconception is that if such technologies are introduced "at the top" of the social structure, as it were, they will then automatically filter down, modernizing the culture as they go. Only sometimes dangerously later do such leaders discover, first, that this is not the way of scientific and technological revolutions; second, that peoples ultimately resent being excluded from judgments or even information about scientific and technical developments that may change their lives and their world in major ways which they are powerless to anticipate or affect; and, third, that the uncritical large-scale adoption of technologies from the developed world *in vacuo* may be a short road to serious sacrifices of political as well as material autonomy. It is encouraging that in many developing nations knowledgeable popular leaders are becoming aware of these pitfalls.

But the sounder road of developing an indigenous science and building the technologies that can arise from it is also fraught with difficulties. It takes prescience, sustained determination, sensitive understanding and political courage to adhere to it. For many reasons, it is apt to be difficult in the developing nations to maintain the consistent view of science as a special form of art, or to sustain the vision that it is creativity, above all, that distinguishes a genuine and living science.

Now of course creativity, in science as elsewhere, is a deeply personal process. A single scientific genius may be more significant to a developing nation than a hundred compatriots of more ordinary endowment. But this truth is all too likely to be unpalatable in a society where science itself is new and unfamiliar. And there are apparently paradoxical corollaries to further complicate understanding and acceptance. Though individual creativity is so crucial, it is also true that there is some critical lower limit to the *number* of creative individuals in the scientific community of a new nation below which it is hard for the society to sustain autonomous advance. Given the statistical sparsity of unusual scientific talent in any population, it is often difficult for a smaller developing nation to accumulate that number, and, given the hazards of "brain drain," to maintain it over a sufficient period of time. Then there is a final, and curiously contradictory, hazard. In the absence of a critical "scien-

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tific volume" of this kind, a single powerful genius in a developing country, with all his constructive potential, may yet endanger a balanced development of science if his enthusiasms and commitments unwittingly impose an unwise initial bias.

It is evident, of course, that a fundamental element in this issue—as in every aspect of the cultural and economic fortunes of peoples everywhere—involves sensitively adapted systems of education, broadly designed and including as wide an age range as possible in the society. Obviously, the scope and quality of such education are crucially important. But beyond lies another factor, importantly determining yet subtle and difficult to fathom and influence. It might be called the basic philosophy motivating training: the scale of values established by the initiate and increasingly manifest among the more intellectual as education proceeds. This factor involves a major opportunity for developing countries, which many have perceived as such. But there is an accompanying hazard. In societies where the decision has been made to pursue rapid technological modernization, pragmatic skills in executing complex technical projects, not unnaturally, are held in high esteem. In several of the newer countries, major educational appropriations have typically been allocated to the "science" budgets, with such subjects as history, geography and art relegated to the background. As a secondary effect of such maldistribution the best students, intent on forging higher material standards for their countries and themselves, tend to orient almost exclusively to the "science" stream, neglecting the background subjects that would best prepare them to understand the place of science in their societies.

This is a dangerous trend. For the immediate present, of course, it looks adaptive, particularly to peoples who are importing sophisticated technologies from abroad and have an urgent need for a large, technically trained cadre. But in the absence of a well-grounded philosophy of science among influential technical as well as managerial groups, in the absence of real understanding of how the scientific and the industrial revolutions actually took place in the West, there is a serious hazard that such developing countries may find themselves within a generation equipped only with technicians—and, moreover, with technicians trained to a world already passing, technicians unable, by virtue of their preparation and philosophy, to innovate effectively in a new one.

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Can the United States play any effective role in alleviating the danger? That is an exceedingly difficult question. Probably the next decade must provide the answer. For beyond that period many trends now incipient will surely have crystallized and the difficulties in exerting any constructive effort will have become far greater. Basically, the question transcends those of science or technology or even economics, importantly as it bears upon them all. It lies at the broader and deeper level of social change.

In the face of the current extension of American commitments, we are inevitably in a period of national caution with foreign aid, and to some degree of national disillusionment. In the current year, the United States made its lowest contribution to foreign aid since 1963: at less than half of 1 percent of GNP, it was the lowest of any member nation of the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development (though still, at $4.6 billion, more than twice as much in absolute terms as that of any other member). Undeniably, much of that aid has been highly significant in world terms, though it is of course hard to document what would have happened in its absence. And it is not only in the field of monetary assistance that effective action has been taken. Though often scattered and uncoördinated, devoted efforts have been made repeatedly to devise technologies suitable to the skills and the economies of the least developed of the developing states. From many sources have come designs for such primitive but well-adapted items of equipment as a simple two-man press for the manufacture of building blocks from mud and lime; a device to produce methane for fuel and as an illuminating gas from waste materials; rugged and simple hand pumps for both shallow and deep field wells; inexpensive and improved hospital equipment especially designed for rural areas, including new X-ray film carriers, blood centrifuges, equipment for the relief of the bronchial spasms so common among children in the African nations, and even cheap and functional incubators. And frequently it has been not only designs but finished products, many of which are now in use.

Necessarily, of course, the impact of these contributions has been initially local and inconspicuous, and therefore somewhat discouraging to world opinion. But, far more important, the experience of such work has stimulated a growing appreciation of how extraordinarily complex and difficult it is to assist the new countries in major and permanent ways: what delicate sys-

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tems problems are involved, and how easily unforeseen disasters can follow developments that superficially appear of unimpeachable benefit. Nothing, for example, could be more startlingly significant for the developing nations than the "green revolution" of the last years. The introduction of the phenomenally high-yielding strains of staple food grains, especially wheat, largely developed in relatively advanced nations, has been hailed the world over for its promise to stem the tide of hunger that has always been a major dread of mankind. In Mexico, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and in a host of other countries, the revolution has taken hold and is succeeding. But only now is the complexity of its total impact becoming generally apparent. Only recently have we fully realized that unless the introduction of the new seed grains is accompanied by far-reaching institutional changes such as agrarian reform, there is a danger that the "green revolution" could, in the end, serve to perpetuate—and indeed to exacerbate—existing inequities.

Again, in the world as a whole some 60 percent or more of the labor of nations has traditionally been engaged in the production of food. In the advanced nations, however, that figure is more like 5 to 10 percent. Typically, the transition from the primitive to the advanced stage comes rapidly. It came a long time ago in Europe and in North America, freeing a large portion of the population to move from the land to more monetarily rewarding work in the cities. The same evolution is now being experienced, with equally explosive consequences, in many of the developing countries. It will overtake yet others before the decade is out, with predictably similar social effects. It seems altogether possible that the population of Calcutta may exceed 15 million during the coming decade, Buenos Aires may reach 10 million, and Cairo six million, while innumerable cities of only slightly lesser size will be swelling proportionately. If the cities can meet these tremendous incursions with even a modicum of success, if their resources for the care—and, most important, the gainful employment—of the new millions can enrich their lives only a bit beyond what they knew before they came, then the worst of disasters may be avoided. But unless an infrastructure of industrial or other support systems can somehow be developed for those millions, swift social disaster can follow. The line is thin indeed. And failure could well mean, in the coming decade or the next, a series of bloody revolts around the world that could

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be reminiscent of the French Revolution, but on a yet larger scale.

In the face of such grim challenges produced by technologies themselves, in the face of a dramatic demonstration of the limitations and the dangers of kinds of aid which, with all their immense benefits, can also threaten serious imbalances in complex human systems which have long been in not quite disastrous, though indeed far from satisfactory, equilibria, what will constitute satisfactory patterns of aid in the future? This question, being asked with increasing frequency and force, cannot be answered today in specific terms.

Two elements, however, are clearly overriding. They seem to be universally relevant, not only over the whole developing world, but over the whole developed one as well. Indeed, it may not be too much to say that they are intimately related to the very evolution of modern man. First, it is now evident beyond all doubt that in the great post-industrial societies the primary economic asset for the coming decades will be *knowledge:* first supplementing, and then perhaps even exceeding in importance, the simpler and more obvious economic assets of the past. As a commodity, knowledge is exportable in many guises and through many channels. Those channels are bound to be elaborated and to increase greatly in influence over the entire globe as mechanisms of distribution also grow in scope and perfection. But it is important to remember that knowledge is also as indigenously cultivable as the new wheats. And so a truth that has been widely evident for many years now becomes a major factor for the decade. It is as clear as it could possibly be—from this standpoint as much as from that discussed earlier—that a critical element in the salvation of the new countries, in the fields of science and technology as elsewhere, must lie in the successful growth and in the effective functioning of their educational systems as well as in their subject-content, their underlying philosophy and their balance. Here is one of the arenas where our attention can best be brought to bear, in the decade ahead, in the training for science and technology as much as elsewhere.

The second element relates to indigenous industries, well managed and firmly established. Without them, future overcrowded cities will evidently be powerless to provide enough for the new masses flocking into them. Without them, effective indigenous technologies are unlikely to evolve, and, even if perchance developed, will have difficulty in establishing firm roots. Moreover,

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without an established industrial structure science itself will lack an essential element of the tripartite support on which it must rest in any country: the tripod of an educational system, of industry, and of government.

Establishing a structure of effective indigenous industries is a supremely difficult task for any developing nation, where time is so short and the challenge so great. Only a few years ago it might have seemed virtually impossible. For the next decade, the rise of the transnational corporations, and their evolution toward true multinationality in the countries where they work, introduces a new, and perhaps a critically hopeful, factor.

Another aspect of this matter deserves continuing thought. It is amply evident that the coming years are going to present peculiar challenges to the United States in the maintenance of its own balance in the arenas of science and technology as well as many others—maintenance of the philosophy and practice of the scientific way which has brought us such power in partnership with our innovative technology in the past, maintenance of the balance within and between science and technology themselves, maintenance of the balance and adequacy of support for both within that triangle of the academic, the governmental and the industrial spheres. It is imperative for our own future welfare that we take wise action here. For many reasons the world of the next decade is going to be a much more difficult and competitive place than we have so far known. But this very prospect may offer a dividend with respect to effective aid to the developing countries. If we really succeed in maintaining our own balance in science and technology over the decade ahead, if we can really remain adequately creative in an increasingly demanding world, if our own internal health can remain sound and we can continue to be focused at least as much on a changing future as on a demanding present, we will benefit not only ourselves. For under these conditions—and under no others—our record will be observed and studied carefully, and, it is to be hoped, profitably, by the developing nations of the world.

## III

Ten years ago there was a good deal of discussion among those most concerned with scientific and technical progress in the developing nations of what was then called, for want of a better term, "planned wastage of trained manpower" by firms

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from developed nations operating branches in such countries. By this was meant that such corporate branches, if they conducted manufacturing operations in developing countries, should undertake managerial and especially technical training programs for a larger number of citizens of the host countries than would be required to supply immediate corporate needs. It was hoped that such "surplus" trainees would seek other local industrial employment, or might be encouraged to start enterprises of their own, or at least that such a trained population, accumulating over the years, would build up a corps of skilled manpower in the nation. It was further expected that, if some of the larger of these corporate branches planned to establish research laboratories as well as technological training programs, "planned wastage" might apply here also, with a consequent strengthening of research resources in the host country.

It is striking how far imagination in that period fell short of actual events. Today the great multinational corporations have evolved to the point where in some countries they may be responsible for material assets considerably greater than the entire government resources of their hosts. But it is not sheer size that is most notable in this context. Two further elements are more significant. The first is the ability of a number of multinational corporations, well demonstrated in recent years, to catalyze developments of real importance in the infrastructures of the developing nations where they have operated: developments of a strikingly constructive and permanent nature. An outstanding, but fairly typical, example is provided by the International Basic Economy Corporation. By the end of 1968 the Corporation had established 119 subsidiaries and affiliates in 33 nations, bringing critical innovations in food production and low-cost housing, and breaking ground for local entrepreneurs who could not have succeeded without the initial heavy innovational and developmental costs borne by the Corporation. Another illustration is offered by Sears, pioneering modern supermarkets in Mexico and establishing a coterie of local manufacturing industries to stock them. As early as 1958 the U.S. Agency for International Development recognized the effectiveness of these channels for foreign aid and inaugurated its private support plan, on which it has relied increasingly for developmental tasks.

Nor is it only among American companies that transnational growth is going forward. Subsidiaries of European and Japanese

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corporations overseas are probably now half as great, (or even more) as those of the American ones, with an annual production in the neighborhood of $80 billion a year. The names of Mitsui and Mitsubishi in Japan, ICI and Dunlop in Great Britain, Renault in France, Volkswagen and Siemens in Germany, Olivetti and Pirelli in Italy, to name but a few, are significant.

Also important is a special characteristic of the evolution of the multinational corporations themselves, one that may receive further emphasis during the decade. In the earlier activities of the transnational companies in developing nations, the relationships basically were those of overseas branches of foreign institutions still firmly centered in their home countries, their philosophies and personnel and operating policies still largely derived directly from the environments of developed states. In recent years, however, many multinational corporations are establishing strong and relatively autonomous divisions abroad, largely staffed by local skills and supervised by relatively independent local management, though still subject to major policy direction from home. A few of the most advanced firms have even gone to the point of being truly international, drawing their management and their ownership from all over the world, becoming as nearly indigenous to the countries where they operate as it is possible to be. This is clearly the way of the future. It is tempting to speculate what new influences it may bring to bear on the political relationships of nation-states, especially among the developed countries, and what new kinds of alliances and working arrangements it will be instrumental in forging within and across the conventional political boundaries.

The influence of the multinational corporations is likely to be powerful on the cultures of nations, both developed and developing, and particularly on the future evolution of their science and technologies, and the relationships between them. For the developed nations, the political climate of Western Europe during the next decade will surely be of major significance in this context as in so many others. Already new elements in the relationships of the Common Market countries, in particular the elimination of tariff barriers, the initiation of a draft convention concerning patents—perhaps in fairly imminent prospect—the work of a commission of the European Economic Community on the establishment of uniform industrial standards for those countries, and the proposed establishment of a uniform

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currency, have notably stimulated the development of multinational corporations there, especially those of United States origin. There have even been one or two examples of genuine transnational corporate mergers involving European companies. Further, if Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland do indeed enter the Union within the next 10 years, and become firmly integrated within it, the decade could see the swift growth of two quite different kinds of transnational combinations: two kinds of gigantic entities characterized by very different origins and histories, with very different kinds of geographical boundaries, and driven by quite different philosophies and operating patterns, yet subject to parallel evolutionary opportunities. For the first time in history, we may see opening before us the startling possibility—even though rather remote at present—of a supranational political entity dealing with multinational corporations as its partners or agents. Such partnerships could amount to a double transcending of national political boundaries and national entities as they have been inherited from the last century, with ultimate consequences that might well be profoundly significant for the shape of world order in the next.

It is not clear precisely what part international structures of science and technology will play in this major drama, nor, in turn, how their own growth and balance will be shaped. Yet already some experience has accumulated with respect to modes of coöperation in science and technology among political entities that are still essentially independent, in any real sense, of coördinated political control. In October 1967, for example, and again in December 1968, the Common Market Council of Ministers initiated studies of the possibilities for close scientific coöperation among European nations in seven technical areas: metallurgy, meteorology, telecommunications, oceanography, data processing, new means of transportation and nuisance abatement. Specific projects formulated include, for example, research in titanium alloys and superalloys, in superconducting materials for industry, and in special fibers and fiber-reinforced composite materials for gas turbines. There are plans to carry some of this and other research forward in community laboratories, or, in some cases, in government laboratories of member states as parts of nationally identifiable programs that would nevertheless be integrated into an overall pattern.

These are by no means the first coöperative ventures to have

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been planned, and indeed carried out, within the European Community. But some must stand as warnings of the difficulties inherent in such undertakings in present circumstances of political integration. Too many have been organized on the basis of individual countries taking responsibility for discrete sectors of a joint project. In partnerships of this sort, each country faces the problem of having plans for future work in its sector approved each year by its own government, with the risk that disapproval in the national forum and consequent loss of national financing can throw the entire joint effort into massive disarray and possibly bring it to a standstill. Even short of that disaster, such arrangements are all too likely to foster international jealousies, each participant country striving to balance its own public financial contribution as evenly as possible with the private returns it anticipates from contracts awarded to its own nationals.

The hazards of joint projects undertaken as purely coöperative ventures between countries, and by industries nominally acting together but with incompletely coördinated responsibility and management, have been illustrated in such projects as the Concorde aircraft, the ELDO[6] coöperative rocket launcher project, and ESRO,[7] the joint agency for carrying forward space experiments. The cost of the Concorde ultimately rose beyond reasonable bounds. ELDO at the start involved the coöperation of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Australia. But the flowering was brief; since its inception in 1962, the organization has encountered crisis after crisis, climaxing in the British declaration of intent to withdraw in 1971. After half a decade of joint work, no major complete launch has been brought off. Similarly, ESRO has suffered many difficulties, and it may be fair to say it has not yet produced a satellite that would have been beyond the capability of its individual member states to construct, and this in an era when coöperation between many of those nations and the United States has been far more fertile. Indeed, the remarkable contemporary accomplishments of some of the individual members of these international coöperative organizations have often stood in striking contrast to the very modest successes of their combined efforts. That contrast tends to confirm the judgment that organizational rather than scientific or technical flaws are primarily to blame. Evidence that Europe itself is now

[6] European Launcher Development Organization.

[7] European Space Research Organization.

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becoming keenly aware of these shortcomings was provided recently in the informal agreement reached by the 12 nations participating in the European Space Conference in Brussels to merge ELDO, ESRO, and the European Conference on Telecommunications by Satellite (ECTS) into a single coördinating operating body. It remains to be seen what success will attend the move, which must be approved by formal treaty. But the direction of thinking is interesting.

Another approach to European scientific and technical coöperation which so far has had but limited success is that of the government-sponsored "European Technological Community." A conspicuous example of this form of coördination is Euratom, established in 1957 to pool research on peaceful applications of nuclear energy among the Six. Originally it was established primarily as a research body, and it did important work. But it was beset by divisive hazards. Most of the member countries set up national atomic agencies in parallel with the joint effort, and in times of crisis tended to favor their own. Again, the enterprise was plagued by the philosophy of "buy-national," under which each member which had provided its share of its support for Euratom from its own budget therefore felt entitled to a comparable return in terms of contracts awarded within its own country. As a capstone to these problems, there was the interference of de Gaulle, a transient but critical difficulty.

Finally, with the years, a field that originally had been essentially one of scientific research grew importantly into one of technological development, and Euratom found difficulty in readjusting to this situation. All this led to a major crisis last year, when for a time it seemed that the organization might actually disappear. In the event it survived, and two changes stimulated by the crisis may prove significant not only for Euratom but for the long-term evolution of European scientific and technological coöperation in general. Hitherto, it had been the philosophy of Euratom that all its findings should ipso facto become common property, and be completely open for common use. The practical result of this apparently liberal and enlightened policy was that industrial firms making real innovations in the field simply avoided Euratom. Under the new policy, Euratom is to undertake contract work for individual firms—quite possibly, in the long run, for some of the multinational corporations. It plans also to broaden its fields of substantive concern.

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In the context of Western Europe, these difficulties emphasize a point likewise forcefully demonstrated in the underdeveloped world: the importance, in building designs for scientific and technical collaboration, of combining the transfer of scientific, technical and managerial skills with capital in a balanced and closely joined "package," adapted to the needs of the countries concerned, whatever their stages of evolution. Although this has often proved difficult for governments, it is the normal practice of the multinational corporation. In this relation the draft convention prepared by the six Common Market countries in 1968, providing for a novel type of transnational company that would transcend the laws of individual states and be responsible instead to the convention itself, is especially interesting.

Once again special emphasis must be given to the universal element that unites the structuring of international coöperation in Western Europe with the problems of the underdeveloped nations. The ambitious and pioneering goal of a strong and tightly knit European scientific and technological community cannot possibly be realized unless it grows from a solid base of common scholarship. How effective an international scientific structure can be when it is based on a truly multinational viewpoint has been well illustrated by the success of CERN, the Centre Européen de Recherches Nucléaires at Geneva, over the past 15 years. A collaborative program of astronomy at commonly administered European observatories has been suggested. Such joint intellectual ventures in science surely offer one of the most promising means for initiating wider scientific and technical collaboration. But in the end even such enterprises can prosper only if they are founded on common and thoroughly up-to-date educational systems. At present, it is difficult to imagine that foundations of common scholarship, vital to the support of future collaborative growth in these areas, can be firmly built in the new Europe without radical departures in modernizing its universities. Scholarship and learning must be made more autonomous and more generally accessible than they have ever been. The extraordinary importance of a unified and intellectually sharpened system of education, built upon a broadly shared base of cultural values, including those of science, is as clear for the nations of Western Europe as for the developing countries, though in a context very different in detail. Another common requirement, too, demands continuing emphasis: the maintenance of a

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subtle but intimate operating cohesion between science and technology, and, most important, of the delicate balance of priorities in their coördination and management.

CERN may ultimately be judged the most viable, and in many senses the most intellectually productive of all the joint research efforts in Western Europe, even though funding is presenting some current—though apparently soluble—difficulties. Its success, however, may be fairly typical of its special class. It has long been evident that international scientific coöperation, even between the Eastern and Western European blocs, and with the United States, has fared better in projects concerned primarily with scientific research per se than in those of wider and more varied scope. A striking contemporary example of this is the recent decision in Moscow and in Washington to allow American scientists to work at Terpukhov, with its Soviet nuclear accelerator, and, reciprocally, to admit Soviet scientists to the American nuclear center at Batavia, Illinois, where even more powerful facilities may eventually become available. A similar example of success in purely scientific collaboration was the recent U. S.-Soviet conference on computer design, development and use, held at Turin and attended by an 11-man Soviet delegation and by representatives of two U.S. universities.

In sharp contrast has been the very different attitude characterizing the spaceship experiments, conducted on the Soviet side with SOYUZ and by Project Skylab of NASA on the American. The investigations themselves are parallel, but the implications, of course, range far beyond the gathering and interpretation of knowledge. Here genuine coöperation has so far proved virtually impossible. There could hardly be a more striking tribute to the Jeffersonian internationalism inherent in science itself. Yet intricate crosscurrents at deep levels influence and mark the boundaries between political and economic and scientific-technological elements of culture: currents which will surely continue to plague us throughout the remainder of the century.

The seminar on computers at Turin was organized by the International Center for Advanced Technological and Vocational Training, a body set up by the International Labor Organization of the United Nations. Like other constructive activities of a similar cast—such, for instance, as the recent joint research effort on the sea, organized by UNESCO, involving more than 20 nations including the U.S.S.R. and planned to last for three

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years—it raises an important question: What will be the role of the United Nations in these movements over the next decade?

The role could surely be important. But at present it is unclear. The uncertainty derives in considerable part from the present structure of the United Nations itself and from its vision of its place and function in the evolving world. Richard Gardner has recently pointed out that in a constitutional sense, the original U.N. Charter scarcely took notice of international science and technology, which less than 25 years later were to be of such overriding importance.[8] Surely the time has come for the United Nations to take official cognizance of the great possibilities in these fields that the coming decade will present.

Resolutions have recently been introduced into the General Assembly recommending the establishment of international jurisdiction and government over the oceans and the ocean beds of the world. If the United Nations establishes a supranational jurisdiction of this sort, an early move should be made to fashion agreements with transnational corporations looking to the exploration and exploitation of these seabeds, with their still largely unestimated wealth. Such a partnership, if successful, could be a step along the road toward reorganizing jurisdictions and restructuring concerns among economic, international political, and national political domains—a road sure to be traveled in other ways over the remainder of this century.

Such developments, of course, will depend importantly upon events within the United Nations itself. Will it recognize the truly immense scope of its opportunities—indeed, of its responsibilities? Will it perceive them effectively enough to broaden its viewpoint and accomplish considerable readjustments at high levels of influence and power? If it does, it could become a truly important lever of the future, implementing the growing feeling among men everywhere that the system of nation-states, as presently organized, is too clumsy—and perhaps too weak—to harness the forces of the contemporary scientific and technological revolution. Upon these rather fateful alternatives much of the shape of the coming decade may depend.

## IV

Despite the fact that formal aid to developing nations by the United States now stands at the lowest GNP percentage of any

[8] Richard N. Gardner, "Can the United Nations Be Revived?" *Foreign Affairs,* July 1970.

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developed country currently engaged in such activity, it still represents, in dollar terms, by far the largest contribution being made today. Together with this circumstance, the history and prominence of the American example and the important and growing influence of American-based transnational corporations leave no doubt that the way in which the United States conducts its affairs in the areas of research and development can exert an extraordinarily important world influence, for good or ill. It must be an important focus for continuing scrutiny by the underdeveloped world. By the same token, though for somewhat different reasons, the way that the United States conducts its research and development must be a focus of continuing review among the developed nations, particularly in Western Europe.

Robert Gilpin[9] has recently distinguished three fundamental economic strategies that a nation can follow in responding to the challenge of the new international economy that will characterize the next decade. It can support scientific investigation and technical development across what amounts to a universal front, seeking to maintain its position in all the advanced fields open to it. Or, if its resources of talented and trained men and women and of money are more modest, it can try to specialize, concentrating on limited areas of science and technology which it considers of the greatest strategic value. Or it can achieve its initial access to science and technology by importations from abroad, hoping later to model its own research and development on them. The first course, obviously, is possible in any extended sense only for the superpowers. It has been followed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Great Britain followed that path in the nineteen-fifties, but revised it during the last decade. Gaullist France also attempted the first policy, but abandoned it after a series of costly failures. Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands, among others, have consistently followed the second policy. The third course is replete with risks. Japan has demonstrated that, in the right circumstances and rightly approached, it can be eminently successful, leading to burgeoning scientific, technological and economic strength. But there is a thin line between success and ultimate scientific and technological thralldom for a smaller country relying on this strategy. The potential for indigenous scientific and technological growth—and with it for an appro-

[9] Robert Gilpin, "Technological Strategies and National Purposes," *Science*, July 31, 1970.

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priate system of education—must be present or must be created and developed in parallel with the borrowing if the enterprise is to be viable over the long term. This is the problem besetting so many developing nations. In practice, of course, every country except those in an extremely early stage of development must, to some degree, employ a mixture of all three modes.

The United States has clearly been the most generally successful pioneer in the first of these strategies during and since World War II. Clearly, its success was made possible to a very considerable degree by the effective channels for continuing interaction and coördination among the three principal sources of support for scientific and educational development in the nation: government, industry and the academic structure. The implicit decision not to formalize a holistic policy in this area but to respond to pressures as they appear is an approach to which we have long been committed in other sectors of public policy. It has sometimes proved flexible, sensitive and genuinely adaptive. But its effectiveness rests upon an unremitting commitment to examine it constantly, to search out inevitable weak points and to reassure ourselves continually that it matches a dynamically changing environment. During the next decade, that commitment will be more than ever a sine qua non for a United States which must coexist in a world including a scientifically and technically burgeoning Japan, a possibly burgeoning Soviet Union, the beginnings of a 10-member national coalition of Western Europe, commanding some of the richest human and material resources of the planet, and in a climate created very considerably by the further development of the multinational corporations. There are reasons enough for diligence.

The challenge takes on particular significance in conjunction with at least three major domestic issues involving our national policy with respect to science and technology. The first two relate to levels of government support of scientific research and education and to understanding priorities.

In 1964, the Federal Republic of Germany devoted approximately 1.3 percent of its GNP to research and development. By 1968 that figure had risen to about 2.4 percent; and 2.5 percent or better is projected for 1972. During the period from 1968 to 1971, although the total budget of the German federal government is expected to expand by only some 6 percent per year, increase in the part devoted to research and development is pro-

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jected at an annual rate of approximately 16 percent. If the amount contributed by industry is added, the entire expenditure on research and development in the Federal Republic may soon reach 13,000 or 14,000 million deutsche marks, if it has not already done so. It was only in 1955 that Germany was permitted to enter the field of large-scale nuclear development. Since then, stimulated by a rapidly growing need for added sources of energy, reinforced by indigenous talented personnel (many trained in the United States and elsewhere) and aided by government funds, progress has been so rapid that in many aspects the German nuclear power program has now caught up with that of the United States, and in some areas has surpassed it. The installed capacity of nuclear power stations is expected to be 2,300 megawatts by 1972. Moreover, it is considered possible that by then additional nuclear production capacity will be on order, which will be capable, when completed, of producing 12,000 megawatts of electricity. The merchant ship *Otto Hahn,* designed especially for nuclear propulsion, is a pioneer among nuclear-powered vessels in the world today, being considerably in advance of the *U.S.S. Savannah.*

The German Federal Ministry for Scientific Research has outlined several "priority programs" touching current frontiers of both basic investigation and industrial development. They include data processing, space research, atomic energy and oceanography. In the field of data processing a series of regional computing centers is planned, in a program expected to reach a level of expenditure of at least 500 million DM by 1971.

In Japan, government funding for research and development in 1966 amounted to 1.4 percent of the GNP; that projected for 1971 is 2.5 percent. This figure is particularly impressive when it is recalled that, in contrast to expenditures in most European countries and the United States, the proportion spent on research and development for military purposes is very low. For the Japanese fiscal year 1966 the total spent on research was reckoned at about 1.35 billion yen, exceeding that of 1965 by nearly 15 percent. Later expansion, though not quite so dramatic, has been continuous. As in Germany, very high priorities have been set by the government in fields of space research, including the development of satellites and rockets. Research on atomic energy, with special emphasis on the nuclear powering of ships and the development of efficient nuclear fuels, is also advancing actively.

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For centuries the Japanese have been avid investigators and exploiters of the marine environment, both physical and biological. It is natural that programs in marine science and marine technology should be given high priority.

All over the world, among developed and some developing nations, research is being accorded an increasingly high priority by governments, and is being supported at an accelerating rate. In many of the most important of the developed countries—notably in Germany and Japan—morale in the sector devoted to research and development has probably never been higher nor productivity greater. And the mainland of Asia is stirring too. There is much to indicate that scientific efforts are quickening in China, and concrete evidence that, now that her own nuclear program has been successfully launched, research and development in satellite technology is proceeding under forced draft.

Against this background, the trajectory of our own government support for science and technology for the last two years, and its projection for the next several have been truly disquieting. According to data prepared by the National Science Foundation and recently quoted by Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, federal obligations for basic research in the nation grew from about $200 million in 1956 to about $2 billion by 1967—an astonishing growth rate of 21 percent a year, which it would be obviously unwise, if not impossible, to sustain for long. But during the years from 1965 to 1970 the average rate dropped precipitously to 7 percent, and for the last three years it has been essentially static in a formal sense. In its budget for fiscal year 1969, the National Science Foundation was allotted the total sum of $435 million, including some carryover from the previous year, and in 1970 the corresponding total was about $438 million.

These tight restrictions have proved drastically disturbing to the federal funding of academic research. The slight dollar increases from 1969 to 1970, to be sure, were made against heavy odds, given the other demands on the national purse, and they may have symbolized some commitment to the principle of advance. Furthermore, the total for the current year is $513 million, and, if recent discussions in the Senate, in which the "sense of the Congress" with respect to support of the National Science Foundation was explored, should result in action, the NSF budget for 1972 may possibly be increased by approximately a further $100 million. These are encouraging signs. Yet

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the fact remains that, because of both dollar inflation and the rapidly rising costs of research, the current result of the funding levels of the past few years has been to constrict anticipated programs of federally supported research by 20 to 25 percent in some 550 institutions. And it seems probable that the level of federally supported research in the nation as a whole has fallen by approximately a quarter during the past four years.

It is quite clear that federal funding for research in the nation cannot—and should not—expand in the coming decade at the rate it did in the first half of the last. Maintenance of such a rate would have resulted in a serious imbalance in the nation's commitments. But our recent violent reaction has been both disturbing and dangerous. An abrupt adjustment toward a new and supposedly static "equilibrium" in the quality and scope of American research and technology cannot avoid wreaking serious and long-lasting damage. Decades ago Whitehead said: "In the conditions of modern life the rule is absolute, the race which does not value trained intelligence is doomed. . . . Today we maintain ourselves. Tomorrow science will have moved forward yet one more step; and there will be no appeal from the judgment which will then be pronounced on the uneducated." His words carry deepened significance today both for those whom we would assist and for ourselves.

The third issue, broader than the first two, involves them both. It deals with the formulation of coherent science policies. Surely the need for an accepted federal science policy in the nation was never greater. Yet it comes at a peculiarly difficult time. It confronts us in a period of critical budget stringency; and it is deeply influenced by at least two other major factors.

A number of years ago, students of trends in academic training in the United States called attention to the fact that during the last decade the number of Ph.D. degrees awarded in the sciences, responding to current national demands in science and technology, was itself increasing at roughly an exponential rate. They warned that realistically this rate could not be projected very far into the future without the risk of a frustrating and harmful waste of talent and human resources. It is at least five years since it became widely suspected that the exponential phase of our demand for scientific talent was fading and might be succeeded by a period of linear expansion whose rate would finally approximate that of the population as a whole. Thus for nearly half a

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decade we were given the opportunity to initiate a gradual change of pace that might have anticipated a new situation. But we failed generally to perceive the need, and failed totally to respond in a graduated fashion. Now, with the necessity obvious, we are tempted to overreact dangerously.

At the same time, we are coming to perceive—again perhaps all too abruptly—that, rich as our resources are, we are reaching a limit in the number and diversity of desirable projects which we have the means to support: we too may be forced to modify the first of Gilpin's strategies. This is an unpleasant discovery. To add to a disenchantment with science and technology, there comes the recognition of the critical factor that again should have been only too evident for many years—the dangerous side-effects which some technologies can have on our environment.

It will surely require at least a decade of hard work even to approach the general task of developing a more cohesive strategy for research and development in the nation, and to formulate explicit policies that not only can set priorities in fields of work —itself a task of truly herculean difficulty—but also can estimate direct returns to the society from its investments in science and technology. The unknowns are stupendous at present, and may always remain so. But some of the elements essential in such a policy are discernible now.

Accepting, as we must, the limitations to which we shall be bound over the next few years at least, what immediate moves can we make? For one thing, an assured expansion of federal support, proportioned against the continued expansion of the GNP itself, would assist a great deal. What the precise proportion should be can be debated. Much more important than absolute magnitudes would be the long-term assurance of growth itself. In this context, it is particularly encouraging to notice that recent discussions of the funding of the National Science Foundation have indeed been taken in this frame of reference, and even that a specific proportion of the GNP—0.1 percent—has been suggested for its continuing support.

The extraordinary importance not so much of the absolute amount of federal support as of its consistency needs constant reiteration. Nothing is so disastrous in the conduct of any scientific enterprise (short of serious inadequacies in the supply of available talent and in the organization to implement it) as erratic, unanticipated changes in the level of its support. This is

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obvious when support is suddenly withdrawn. It is less obvious, though equally true, when support is suddenly and unexpectedly expanded unreasonably—as earlier experiences of the National Institutes of Health bore ample witness. This argues strongly for gradualism in the federal funding of research. But it argues particularly for the establishment of some stable formula for determining a reliable and predictable floor for research expenditures from year to year. Thus, if federal research support is indeed to be tied to the national economy, its proportion should be set at a point that can be realistically regarded as a minimum, guaranteed, stable base, to be honored even in lean years when other demands are unusually severe.

Another closely related element of policy, similarly pointed at the levels of federal support of science and technology, is based directly on the distinction between those categories which is so critical in the context of the developing nations. In a modern industrial state the functional differences between science and technology, so important in the developing nations, persist, and it is important to reckon with them. That it is possible to do this at a very practical level was demonstrated in the structuring of our own federal budgets for the support of research and technology in the previous two decades. During much of this period, the budget items for science and technology were formally separated, and the curves of federal support for the two categories varied independently from year to year. In the category of "basic" research, it has been estimated that federal support grew by 29 percent a year between 1956 and 1964, then dropped to 9 percent between that year and 1969. In the "technology" category the earlier growth rate was 21 percent, the later 5 percent. Thus the rate curves for the two classes of funding were preferential to the "basic" category in both periods. But the actual dollar budgeting in the "technology" category was much the larger of the two. The separation of the two, therefore, made it possible to go on making modest increases in support of research.

The distinction, however, was formally abandoned in federal budgeting late in the decade, and several advantages seem to have been lost by the change. The budgeting process has almost certainly been rendered less sharp in this area, and it seems probable that any move to establish a stable "floor" under the federal support of scientific activities will be made more difficult. There seem to be cogent arguments for reversing it.

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Again, early in the sixties a number of large items of federal expenditure that had once been designated for maintenance, operations and procurement were transferred to columns debited to research and technology. In the Department of Defense alone this transfer increased the research and development account five or six times, resulting in a recorded expenditure of more than $17 billion a year for "Research and Development," when in fact only about 26 percent of that amount was expended for basic and applied research.[10] Such blurring of categories makes it harder to achieve adequate federal funding for scientific research and education, and to maintain an appropriate balance of that funding in the total picture of federal obligations.

By the same token, the present national budget provides about $1.5 to $2 billion for the support of scientific research. For technological development, as currently defined, about 10 times this amount is available: $15 to $20 billion. Approximately $150 billion is budgeted for goods and services closely related to or dependent on technology. These strikingly contrasted proportions offer opportunities for beneficial readjustments of balance at little cost. A shift of approximately 5 percent of the funds allotted to development to the research column, for example, could increase the latter sum by half. Such simple illustrations, randomly chosen, underline the need for adequate monitoring and survey mechanisms to determine an operating equilibrium in the multifarious situations with which a developed industrial nation is constantly confronted. How they are to be achieved will be a major policy concern through the next decade.

Another element of future policy must obviously involve a thorough reëxamination of federal support for education both within and beyond science and technology. In this arena, decisions taken today will have their most important effects a decade or more hence. Serious underproduction or overproduction of advanced graduates in science and technology can contribute gravely to undermanning and so weakening the national economy, or can result in grossly inhumane and wasteful maldistribution and misuse of human talent.

Discussions of the federal support of science have tended recently to polarize into two distinct patterns, commonly referred to as the "institutional" grant and the "project" grant. "Project"

[10] "Science and Technology: Tools for Progress," The Report of the President's Task Force on Science Policy, April 1970. Ruben F. Mettler, Chairman.

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support usually connotes a pattern in which specific research enterprises are judged individually, usually by panels of experts, on the basis of their substantive importance and the excellence of the personnel involved. This pattern, widely adopted during the years of most rapid growth of federal support for academic science, still accounts for approximately 75 percent of the total federal support to graduate education in the country. It has some obvious advantages, among them the careful judgments of quality that individual proposals have usually received. But it has the disadvantages of tending to reward, and so to emphasize, proficiency in research over the proficiency in teaching which our own nation, like all others, so much needs today.

Under the institutional system, by contrast, support is commonly given in bloc grants to carry on both research and teaching, and is administered by the receiving institutions as they judge best. The defects of the project grant system are the virtues of the institutional one. It allows greater latitude in the expenditure of monies, permitting a more effective balance between the support of teaching and research, and even making possible a better balance within the research category itself. It also restores needed authority to the university and helps sustain the institutional integrity essential to hard-pressed educational organizations in our time.

But an overall support policy must be conceived in a much more general frame. Six further categories of grant patterns have been distinguished by the President's Task Force on Science Policy,[11] including Institutional Sustaining Grants, Departmental Sustaining Grants, Developmental Grants, Graduate Facilities Grants, Graduate Fellowships and Research Project Grants. Even though such categories must be arbitrary, they can recognize a multiple array of needs and channels and thus facilitate the design of a balance more attuned to the evolving needs of the country as a whole. The balance achieved in the federal support of education for science and technology, in respect both to level and to the modes of its distribution, will be of major interest to developed and developing nations alike in the years that lie ahead.

In a wider area, the maintenance of proportion, and, above all, of effective integration, is vital among the three great supports of any nation's scientific and technological health and progress:

[11] "Science and Technology, Tools for Progress," *op. cit.*

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its industries, academic structure and federal establishment. This is especially critical for the United States today.

The U.S. government's historic practice of specifically forwarding the commitments of the private industrial sector to secure major technological advances, especially through the contract mechanism, has been highly significant—more than ever since World War II, when it was widely relied upon for the development of military technology. Today, although the government is estimated to finance two-thirds of the nation's technical effort, a good two-thirds of the enterprise is executed by private industry. At the same time, the government is itself a main consumer of the technology perfected by industry. The result has been to make private enterprise, to a significant extent, the beneficiary of public undertakings. This contrasts with the practice in Europe, where there has been a tendency to rely primarily on government establishments to conduct the work in government technology and, on the whole, to neglect the resources of private industry. That pattern, which has proved demonstrably less effective, has come under increasing European criticism in recent years, particularly in Great Britain.

The American system itself is due to confront some serious and often novel problems over the next decade. They will be posed particularly by the growing need, and the growing public demand, to allocate more of the national productive capacity to imperative social and economic wants. It remains to be seen whether our own system can adapt satisfactorily to these new conditions. Given its flexibility, however, the odds seem good.

Meanwhile, the significance of the government-industry-academic partnership for the health of American science and technology becomes ever more evident. No matter how well federal support of research may be administered, federal funds will inevitably fall far short of the ultimate need. But there is little indication that private industrial support will recede: on the contrary, it can be expected to expand. A survey made somewhat over a year ago by the Economics Department of the McGraw-Hill publishing company estimated that in 1978 industry in the United States will be investing some $33.6 billion in research and development, compared with the $17.6 billion expended in 1968. In 1978, colleges and universities are expected to carry on $5.6 billion worth of research, compared with $3.5 billion in 1968, and the corresponding figure for nonprofit laboratories is ex-

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pected to reach $1.6 billion, compared with $840 million in 1968. Not only is the cumulative expansion of industrial research and development likely to exceed considerably that in other sectors of the research economy, the current cutbacks forced on federal funding are not likely to be reflected on the industrial scene either. Industrial employment of scientists and engineers grew at an average rate of 3.2 percent during the past decade, and the rate of growth between 1969 and 1972 has been projected at 4 percent. The future significance of the multinational corporation in the world environment is emphasized once again in this context.

Many even more immediate questions of American science policy will surely occupy our attention during the coming decade. The evolution of mechanisms for the smooth transition of support for vital research programs from military to nonmilitary agencies, particularly the National Science Foundation, will, for example, be very important. But in terms of the impact of the United States upon the rest of the world nothing can be more significant than the conservation of the balanced working system that we maintain, however imperfectly, among government, industry and the academic community in supporting and prosecuting the enterprises of science and technology, and assuring that the channels of communication among them are kept sensitive and dynamic. That system, as we have developed it over the years, in some sense almost by accident and out of characteristics and traditions deeply embedded in our culture, has been the envy of the world. There are forces now that could erode or even dismember it. It is of primary importance, for the world at large quite as much as for the United States, that it, and the general philosophy undergirding it, be defended and maintained effectively through the years ahead.

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# EUROPE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS

*By Anthony Hartley*

FOR anyone who is a believer in the integration of Europe the present political conjuncture must appear somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, there is a discernible thaw in relations within the Community itself. The resignation of President de Gaulle and a change in French foreign policy (which is none the less real for being denied) have permitted the completion of the Common Market's agricultural policy, some sort of a start has been made on planning a common monetary policy with the Werner Report, and the crucial negotiation for the enlargement of the Community is now under way. After seven years of relative stagnation it might seem as though the creation of an integrated Europe had been resumed—to end perhaps in the emergence of a larger and stronger economic entity which, by the very fact of its greater freedom of action, will hardly be able to avoid political decisions and, hence, concerted political action through appropriate institutions. (By "Europe" is meant not only the Six of the Common Market but also those other West European countries with whom they have close political, economic and cultural relations. Such a definition, moreover, does not exclude the so-called "neutrals," or Spain and Portugal, and it might be hoped that at some point it would be possible to extend it to countries in Eastern Europe.)

This is what a "European" might hope, and, to introduce a personal note for a moment, particularly an English "European" who has seen his own country notably suffer from isolation and lack of creative political tasks over the last seven years. But it would not be realistic to let the more cheerful atmosphere at present reigning in Brussels conceal the fact that, in the seventies, European integration will be something of a race against time. In the past history of the Community timing has, of course, always been important. The creation of the Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 depended upon the determined exploitation of political opportunities which presented themselves for quite brief periods. It is only necessary to imagine what would have happened if the Treaty of Rome had remained unratified in May 1958 to appreciate how narrow the margin was. Similarly, it is possible to

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identify a number of trends in world politics which in the decade to come will work against the emergence of a Europe unified politically as well as economically.

The aim of the founders of the European movement was political rather than economic. They intended to create a new center of power in the world, linked no doubt by an alliance to the United States, but also potentially capable of generating its own policies and making them effective whether inside an Atlantic framework or, if necessary, outside it. This aim coincided at the time with the purposes of American foreign policy which demanded the strengthening of Western Europe against a Russian military threat. And that threat (which can hardly be simply dismissed) in itself helped to convince West European governments that unity was desirable. Thus in the fifties and early sixties the policies of the two superpowers flanking Western Europe—intentionally or unintentionally—abetted the work of the builders of supranational institutions, whose endeavor it was to give the Europe they were constructing more control over its own destinies.

II

In the seventies, however, the case is altered. The policies of the superpowers as well as their relationship to each other have changed, and with that change has come a number of trends in international politics which threaten to preëmpt the choices that might otherwise be open to a political Europe. Just as the new candidates for entry into the Common Market will find that certain decisions have been taken and cannot be changed, so a political Europe beginning to emerge in the late seventies will be liable to discover its freedom of action limited by international decisions in which it has had no say and which its component parts have been too weak to affect. Moreover, those component nation-states themselves, by their factionalism and fragmented policies, may also prejudice the potentialities of a unified European policy.

The most reasonable aim of such a policy would be the appearance of what the present writer has called elsewhere "a regional Europe," not seeking a global role but content to defend its own immediate interests in Europe and to exercise economic and political influence on geographically adjacent areas—in the first place on the countries lying around the Mediterranean basin.

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The foreign policy of a regional Europe has been sketched out by the association agreements already negotiated by the European Economic Community. In North and West Africa and the Middle East there are countries which will inevitably receive some of the fallout from a prosperous and industrially advanced European region—much as Mexico at present receives economic advantage from its common border with the United States. And it is probable that economic interest on the part of Europeans will be followed by political involvement. In the case of the Middle East the need to secure the continuation of oil supplies makes it certain that there at least will be a necessary theater for European diplomatic activity, perhaps in directions anticipated by France's present courtship of the Arab states. These are some of the lines along which the foreign policy of a regional Europe will develop.

How would such a prospect now strike the flanking global powers—the United States and Russia? American policy is still officially favorable to European integration, whatever skepticism about supranational institutions may reign in the White House. But the objections that have recently been voiced at the results of the Common Market's agricultural policy and to its association agreements show that quite early manifestations of European policy—in the economic sphere but with political overtones—can be unwelcome in Washington. There is perhaps some misunderstanding here. There is also some lack of logic. American support for European integration was an enlightened policy in which the rise of a serious commercial competitor was accepted for political ends. But, now as then, those ends cannot be attained without the means (*e.g.* the common agricultural policy and its effects on American agricultural exports), and if this was not realized from the beginning, then it ought to have been.

Similarly, the association agreements of the European Community can be regarded as the beginnings of that reinvolvement of Europe with the underdeveloped countries which American diplomacy has constantly recommended. It was never very probable that such a reinvolvement would take place without some economic profit accruing to Europeans, but it would be missing the point not to see that the association agreements can be a stabilizing factor—politically and economically—for the areas in which they operate, as well as a means of helping countries which, like those of West or North Africa, badly need it. Here

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is another instance of an American political objective being accompanied by economic disadvantages whose impact had not been fully realized.

Since the United States has a trading surplus with the European Economic Community at present, it can hardly be claimed that the commercial damage done by the Community to American interests is very great. A trade war, supposing that anyone wished to embark on so suicidal a step, would probably harm Americans more than Europeans. None the less, commercial competition may increasingly become a factor in lessening American enthusiasm for further European integration. And if American policy ever passed to the stage of an active dislike of the emergence of a political and economic Europe, then the United States would be in a position to encourage those forces in Europe which are still resistant to an extension of supranational institutions. Such an evolution would hardly be in the interests of the United States, but it cannot be totally excluded. The rise of an integrated Europe is as adapted to the Nixon Doctrine of letting Europeans settle their own affairs as it was to earlier American pressure on them to fortify their institutions, but in the heat of commercial rivalry this fact may come to be forgotten.

III

As for the Russians, not surprisingly they have no wish to see a new power arise on their western frontier. Even without communism it cannot be imagined that any Russian régime in the seventies would be anything but hostile to the further progress of European integration. This hostility has deep roots in history and the facts of power. In the fifties and sixties the presence of the Soviet Union as an adversary could help to speed the movement for European integration. Now, a more flexible Russian diplomacy and, above all, the possibility of an American withdrawal from Europe (itself the consequence of a loss of American self-confidence following on the Vietnam war) have created a situation in which West European countries feel that they must arrive at some sort of modus vivendi with an Eastern neighbor whose military strength looms even larger than it did 20 years ago. That Herr Brandt should have chosen this precise moment to inaugurate his *Ostpolitik* is, no doubt, due to domestic considerations, but also to a feeling that contacts with Moscow had better be established while American backing is still available.

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President de Gaulle's desire—still residually present in President Pompidou—to become a sort of European *interlocuteur valable* for the Russians also assumed that there would be an eclipse of American influence in, and support of, Western Europe.

The consequences for European integration of the series of negotiations with the U.S.S.R. now beginning, and ranging from German *Ostpolitik* to the European Security Conference proposed by Russia and its allies at their Budapest meeting of March 1969, remain to be seen. But they are unlikely to be favorable. A "European" must believe that any attempt to reach lasting arrangements with Russia in Europe would have been better delayed until the process of unification was further advanced and a specifically European voice could make itself heard.

The potential danger of the present German government's *Ostpolitik* is twofold. First, there is the fact that West Germany is simply not an equal negotiating partner for the Soviet Union. It is no criticism of Herr Brandt and his colleagues, though it is a criticism of the present fragmented state of European politics, that at this crucial moment Bonn has not been able to receive the support and counsel which a unified European view of what constitutes a settlement in Central Europe would have afforded. Since no such agreed European policy exists, it is little use lamenting its absence. But no consultations with the object of elaborating one have ever taken place, and it is hard not to feel that the states of Western Europe have neglected their own interests in a manner which they may come to regret.

The government of the Federal Republic has indeed got itself into the uneasy position of being dependent on Russian goodwill for its own internal political success. An *Ostpolitik* which began as the cautious exploration of possibilities has now become the essential ingredient of Herr Brandt's policies. The very fact that there can be discussion as to whether Moscow will choose to aid him by concessions on the Berlin question or will reserve its favors for a successor Christian Democrat régime suggests that his government may have lost some of its freedom of action. The euphoria which reigned in West Germany following the conclusion of the Moscow treaty, the approval voiced by politicians and public opinion polls, make any retreat all the more difficult. Here again the advantageous position gained by Russian diplomacy is not the fault of the German negotiators. It was very much inscribed in the facts of an unequal dialogue.

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It may be that the Soviet Union will decide to make concessions on Berlin (perhaps by granting the so-called "human alleviations" of which so much has been heard) with the object of securing the ratification of the Moscow treaty. It would seem to be to its advantage to do so. For the treaty itself, despite the fact that its text contains nothing limiting the possibility of future European integration, none the less could be used as a lever to further Russian interests in Western Europe.

What, for example, would happen if at some future date in the seventies the Soviet Union declared that it regarded some proposed step toward European unity—no doubt, in the field of defense—as incompatible with the Moscow treaty? Theoretically, all a German government would have to do would be to stand firm and repeat that the treaty contained no such veto. Juridically, it would be in the right, but this would do nothing to lessen the political pressure exercised by the threat to reactivate the campaign against "German revanchism," to cancel trade agreements and to hamper communications with Berlin. In such a case Bonn would have to make a solitary decision whether to resist Russian pressure, since the threat to denounce the treaty would simply be the continuation of the bilateral relationship which led to it in the first place. It may be that the German government of the day would stand up for itself and its European principles, but it would be as well if those committed to the creation of an integrated Europe—both within the Federal Republic and elsewhere—were to realize that the future may well see some such clash between European policy and *Ostpolitik* and be ready to react to it.

IV

If the Moscow treaty contains potential hindrances to further European integration, the same would be doubly true of a European Security Conference. Europeans would go to such a conference without a common attitude either among themselves or between them and the United States. German commitment to *Ostpolitik,* French desire to play a leading part, British fears about European security—these attitudes add up to nothing that can be called a common European interest, and a demonstration of disunity on such an important occasion would leave disruptive traces behind it. Despite the eagerness of a number of European governments to come to the conference table, it seems certain that

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the general European interest would be better served by delay—at least until after the completion of the negotiation for the enlargement of the European Economic Community.

Any such conference would undoubtedly see the Russians striving to attain a triple objective: (1) to hasten American withdrawal from Europe; (2) to gain formal acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe; and (3) once again to inhibit further European integration, especially in the field of defense. The first of these points can be more easily discussed in the context of bilateral arrangements between America and Russia and the effect of these on the European future. The second Russian aim would raise in an inconvenient form for West Europeans the whole question of the future of Eastern Europe. For though they must perforce recognize the de facto Russian domination beyond the Elbe, it would none the less be highly embarrassing to be asked to embody it in durable arrangements for the future of Europe. Not only would this discourage such velleities of national independence as already exist within the Russian empire, but it might also prejudice what is bound to be the uncertain future of relations between Eastern and Western Europe.

For monolithic though the present Russian régime may look at the moment, forces are clearly working for change within Soviet society which may in time crack the bureaucratic carapace that contains them. The liberalization—or at any rate the open emergence of political conflict—within the Soviet Union may come sooner than now appears possible. When it does come, it may well be accompanied by convulsions of one kind or another which will have the effect of concentrating Russia's attention on its own domestic affairs. In this event, the satellite régimes in Eastern Europe will not be unaffected. Indeed, one would expect that a relaxation of Russian attention would leave very little remaining of the carefully constructed chain of people's democracies. In view of these possibilities, in view simply of the large question mark written over the political future of the Soviet Union, it would seem undesirable for Europeans to bind themselves formally to accept an indefinite Russian suzerainty over Eastern Europe, or to make engagements which might hamper the resumption of normal relations with the countries of the Balkans and Central Europe.

Nor should Europeans accept any arrangements arising out of a European Security Conference which would restrict their

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freedom of action either in constructing an integrated Europe or in determining the policies to be pursued by it once constructed. It is perfectly possible that there might be a Soviet attempt to suggest that NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be recognized as the only two military alliances in Europe accepted within the framework of a security pact. Such a proposal would mean that solely European military arrangements could be objected to as infringements of such a pact. This is a purely hypothetical instance, but it is easy to think of other ways in which the results of a European Security Conference could place obstacles on the road to an integrated Europe. The basic principle of what might come out of such a conference would presumably be an acceptance on all sides of the status quo in Europe, of a balance of forces which has, at any rate, the advantage of being already in existence. But it is precisely a change of that status quo which the appearance of an integrated regional Europe, beginning to take on political shape during the seventies, would mean. Realistically, any permanent arrangements for Europe should take into account the possibility of this new entity, but it is a major purpose of the Russian proposal for a Security Conference at this moment that they should not. On the contrary, arrangements should emerge from such a conference that would help to abort or shackle it.

V

A Russian diplomatic offensive combined with an American desire to withdraw to a greater or lesser degree from military commitments in Europe have therefore reversed the conditions of the fifties and produced a conjuncture which is unfavorable to further European integration. And something of the same limiting effect can also be discerned in the bilateral negotiations now being carried on between the United States and the Soviet Union. Any united Europe worthy of the name must have a defense structure corresponding to its attainment of political integration. That defense structure will certainly have to cover the nuclear weapons already possessed by two West European powers.

Yet agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) at present being conducted in Helsinki would probably have for effect the limitation of European capacities in the nuclear field. However much the current American administration

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may favor the idea of European unity, it would be expecting too much of it to suppose that in talks so vitally important for the United States it could easily refuse to accept a point in the name of the hypothetical rights possessed by a political entity which has not yet made its appearance. And the Russo-American talks on the Middle East (where West Europeans have an urgent interest in the continuation of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf) will produce the same result. The European view of these matters will not be heeded unless the European voice is heard—and not merely the vociferations of individual nation-states. Whatever the goodwill of American negotiators, they will not take into consideration a mere absence.

Like Great Britain in its current attempt to enter the Common Market, a future political Europe is constantly in danger of being committed (and therefore limited) by the results of negotiations at which it is not represented and which it will be powerless to alter. If the lines of future European security are to be sketched out between America and Russia, then the odds are that they will be so drawn as only to leave room for a Europe feebly integrated and politically impotent. This will not necessarily be due to any hostility—on the American side, at any rate. But in any arrangements made here and now about European security, the two superpowers will not easily agree on the complex calculations necessary to estimate the role of an emergent Europe and also probably have little interest in making the effort. They will not be concerned with waiting for a European Godot. They will hardly care to imagine what form his appearance might take.

In the event of a détente between Russia and America going as far as genuine agreement over European security, then the freedom of action of a future political Europe might be restricted to a point where it was unable to emerge at all. Since political action tends to be created by political opportunity, it might reasonably be supposed that a Europe finding itself in an international subsystem would not feel it necessary to produce a strong political reaction to its own condition. Indeed, an agreement on European security between the United States and Russia, accompanied by a withdrawal of American forces from Europe, would logically make of Western Europe a neutral zone (though not a "third force"), creating a Europe *à la Suédoise* which would make up for lack of power by the assumption of stern moral attitudes toward the international shortcomings of others.

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If, on the other hand, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorate, then American policy can be expected once more to do all it can to hasten European integration. In that case, however, the policies of a united Europe would be an adjunct to American global policies. It is the state of muted hostility between America and Russia, which neither polarizes the world into military alliances nor supervises it in the name of a series of bilateral agreements, that gives the maximum freedom of choice to a political Europe—as, indeed, to all emergent centers of world power. The present uncertainty of relations between the two superpowers is probably, however, a transitional phase of world politics—another reason for Europeans to hurry if they wish to achieve what the founders of the Common Market had in mind: political unity and independent power.

Despite the subdued euphoria which followed the Hague conference, those who are engaged in constructing a future Europe must realize that time may not be on their side. Not only has the result of their labors begun to impinge on the interests of Russia and America, but the superpowers themselves have now reached a point in their relationship where the seventies may well see decisions taken between them on the subject of a general European settlement with or without a European Security Conference. The possible area of independent European decision is being narrowed, but without such possibilities there will be no imperative need for political machinery to take collective European decisions. Why surmount all the obstacles to common political action, if at the end of the road there is nothing to be done with the institutions that have been forged? A European settlement based on the status quo and guaranteed by the two superpowers might well act as a soporific on those forces which, hitherto, have made for European integration. It would certainly act as a powerful argument against them on the part of those who wish to let sleeping dogs lie.

VI

Up to now a sense of danger and diminution have been the best spurs to European unity. Existing European institutions were created after Korea and the Berlin blockade, and after Suez. Now there should be an equal sense of urgency. It should be realized, for instance, that if the present British negotiation with the Six fails, it is unlikely that the European voice will

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have any influence at all on events during the seventies. In a sense the important thing about this and other negotiations for the enlargement of the Community is that they should be got over quickly. Until they are, no other European task—certainly no political task—can be begun. And it will be precisely in the seventies that the European Economic Community will need to embark on political tasks, to take that major step forward on pain of ceasing to progress at all.

Just how the transfer from the economic to the political level will be achieved—supposing that all goes well—is not easy to foresee. It would be logical for a beginning to be made in the field of defense; but because of Germany's special position, this would have to deal with conventional rather than with nuclear forces. Something, indeed, might be done in the way of a nuclear agreement between Britain and France, but this would have its importance in the context of Anglo-French relations (and hence as a preliminary to Britain's entry into the Community). An arrangement which left Germany as odd man out could hardly be the starting-point for further European integration.

Yet some steps must be taken and some thinking done if Europe is to have any influence at all on the new international conjuncture which is now in the process of formation. Immediately, the negotiations for the enlargement of the Community can be speeded as far as is possible. European statesmen could also think seriously about how they could extend common policies into the area of defense. Meanwhile they might note that the places on the board are nearly all occupied in the international game of Go and do their best to keep what freedom of action they still have. That is, they should judge international events by the freedom they leave to the Europe of the future and refuse to acquiesce in arrangements that diminish it. If they are not prepared to act now in the name of an emergent Europe, then they can hardly be surprised if the ideal of European unity turns out to be one of history's more transient dreams.

For the United States this would not be a happy conclusion. An enlightened American policy helped to encourage European integration as a means of stabilizing and perpetuating the success of the Marshall Plan and increasing European security. It was perceived at that time that a powerful and independent Western Europe was in the interest of the United States, and this is, no doubt, still true today. It is also true that a European settlement

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arrived at without heeding specifically European interests would be unlikely to produce stability and would imply a retreat on America's part from the most creative sector of its foreign policy over the last 25 years.

A Europe ceasing to move toward common policies—that is, toward an eventual strengthening of its political and military position—would imply either the indefinite presence of American troops on the Elbe or the acceptance of a neutral Western Europe with all the uncertainties that would accompany it. Whatever the Department of Commerce may think, agricultural surpluses are a bad starting-point for the consideration of questions like these. Over the next years Europeans will show whether they are sufficiently resourceful and energetic to take their destiny into their own hands in time to prevent it from being decided for them. It would be as well if the United States continued to accord such positive efforts as they can make to the encouragement and understanding that have previously been available.

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# NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND AMERICA

*By Andrew J. Pierre*

THE Atlantic nations are moving toward a new security relationship which may in time involve the role of European strategic nuclear forces. We are in a period of widespread questioning of the nature of future American participation in the defense of Western Europe. In the squalor of American cities, the increased racial and social tensions of our society and the demands for a shift in national priorities away from defense toward domestic problems lie the seeds of change. If we add to these the economic recovery of Europe, the U.S. view that the allies are not carrying a fair share of their own defense, the balance-of-payments deficit toward which the U.S. forces abroad make a substantial contribution, the squeeze on the Pentagon budget, the tendency resulting from the traumatic experience in Vietnam to shed responsibilities, we find the ingredients of a reduced U.S. military involvement in Europe.

Western Europe will, however, remain dependent upon the American commitment to its security. As long as the western end of the Eurasian land-mass is not politically united, and so long as the need for "security" from the East exists, the United States must continue to act as the balancer. The only alternative to the American nuclear umbrella is a full-scale European nuclear deterrent, and this is not feasible for as far ahead as we can see. The military requirements of such a deterrent are roughly equal to the panoply of nuclear forces of the superpowers; the political requisites are even more daunting. The control arrangement for such a force would require a political authority capable of deciding on its use on behalf of Europe. No nation in the present European system will be prepared to place its survival in the hands of another, since the use of the deterrent could invite the destruction of its homeland. The necessary psychological cohesion, political unity and institutional loyalty are lacking. Only a President of Europe with full authority in a nuclear crisis could endow a European deterrent with credibility.

Europe must nevertheless fulfill a role worthy of itself in its own defense. Attention should now turn to how the European pillar of NATO might be strengthened. American forces in

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Europe are going to be reduced, if not this year or next, then not long thereafter. There is hardly any chance that they will be totally withdrawn, for their "hostage" function is necessary. Either European force levels will then be increased—which appears unlikely in the present atmosphere of détente and domestic priorities—or the Alliance will have to reshape its defensive strategy. The bare bones of the flexible response strategy, adopted in 1967 upon American urging, are already showing. A revised NATO strategy should substitute qualitative improvements for quantitative reductions. Greater use should be made of small, mobile forces in place of present Central front deployments, and the conventional air and ground forces of the European armies should be further rationalized and integrated. In recent months the European NATO governments have begun the painful task of finding ways to increase their share of non-nuclear defenses.

We should also think anew about the existing European nuclear forces. Hardly any attention has been paid to them in the last few years; perhaps this was due to "MLF fatigue," and in many ways it has been a welcome respite. The divisive debate over the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) illustrated the dangers of superimposing a totally new and complex nuclear-weapons scheme upon the existing pattern of strategic weapons and alliance relationships. The relative success of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO in providing a forum for information and consultations on nuclear strategy has also been a factor in the respite, as has the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Moreover, the Wilson government, in its discomfort following its failure to fulfill its electoral pledge of "renegotiating" the Nassau Agreement of 1962, treated the subject of Britain's nuclear force with embarrassed silence.

Yet if Western Europe is in time going to take on a substantially larger share of the responsibility for its own security, the role of European nuclear forces will have to be reappraised. A major lesson of the past two decades is that Britain and France will not accept a non-nuclear role, leaving the deterrence function solely to the United States. Even if the abstract logic of some strategic analysts suggests that "rationally" these forces should be abandoned—that they cannot be employed against the U.S.S.R. without inviting holocaustal retribution—the political military, bureaucratic, psychological *and* security incentives

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and pressures which led to their creation and maintenance point elsewhere. Moreover, the British and French strategic forces do exist; fresh thought should now be given to their future—and the American relationship to it. Nuclear diplomacy provides the United States with a wide range of choice through which it can exert considerable influence on the evolution of Europe.

## II

An examination of the future of the European nuclear forces must begin with a consideration of the impact of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) upon Europe, and upon European-American relations. Thus far the public impact has been slight, and the European governments appear to be generally satisfied with the level of consultations in NATO. The establishment of stability in the Soviet-American strategic balance would be in their interest. The superpower arms race, though not costly to the Europeans, is dangerous. The possibility of a successful first-strike capability against an adversary's retaliatory force is alarming. The European concern in halting the strategic competition is based on the fact that Europe is at the center of the East-West confrontation and might well be the first to suffer should nuclear war start.

On the other hand, from Europe's point of view, the simple fact that the SALT dialogue is now well under way places the central strategic balance, around which the structure of international relations in most of the industrialized world is built, in a somewhat new perspective. A rough parity in the strategic nuclear capabilities of the superpowers now exists and will probably be codified through SALT. As the perception of this parity sinks into the consciousness of the European public, the credibility of the American security guarantee to Europe, especially that part of it dependent on the first use of strategic nuclear weapons, may become open to further question. The European allies should consider, however, that the United States has been vulnerable to nuclear devastation for over a decade, and that the credibility of the American guarantee has been based less on "superiority" in nuclear weapons than on the intangibles of shared interests and political resolve.

What would be the consequence of a deployment of an Anti-Ballistic Missile system (ABM) by the United States upon the viability of the security guarantee to Europe? This is difficult

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to judge because it is so much a matter of perceptions. Two competing speculations are possible. On one hand, the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment could be perceived as increasing the credibility of the guarantee in that the retaliatory force might be insured against destruction, and an eventual area defense of the population would strengthen American resolution in times of crisis. Alternatively, the United States could be seen as withdrawing into a "fortress America" mentality and losing interest in her allies after having developed the protective cover of ABM. A third "scenario" may well come closer to what might occur: the United States continues on with its ABM program in fits and starts, but sufficient doubt persists concerning its effectiveness that on balance there is little impact upon belief in the reliability of the American guarantee.

Deployment of ABM and Multiple Independently Targeted Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRV) by the superpowers, particularly if it were on a large scale, could nevertheless leave Western Europe with a sense of nuclear nakedness. The Soviet Union with its Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), medium-range strategic bombers, tactical nuclear weapons and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) that can be retargeted, maintains a massive capability against Western Europe. This may increase the fear that Western Europe will be held as a "hostage" by the Soviet Union against American actions and policies around the world. One need only recall the concern about possible Soviet pressure on Berlin at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. In addition, with both superpowers partially secure behind their missile defenses but in all likelihood still vulnerable to each other, there may develop a concern that the superpowers will adopt strategies of "controlled" warfare with the European continent as the potential battlefield. In such circumstances Britain and France would have an interest in retaining the means to break up the rules of engagement. The Europeans are extremely sensitive to becoming the inadvertent victims of a growing Soviet-American global commonality of interests.

It is most unlikely, however, that the West European states would respond to Soviet and American deployment of ABM and MIRV by building an ABM system for their own defense, even if American assistance were to be made available. A European ABM would be for the purpose of defending its popula-

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tion since there will be few "hard" targets such as European land-based nuclear retaliatory forces. But the task of constructing an effective system of area defense would probably present insurmountable difficulties. The close geographical proximity of Western Europe to the Soviet Union necessitates an extremely rapid and technically efficient ABM system, but even if it were feasible to create it at great cost, the Soviet Union could respond by threatening "unacceptable damage" with alternate forms of offensive forces, such as manned bombers and cruise missiles. The cost of a European ABM system would be much greater than the expense which the Soviet Union would incur by improving its offensive capabilities enough to neutralize it. Moreover, the political as well as the command and control problems of organizing a European ABM would be formidable. Such a system would almost certainly require nuclear warheads and, because of the close proximity to Soviet nuclear forces, a decision to use ABMs would have to be made within seconds of the launching of an attack.

Will the new advanced technology, ABM and MIRV in particular, be the death blow to the European nuclear forces? It has often been predicted that the expense and difficulty of overcoming ballistic missile defenses will squeeze smaller strategic forces out of the calculus of deterrence. One must be careful, however, not to downgrade these forces too quickly. No doubt it is true that the new, costly and sophisticated systems serve as a stark reminder of the technological dominance of the superpowers. Contrary to the assumptions of some observers, however, it does not necessarily follow that ABM and MIRV will make smaller nuclear forces obsolete.

The British and French forces have a counter-city doctrine, that is, they are designed to deter by threatening the adversary's population and industrial centers. Unlike the United States, Britain and France do not attempt to maintain elements of a counter-force strategy designed to limit damage by destroying the adversary's offensive forces. As long as the Soviet Union does not possess a very effective ABM defense of all its principal cities, the British Polaris A-3 missile and the coming land- and sea-based French missiles are likely to pose a credible threat. These European forces need not reach all the enemy's population centers, or even any one particular city, in order to inflict "unacceptable damage." The threat to do marginal damage to the

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Soviet Union, to destroy one or two medium-sized cities, may well be sufficient for the required level of deterrence. Moreover, the ability to threaten a nation not possessing ballistic missile defenses—China, for example—would not be diminished.

Much will depend upon the outcome of SALT. An agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to maintain a low level of ABM, or to ban ABM altogether, would probably maintain the credibility of the European nuclear forces and lengthen the utility of the present generation of their weapons systems. An outcome leading to a comprehensive ABM deployment in the Soviet Union would seriously undermine their credibility. It is very unlikely that the British Polaris submarines or the French strategic missile forces would be able to penetrate "thick" Soviet missile defenses. In such a case the European forces, individually or collectively, would need to climb up to a higher technological plateau.

III

The British strategic force consists of four nuclear submarines each of which has 16 Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of over 2,500 nautical miles.[1] The missiles are tipped with Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs), of British design, which are not independently targeted. Under the terms of the Polaris Sales Agreement the British have bought the missiles from the United States, and American manufacturers provided components of the navigation system, the fire-control system and some of the communications equipment. The submarines themselves are of British manufacture, as are the nuclear warheads. Because of the refitting required after each 60-day patrol, and the more extensive overhaul after longer intervals, it is only possible to assure having one submarine on operational patrol at all times, although most of the time there should be two. The nuclear force is "assigned" to NATO, as agreed at Nassau, with the right of withdrawal when "supreme national interests" are at stake. Target plans have been made in coördination with the Alliance through the Joint Strategic Planning System, but Britain is assumed also to have a targeting plan of its own. The construction of the Polaris

[1] In addition, the British military nuclear capability includes the Canberra bombers, the Buccaneer bombers, the aging Vulcan and Victor bombers, the F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers and two planned aircraft, the Jaguar Anglo-French strike/trainer and the MRCA, multi-role combat aircraft, being constructed by a consortium of nations. Each of these aircraft has a tactical nuclear capability.

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flotilla, which was scheduled to be finished in late 1970, was remarkably inexpensive since the research and development was undertaken earlier by the United States and because there was a high order of coöperation between the two countries. The running costs are also low, less than two percent of the defense budget.

The obsolescence of the Polaris submarines will depend upon progress in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and deployment of ABM defenses. In recent years a great deal of effort has been put into research in ASW techniques, but thus far the ability to detect long-range, nuclear-powered submarines remains extremely limited. Most experts who have looked at the task of tracking and detection in the deep seas believe that advances in ASW will not make Polaris submarines vulnerable for some time.

The potential challenge posed by ABM is more serious. The presently limited Soviet ABM deployment of uncertain quality is unlikely to be very effective against British Polaris submarines. But a moderate or heavy Soviet missile defense would present real penetration difficulties, and the Soviets could achieve this by the middle-to-late 1970s. This would be especially true if Britain does not acquire a MIRV capability and more sophisticated penetration aids. In such circumstances, a growing Soviet defensive capability would present obstacles earlier and far greater to Britain, and to France, than to American offensive forces.

Planning should now be under way for the 1980s. Because of the long lead time necessary, strategic delivery systems take an average of seven years for research and development. Thus, Britain should be prepared to make some important decisions around 1973 if it is to be assured a relatively viable nuclear force in the following decade. Whitehall planners and Westminster politicians, in reaching their decisions, will have to grapple with some fundamental questions. Does Britain wish to remain dependent upon the United States for its strategic delivery systems? If not, should Britain seek self-sufficiency by embarking on a strategic missile program of its own? Or should Britain attempt to develop a collaborative arrangement with France for the joint development and production of nuclear weapons? In weighing the alternatives, British leaders will have to consider the broad spectrum of foreign policy, including the developing

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nature of East-West relations, the steadfastness of the American commitment to the security of Western Europe, prospects for limitations on the superpowers' strategic forces and the nature of the coming strategic environment.

The question of Great Britain's future in Europe will be a central one. If the negotiations on entry into the Common Market are promising, or Britain is brought into the EEC, the European element of British policy will undoubtedly be strengthened. And we do not know if some sort of an arrangement with France on nuclear collaboration may not yet be the necessary ticket of entry into Europe. It is difficult to conceive of a real *entente nucléaire* between Paris and London while Britain continues to remain outside the Community. Once in the EEC, however, Britain would be likely to want to use its knowledge and experience in nuclear matters, and its position of comparative strength in defense technology, to help shape the future course of the Continent.

Another consideration involves the future of the Anglo-American special relationship in nuclear affairs. British policy-makers will want to ascertain whether they can expect to receive from the United States another generation of strategic systems after the Polaris submarines, or if they can plan on assistance in warhead design, for example, MIRVs. This will not be an easy task. A detailed examination of the tangled history of Anglo-American nuclear relations since 1939 illustrates its bittersweet nature. Conflict as well as coöperation during the wartime Manhattan Project, the Quebec Agreement of 1943, the abrupt end of collaboration with the passage of the McMahon Act in 1946, the abortive 1949 negotiations on renewal of collaboration, Skybolt and Nassau in 1962—all reveal the extent to which such decisions have been as much the result of timing, politics and personality as of orderly and rational decision-making.[2]

In the middle 1970s, relevant sections of the U.S.-U.K. nuclear exchange agreement of 1958 will terminate. The separate articles dealing with the exchange of information on nuclear weapons and providing for the exchange of weapons-grade nuclear fissile materials will end in 1974. It should not be assumed that these accords will be renewed in a routine manner, although this could occur (as has already happened once). There are those in the

[2] The subject will be treated in detail in my forthcoming book on the politics, strategy and technology of the British nuclear force, 1939–1970.

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United States who oppose the favorable treatment accorded Britain. The privileged access given London is seen as harmful to America's relations with France; as affirming the importance of nuclear weapons in the eyes of non-nuclear nations; and as psychologically deflecting Britain from its true European destiny. If such arguments gain influence, then Washington will want to consider the U.S.-U.K. nuclear accords in the context of the defense arrangements of the Alliance as a whole.

For its part, Britain must recognize that along with the very considerable technological benefits of the special nuclear relationship have come some not insubstantial political costs. The French have always viewed the bilateral nuclear ties with suspicion, and some French leaders see them as the acid test of Britain's political loyalty. De Gaulle's failure in his 1958 bid for equal treatment through a three-power directorate, and Britain's choice at Nassau of the United States as its future nuclear partner, undoubtedly contributed to keeping the United Kingdom barred from the Common Market. If Britain is to be fully accepted by the continental countries as a European state, it may have to strengthen its European identity by a corresponding loosening of its close ties across the Atlantic.

Let us consider some of the options available to Britain, turning initially to those that do not involve coöperation with France.

First, Britain could give up its nuclear force. The Polaris submarines when they wear out in the 1980s might simply not be replaced; or the missile systems could be taken out of the boats earlier and the submarines converted to an attack role. Another possibility would be to sell the Polaris flotilla to the U.S. Navy. Many on the British Far Left would be pleased. But it is unlikely that any of these possibilities will occur. The watershed of the ten-year national debate on Britain's independent possession of nuclear weapons was reached with the Labour government's quiet decision in 1964–65 not to "renegotiate" Nassau by cancelling the agreement for the purchase of Polaris missiles. Whatever may have been the merits in the past of the arguments for phasing out of the military nuclear business—and they were considerable—Britain will not, through an act of self-abnegation, now leave France as the sole nuclear power in Europe.

As to nonproliferation, the once widespread belief that Britain, by voluntarily renouncing its nuclear arms, could strongly influence other countries to desist from acquiring them, has lost

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much of its validity. Today, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the heart of the anti-proliferation strategy; the countries to be influenced are less those of Western Europe than of Asia and the Middle East; and these states, being primarily concerned with regional security and prestige, are not going to be much influenced by exemplary action on the part of Britain. Nor is it clear how a nation can convince the world that it has "ceased" to be a military nuclear power, even if it wishes to, except through a system of comprehensive international inspection of plants, stockpiles, military facilities, etc.

Finally, it is quite possible that Britain's nuclear capability will play some role, perhaps a major one, in the evolution of its future relationship to Europe and the future organization of Western defense. British leaders are unlikely to forget that in their nuclear force they possess an important bargaining asset and instrument of diplomacy. Unless there is a surprising transformation in the present international system, it is unlikely that Britain will on its own give up nuclear weapons over roughly the next 20 years; beyond that, prediction is hardly ever wise.

Second, Britain could pursue a policy of deliberate technological independence—a policy not to be derided since it is the chosen course of all the other nuclear powers. France's example is being watched with great interest and some envy—"French missiles will carry the tricolore, Britain's the stars and stripes." A case can be made for a new missile program on the basis of technological advancement and the need for staying in advanced research and development; Britain has not been developing long-range missiles since the cancellation of Blue Streak in 1960. A new British-developed missile would probably make sense only if it were to be launched at sea.

A mobile land-based missile, an IRBM moved by road or rail around the Scottish Highlands, is conceivable. But in all likelihood it would be politically unacceptable since it would make the British Isles a lightning rod susceptible to a Soviet counterforce threat. Moreover, as far as we can look ahead in strategic technology, sea-based deterrent forces appear to have a considerable edge over land-based ones in retaining their invulnerability. If it were decided to develop a long-range missile it might therefore be quite similar to the American Poseidon; this would be very expensive and technologically consuming, but it need not be beyond the nation's capabilities. Alternatively, Brit-

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ain could simply develop its own MIRVs for the existing Polaris fleet. A British MIRV would probably carry fewer and smaller warheads than those developed for Poseidon, but improvements in accuracy might well compensate for this.

Third, Britain could seek to renew its present dependency upon the United States. This might be the least expensive option, but in the long run it could have a restrictive influence upon British foreign policy since it is hardly compatible with the arguments for pursuing a greater role in Europe. Assuming this course were followed—in many ways it is the most "natural" given past history—what weapons might Britain receive? Poseidon in combination with the American MIRV would be an obvious choice; or the American MIRV alone might be adapted for use on the British Polaris. The present size of the Polaris flotilla might be increased so as to enhance its credibility as a deterrent. Even two more submarines would make a substantial difference, since they would double the number that can be guaranteed on patrol at all times. But attention might also be turned to the next generation of sea-based deterrence, the ULMS (Undersea Long-Range Missile System) submarine, with 20 MIRVed missiles of 5,000-mile range. This new system has yet to be approved for production, but since the sea increasingly appears as the best environment for a retaliatory strategic force, its future looks promising.

The French nuclear force is at quite an earlier stage of development than the British. Moreover, Paris does not have as wide a range of decisions to make in the coming years as does London. Construction of the *force de frappe,* which was decided upon a decade after the equivalent British decision, has fallen considerably behind in the past three years. The social upheavals of May 1968 and the monetary crisis of that autumn forced a reduction in the military budget, postponement of the 1969 nuclear tests, and a delay in the production of the missile systems. The French force consists at present of 36 Mirage IV bombers which will begin to be supplemented in late 1971, two years behind schedule, by nine land-based solid-fuel IRBMs in Haute-Provence. Due to rising costs, the number of silos was reduced from 27 to 18. The first of the missile-firing nuclear submarines, the *Redoutable,* having suffered an equivalent delay, is now being tested and should be operational in 1971. The third submarine will not be ready until 1975, and a fourth is contemplated; mean-

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while the French are still far from having perfected a compact thermonuclear warhead for the sea-launched missiles, and further atmospheric tests are expected in the Pacific this summer.

The third *loi-programme,* covering military expenditures for the next five years, was approved by the National Assembly this past October. The priority given to the *force de frappe* by de Gaulle is to continue under President Pompidou and his ultra-Gaullist Minister of Defense, Michel Debré. Despite great concern in professional ranks about the condition of the army's and navy's conventional forces, one-third of new procurement over the next five years, or $5.5 billion, will be devoted to nuclear forces, including the Pluton tactical nuclear bomb which will come into service in 1973. The *force de frappe* is an ambitious undertaking, and thus far has been developed almost wholly independently. If France had benefited from the same American assistance as did Britain, it would be several years ahead. With current expenditures running at a level of $1 billion a year, competing welfare demands are increasingly being heard in France. French administrators and scientists, looking at the technology ahead, especially the need for improved penetration capabilities in case of further Soviet ABM deployment, and fearing further budgetary squeezes, have for some time been interested in nuclear collaboration with Britain.

IV

An *entente nucléaire* between Britain and France has an inherent logic since many of the interests of the only two nuclear powers of Europe do coincide. For both countries the almost inevitable reduction of American forces in Europe and the continuing strategic dialogue between the superpowers will require a reëvaluation of the role of European nuclear forces in the defense of Western Europe. And both countries may also be faced with the task of maintaining credible nuclear forces within an increasingly technologically advanced strategic environment.

An analysis of the possibilities for Anglo-French nuclear collaboration must be separated into two parts. One is the potential for an exchange of knowledge of nuclear weapons, including that about their production, and the transfer of existing nuclear materials and technology. The other is the possibility of coöperation on the operational use of nuclear weapons, that is, their targeting and deployment. The latter is particularly important since it is

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affected by concepts of national sovereignty and should be consistent with alliance relationships. Although technological needs may present the original basis for collaboration, it is the political requirements of policy which in the final analysis are paramount.

If one looks at the technology of the British and French strategic nuclear programs, one finds that they are remarkably complementary and therefore suitable for a series of exchanges. Britain is far ahead in the design of warheads, having exploded its first thermonuclear device more than ten years before France and having also acquired much design information from the United States. France, for her part, needs assistance in warhead miniaturization and is greatly interested in the British experience with MRV warheads. The sophistication of warheads is, of course, the crucial factor in the ability to penetrate ballistic missile defenses.

With regard to missile propulsion the situation is reversed. France is ahead in the production of solid-fuel ballistic missiles, having designed them for the 18 IRBM silos in Haute-Provence and for placement in her missile-launching submarines. Because of the expected availability of Skybolt and Polaris, Britain (as mentioned earlier) has no strategic missile program of its own. As to guidance technology, comparative strength is difficult to judge. Although Britain has acquired a great deal of knowledge through the Polaris program, France has done more independent work in some areas of guidance.

Since existing strengths and weaknesses are roughly complementary, the technical basis for an agreement on collaboration undoubtedly does exist. The benefits of a straight technological exchange would not, however, be equally distributed. At the present juncture France would gain the most. An early agreement on technological assistance could save considerable money and time for France, even in developing her present generation of systems; for Britain it is too late, and in any case the assistance came from the United States. This is part of the explanation for the French interest in collaboration in recent years and the relative British lack of enthusiasm.

Joint development of a post-Polaris system would be another matter, likely to be attractive to both countries if it were possible to bring together British warhead knowledge with French missile propulsion experience. Such a combination would permit substantial savings for what is likely to be a very costly strategic

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system, since it may have to be capable of penetrating missile defenses. Anglo-French nuclear collaboration on the next generation of both their nuclear forces might encompass joint research and development, common testing and the coöperative production of the system, or some variation of these. Collaboration might also be broadened to include work on nuclear hunter-killer submarines, the production of enriched nuclear fuel and weapons-grade nuclear materials, and the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons.

The political understanding necessary for Anglo-French collaboration may be more difficult to achieve than the technological basis. Nuclear weapons not being like consumer products, the manufacturer will produce only if he retains influence over how his product is to be employed. Thus collaboration would entail agreement on nuclear targeting and force deployments as well as some common understanding concerning political aims.

In the mid-1970s Britain and France will have missile-firing submarine forces which are remarkably symmetrical. Both will have four boats, carrying in each case 16 missiles per boat. An Anglo-French force of eight submarines could assure a minimum of three on patrol at any time, and more often than not four. Since this would provide a greater threat to the Soviet Union than either force separately, it would enhance the credibility of the deterrence capability of either nation.

Such an Anglo-French force could be constituted by the coördination of targeting plans, patrol missions, some joint communications and intelligence, and possibly coöperation in maintenance facilities. Command and control arrangements would remain national, however, as would the ownership of the boats. Each national contingent would be left able to recapture total freedom of action whenever vital interests were at stake. The decision to fire would thus be solely a national one—as indeed it must be so long as nations are not prepared to give up a most vital element of their sovereignty—control over their military forces.

There are major political inhibitions in such an arrangement, and the first is created by the special nuclear relationship with the United States. The 1958 agreement on nuclear exchange forbids either country to transfer knowledge and secret information obtained from the other to a third party. Although Britain has without doubt originated a good deal of valuable data

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through its own research, it would be almost impossible fully to disentangle such indigenous information from that obtained from the United States. Nevertheless, some British-produced data could certainly be isolated and passed on to France without American permission. Doubts arise as to whether this would be a wise thing to do if it irritated the U.S. government and especially the Congress. With so much of Britain's nuclear program linked to that of its ally, and the full range of its future options dependent upon a continuation of these close ties, there would seem to be a high value placed upon maintaining the spirit as well as the legal terms of the agreement. Whitehall officials have long been sensitive to this and, unless there is a major reorientation of defense policy, they are unlikely to propose an accord with France which could upset the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress.

The divergent views on the Atlantic Alliance currently held by France on one hand, and by Britain and the United States on the other, create a still more formidable political inhibition. Britain in recent years has been of the view that nuclear policy should be discussed in the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO and that European nuclear forces should be targeted in coördination with those of the United States. Accordingly, an Anglo-French force should fall within the Alliance framework. This has been contrary to the French view which sees NATO as too much under U.S. influence and which therefore equates the coördination of forces within NATO with loss of national autonomy.

An Anglo-French force *outside* NATO would have grave disadvantages. The United States would not support it, and consequently the restrictive provisions of the Anglo-American exchange agreement would come into play. Such a nuclear contingent outside NATO would also not be acceptable to the West Germans since it would not be committed to their defense and might thus stir a wave of interest in national atomic weapons in Germany. Moreover, it would be of concern to the other NATO members as a step away from the common defense of Western Europe and might thus induce the unravelling of the Alliance. Outside NATO and without the support of the United States, an Anglo-French force would have reduced credibility and would sharply open to question the continuation of the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe.

For these reasons the present political obstacles to Anglo-

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French nuclear collaboration seem formidable. So long as France insists on unblemished nuclear independence, an arrangement satisfactory to the two countries as well as to the Federal Republic and the United States seems unlikely.

Still, the trend is not unfavorable toward an eventual accord. In the past two years, France has dropped the *tous azimuts* strategy of armed neutrality and her nuclear doctrine has moved closer to that of the Alliance. The selective, ad hoc coöperation of French forces in West Germany with NATO increased after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Now, immediately following the death of de Gaulle, France is not likely to make abrupt changes in policy, such as an early return to NATO, but the political shadow cast from Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises will quickly diminish. With the passage of time and changes in the cabinet, France's role in the world will be reassessed, and some of the more Gaullist conceptions of the Alliance are likely to be modified. The new British government has at its head a man who has since 1967 spoken favorably of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration within NATO. It is no secret that a number of influential Conservatives are interested in exploring the possibilities. Among these is Britain's chief negotiator with the Common Market, Geoffrey Rippon, until recently the shadow Minister of Defense. The Nixon Administration, moreover, is not unsympathetic to reviewing its nuclear-sharing policy, especially if this encourages the European allies to take on greater responsibility for their own defense.

V

The time has come for making progress toward creating a European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance—one ready to bear a heavier burden of Europe's defense. This might parallel the progress which is now under way in the widening and deepening of the Community. Coöperation within Europe across the spectrum of defense activities—conventional and nuclear—would be increased as the American military role is reduced and the redistribution of responsibilities takes place.

In so far as strategic weapons are concerned, Britain, France and the United States might enter into a new set of nuclear relationships. Collaboration on nuclear-weapons technology between London and Paris would receive the support of Washington as would the coördination of the targeting of the two forces. In turn,

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their joint targeting plans would be coördinated with those of the United States in the same manner as the British plans have been coördinated in the past. In practice both the ultimate command and control decisions, as well as the ownership of the forces, would remain in the hands of the respective national authorities, although nuclear planning—both targeting and strategy—would be a common undertaking. Britain and France would accordingly have three sets of target plans: "Alliance," "European" and "National," the latter in the unlikely event that independent action should ever be desirable.

The British and French forces might become subject to the advisory guidelines of a European Nuclear Committee (ENC) on which the non-nuclear countries would be represented. This would be of special importance to the Federal Republic of Germany as the only major West European power without an independent nuclear capability. The ENC would permit the formulation of a European perspective on planning for contingencies and political guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons. A unified European view might thereby be presented to the United States. The ENC would also be an appropriate forum for discussion of the problems associated with the next generation of the European nuclear forces. In time, if the notion that the British and French forces were truly "Europe's force" took hold, the non-nuclear countries might contribute to their maintenance either through joint production of delivery systems or through common financing. This arrangement would not involve a breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty since it would not include a transfer of nuclear weapons, or of their control, to non-nuclear powers.

The United States could assist such a European grouping in a number of ways. Britain might be released from some of the restraints of the Anglo-American nuclear agreement so as to permit it to exchange knowledge and materials with France. The ten American Polaris submarines not to be converted for Poseidon missiles might be sold to the ENC with the understanding that they would be operated by Britain and France on behalf of Europe. A direct offer of technological help to Britain and France in the construction and maintenance of their nuclear forces would be the most important form of assistance. This would be of particular significance if they needed to acquire MIRVs in order to overcome a heavy Soviet ABM defense.

Such a new American policy, especially with respect to nu-

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clear sharing with France, would be a recognition that the conditions and priorities of the future will differ from those of the 1960s. Then it was argued that de Gaulle's coöperation could not be "bought;" nor should he be "rewarded" for his attacks on NATO and the dollar. Perhaps that was right for the times, but France, we hope, will now gradually be returning to the Alliance system. If Paris agrees to joint targeting, the *force de frappe* should no longer be seen as a challenge to American policy.

Similarly, past concern over nonproliferation no longer seems as relevant. France is a nuclear power; her example has not encouraged Germany to emulate her; and the real dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons are now outside Europe. The NPT, the SALT dialogue between the superpowers, the progress toward European economic integration, the opening of new contacts between Western and Eastern Europe, and the forthcoming reduction in the American military presence in Western Europe are all creating new circumstances. Consideration should be given to a more constructive U.S. policy of aiding the European nuclear forces so as to integrate them into a polity of Western deterrence. This might, in the long run, be the best way for the United States to retain its influence in the affairs of Europe.

American nuclear assistance to the European forces is a difficult and complex policy problem, but it is one that will have to be reëxamined in any case when the present agreement with Britain expires in 1974. U.S. policy on this matter should be informed by the following considerations: (1) assistance should be offered only if France and Britain, jointly or individually, request it; the U.S. should not be the promoter of a new design, a "solution," or even attempt to act as a catalyst; (2) West Germany should be in agreement with whatever is done and should not feel discriminated against; (3) any assistance should be consistent with the NPT and not provide the Soviet Union with a valid accusation against Bonn that it has acquired control over nuclear weapons; (4) care should be taken so that nothing is done which blocks an agreement in SALT.

A new nuclear-sharing policy with France would not require a change in the U.S. atomic energy legislation since France would now qualify under the 1958 amendments permitting assistance to those states which have already demonstrated "substantial progress" in a nuclear-weapons program of their own.

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But it would have to receive the support of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and of the Congress as a whole. This might be more readily obtained if it were done in conjunction with an understanding that there was to be a limited reduction of U.S. forces in Europe.

As far ahead as we can see, Western Europe will continue to rely upon the United States for its ultimate security guarantee. A reshaping of responsibilities is nevertheless feasible and should include a reappraisal of the value of European nuclear forces. These, we should now recognize, will under all probable circumstances be continued, and they therefore should be employed so as to make a greater contribution to the Alliance's total effort. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that Western Europe will ever be able to stand fully on its own without nuclear weapons. The goal should be a European nuclear role within the Atlantic Alliance. This would fortify the European pillar and serve as a step toward greater European political integration while enhancing the partnership with America.

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# THE REAL DIVISIONS OF EUROPE

*By André Fontaine*

ALL Gaul is divided into three parts. Curiously enough, American intellectuals resort to the celebrated quotation from Caesar more often than do their French counterparts. Similarly, the divisions in Europe and in their own homelands are no doubt felt less keenly by the citizens of the Old World than by those of the New. Americans are used to vast expanses without frontiers. It shocks them to see that there still persist in Europe the antiquated particularisms which their grandfathers left behind in favor of the comforts of the melting pot.

A good deal might be said about just how much melting has taken place in that pot up to now. American minorities are reaffirming their separate identities at the very time when, more and more, one can see coming true in Europe Upton Sinclair's famous prophecy: "Thanks to the movies, the world is becoming unified—that is, becoming Americanized." Skyscrapers, supermarkets, and even Intercontinental hotels have appeared beyond the Iron Curtain; nothing is less personalized than the cities of concrete and glass that are rising from one end of the Continent to the other, so much alike that when you arrive in the evening after a long journey you no longer know whether you are in France, Germany, Holland or Sweden. Movie houses show the same films; radios broadcast the same programs; everywhere advertisements cover the walls with the same brands of soap, of brassieres or of cars; skirt lengths obey the same norms from San Francisco to Ankara; and "sex shops," which originated in Copenhagen and New York, are opening simultaneously in Paris and Munich.

Never—even in the way in which its nonconformists make themselves conspicuous—has Europe seemed so bent on similarity. It is as if free societies naturally aspired, by a typically American trait, toward that collective identity which the subjects of totalitarian régimes would somehow like to escape because a conscious effort is made to impose it on them.

But similarity of habits and behavior can be accompanied by profound antagonisms, the stupidity of which individuals discover the moment they have a chance to step back and view them

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in the proper perspective. This was the case, for instance, with those Belgian students who confided to me that they had become friends because they were living in Paris, whereas if they had stayed at Louvain, their original university, the language conflict would have prevented Flemings and Walloons from so much as speaking to one another. In this connection, the fantastic migration, which successively made the Germans and the French for a number of years first the guardians and then the prisoners of one another, did not so much nurture the mutual hostility they had learned as children as it made each nationality aware of belonging to the same universe. There had never before been so many mixed marriages as there have been since World War II—1,200 for the year 1969 alone. And there are today 43,000 former German prisoners of war settled in France.

The fact that England was not invaded, and thus did not participate in this unprecedented migration, perhaps helps explain why it took her so long to decide to knock at the door of the Common Market, and why, at heart, she still hesitates. On the Continent, on the other hand, antagonisms between nation-states have diminished considerably over a quarter-century. All of the territorial disputes that persisted 20 years ago have since been settled. The problems of the Saar and of Trieste, which for a long time poisoned Franco-German and Italo-Jugoslav relations, were solved peacefully. Austrians and Italians have arrived at a modus vivendi over what the former call the South Tyrol and the latter the Alto Adige. After 20 years of cold war the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union have just signed a treaty that sanctions the inviolability of the frontiers established by the 1945 victory. In spite of the persistence of certain more or less circumspect disputes with respect to Transylvania, Macedonia and Eastern Moldavia, the Balkans do not appear to be about to return to Balkanization. Even Greece and Albania, officially still in a state of war, are gradually moving toward the normalization of relations.

The reawakening in various European states of regional or national rivalries contrasts with this development. To the example cited above of hostility between Flemings and Walloons, which caused another death last September, could be added a number of others, the most conspicuous of them no doubt being that of Jugoslavia. Despite Tito and the one-party system, the Croats are quick to denounce Serbian imperialism, and Slovenia

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is leaning to separatism. Bratislava's aversion to Prague, which Hitler used to his own advantage in 1938–39, served the ends of the Soviets 30 years later; the threat of a Slovak secession helped the Russians subdue Czech resistance.

As the Franco dictatorship grows progressively slacker, the demands of the Basques and the Catalans are making themselves heard with ever greater force. In a few years, the number of members of the Scottish nationalist party has increased from 2,000 to 80,000. Only the presence of British soldiers in one case and of blue helmets (U.N. forces) in the other permits the maintenance of relative calm in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Numerous court trials testify to the vitality of Ukranian nationalism. Even a wise Switzerland is obliged to face, in the canton of Bern, a French-speaking "Jurassian" separatism.

After a 20-year delay, Italy, which had already given autonomy to Sicily, Sardinia, the Val d'Aosta and the Alto Adige, decided, last June, to enforce the provisions of the constitution relating to the setting up of regional parliaments. I happened to be in Milan at the time: people with whom I talked there passed the harshest judgments on the southern Italians, and declared openly that the future of Lombardy lay in a close association with Lyon and South Germany; they were not at all burdened by how this might affect the Southerners: "Our long suit is automation," one said. "What have we to do with that army of sluggards?" And an elderly industrialist quoted Cavour to me. After Cavour had visited Bologna some years before his death, he wrote to a friend: "I had never before gone so far south; if I had, I might well have given up trying to forge Italian unity."

France herself, although her national unity is the end product of an effort pursued obstinately over the course of a thousand years by all the régimes she has ever known, is not escaping these internal dissensions. The competition between Nancy and Metz for the title of metropolis of Lorraine contributed to the defeat of General de Gaulle in the referendum of 1969, which then brought about his departure from power. The election to parliament of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber is basically the fruit of the discontent of the southern Lorrainese, chagrined at seeing the authorities favor the north.

II

If all these disputes are erupting with greater or less force just

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about everywhere in Europe, it is largely because of the atmosphere of general détente in which, for the first time in more than a half-century, its people are living. Just before and just after wars, and all the more while they are raging, the sense of a common threat binds populations together. It has often been said, for example, that World War I saved the existence of Belgium, for one of the most celebrated statesmen of its history had, just a few years before, considered it his duty to announce its inevitable dissolution to King Albert. The necessity for union, and even for outside protection, is readily accepted when the enemy is in sight. When danger is no longer felt, it is rejected.

It is important to remember, too, that not so many years ago nationalism had a bad press in many circles. The parties of the Left, faithful to the internationalist ideas of socialism, constantly denounced it, and the Catholic Church had made it a veritable heresy. Hitler and Mussolini had had too much to do with encouraging the nationalisms of the Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Flemings and even the Bretons for these groups to be able to show their colors openly after the war. Einstein expressed a widely held point of view when, contemplating the vast expanse of rubble heaped up by the nationalistic excess of the Nazis, he declared that nationalism was an "infantile disease, the measles of humanity," and put forward the idea of a world government. But with the help of decolonization, nationalism is once again on the rise. Why refuse to the Basques what the inhabitants of Rwanda have obtained?

One can also hardly overlook the democratization of education. In the Belgium of yesteryear or in the Hapsburg Empire, Flemings and Slavs found themselves relegated to a second-rate position compared to people whose mother tongue was in one case French and in the other German or Hungarian and who could therefore pursue studies which would assure their undisputed superiority. Today, the Flemings, the Slovaks, the Croats, the Slovenes or the Macedonians consider themselves—with respect, in the first instance, to the Walloons, and in the other instances to the Czechs and the Serbs—as equals who are treated unequally. The scope of their demands is proportionate to the humiliation that they still feel.

Whatever the relative importance of all these factors, however, the main one is still the inequality of development of different regions within a given country. The most spectacular

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example is obviously that of the Mezzogiorno, the Italian South, the home of 38 percent of the population of Italy, whose living standard is no more than 68 percent of the national average. But analogous contrasts can be found next door in Jugoslavia: the Slovenes in the northwest live just about as well as the Austrians, while Macedonia, Montenegro and the south of Serbia, to say nothing of Kossovo where the Albanian minority lives, and certain remote regions of Bosnia, are only just now slowly emerging from Balkan squalor. In Spain, the industrial dynamism of Catalonia and the Basque country contrasts with the underdevelopment of Andalusia or old Estremadura.

It has been said that the well-known division of the world into developed nations in the North and underdeveloped ones in the South transcends the national framework while posing virtually the same problems. The rich provinces are occupied more with adding to their wealth than with aiding the poor provinces, and investments flow more naturally toward developed regions where they are assured of quick returns than toward the deprived zones, which lack the skilled labor and the temperate climate propitious to work.

The result is the vast human current that drains off to the industrial metropolises of the North the surplus population of the South. These people are then crammed into those ghastly shantytowns whose very existence, notably in Spain and France, to speak only of Europe, cruelly gives the lie to the optimistic slogans of the "affluent society." That it is a question of a basic phenomenon, typical of the contemporary era, is attested to by the fact that a socialist country like Jugoslavia has been unable, in a quarter of a century and in spite of a centralized economic policy that theoretically protects investments from the anarchy and money lust of capitalism, to prevent its various republics from developing at an extremely uneven rate. When Belgrade tries to prevent Slovenia from collecting its share of a loan, obtained from the International Monetary Fund for constructing a highway, by citing Slovenia's high living standard, indignant cries of protest well up in the parliament of Ljubljana and spark a genuine political crisis.

Federal Germany, thanks to its fantastic prosperity and its exceptional degree of decentralization, has been able, on the whole, to develop harmoniously and to provide in a so far decent manner for the large foreign work force—notably Turks, Jugo-

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slavs and Italians—which it has brought in. But it is also clear that the economic slump of Wallonia, a victim of the decline of coal, has much to do with the acrimony shown by that province's inhabitants toward the Flemings, who were only yesterday looked down upon and relegated to secondary tasks, and are today riding a floodtide of social and psychological revenge. And if Northern Ireland has been on the verge of civil war for more than a year, it is not only because the Orangemen intend to maintain their totally anachronistic political privileges; it is also because the Catholic minority there is the main victim of an underdevelopment that nobody can or does deny.

Switzerland is only managing to keep its balance by practicing a deliberately Malthusian naturalization policy, while the régimes of Portugal and Spain owe their survival solely to the emigration of hundreds of thousands of their sons to other countries of Western Europe. As for France, the Paris region is developing spectacularly while many provincial regions stagnate. The north is tottering under its stocks of textiles, and looks on apprehensively as the coalfields on which its prosperity was founded shut down. Brittany is uncomfortably aware of being, first and foremost, a reserve of manpower. The regions west of a line between Cherbourg and Montpellier are tending to vegetate, and hardly a single kilometer is to be found there of the great highways that are the veins and arteries of development throughout the modern world. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the prospect of the installation of an American factory became an electoral issue. The people of the Ardennes now feel betrayed by the government because Henry Ford decided to set up in Bordeaux—the electoral fief of the prime minister—the assembly-plants which, on the strength of a few imprudent words, they believed they could count on.

To the extent that the prevailing philosophy has made the pursuit of profit—and the comfort it buys—the principal motivation of human activity, the most squalid greed is destined to win out over national and community interest. From this the century-old class struggle in Europe is taking on entirely new forms.

The traditional Marxist formulation, which has inspired so much of the political thought of the European Left, retained the idea of a binary world, of exploiters against the exploited—"they and us," Lenin said. It postulated the existence of a working class which, if not naturally solidary, was at least called on

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to recognize its deep solidarity and redeem the world in overcoming its contradictions. The reality of today is complex in a different way. Just as the unthinkableness of destroying one another has brought a relationship into being between the United States and the U.S.S.R. that is no longer simply one of more or less "peaceful coexistence" but one of coöperation, so we have seen grow up in France and Italy a de facto collaboration between "bourgeois" authority and officially revolutionary labor unions that is more and more cordial, indeed practically institutionalized. It is significant that in France a communist labor union, the CGT, is currently devoting tremendous efforts to preventing the state from recognizing a new independent union as a qualified spokesman for labor together with the big established unions of communist, social democratic, or Christian orientation. This coöperation is far-reaching, extending to an actual solidarity in the face of a common danger. Just as Trotskyists and Maoists ceaselessly denounce the collusion between American imperialism and the "social imperialism" of the "new Tsars," so in France, during the great crisis of May 1968, a compact quickly came into being between the government and the Communists—both of whom were threatened by the sudden eruption of "leftism."

In France and Italy, millions of voters continue to give their votes to the Communist Party, but their daily behavior is only affected in a relative way by this political choice. Indeed, belonging to the Party—which is, incidentally, only the case with a minority of the working class, salaried employees or intellectuals—now indicates the need for participation in social activity; the hope of a revolution has been put off too long for anyone to believe it imminent. The Communist Party and the CGT, with their hierarchies, their festivals, their obligations, their schools, their preferments, their newspapers, have become a society that is not so much a rival of capitalist society as complementary to it. At least it is to the extent that it satisfies the need for participation and promotion that its members would be unable to satisfy because of their modest resources and origins, in a world that is very exclusivist and which reserves most of its leadership for its own children.

## III

Such an analysis obviously scandalizes most communists, who

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are convinced of the correctness of a dogma which has the force of scientific certitude. In any case, it is not called into question by the divergent trends within the leftist credo which is increasingly influencing a part of the intelligentsia in almost all Western countries and even to a certain extent on the other side of the Iron Curtain; most notably the influence is felt by students, backed up by far from negligible contingents of working youth and Christian trade unionists. The Sino-Soviet schism, Moscow's abandonment of the Latin American guerrilla movements, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and, among more recent developments, the German-Soviet treaty, the Kremlin's acceptance of the Rogers Plan and its refusal to recognize Prince Sihanouk's revolutionary government—all these are, to the leftists, evidence of "treason" on the part of the "Brezhnev clique." They find it hardly surprising that the parties which submit to that clique's orders are also betraying their revolutionary vocation by taking the path of the social democrats, *i.e.* collaboration between classes.

As a matter of fact, this collaboration is not just the result of instructions from the East. It is, above all, the expression of a sociological and economic necessity. French or Italian, the workers have ceased to be the spearhead of revolution, for the time has passed when Marx could write that they had nothing to lose but their chains. Although many of them still live in poverty and in substandard conditions of housing and transport, and although they are excluded from the big economic and political decisions, they are no longer the pariahs whom Engels saw as inexorably bound by his famous iron law of wages.

Nearly a century of desperate and sometimes bloody struggle has enabled them to seize prizes their ancestors wouldn't have dared dream of: social security, family allotments, free education, limited working hours, paid vacations, retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, recognition of unions. The steady trend toward regular monthly salaries and, in France, contracts tied to productivity, are two new steps toward the reduction of "class" conflict. But at the same time a new *lumpenproletariat* is fast emerging, consisting for the most part either, as in France, of imported laborers, or, as in the Italian Mezzogiorno, of underdeveloped domestic populations. With neither group does the official proletariat, organized and militating within the ranks of the Communist Party or the CGT, feel any instinctive solidar-

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ity whatsoever. The Italian Communist deputy Maria Antonietta Macciocchi has described this situation better than anyone else in the course of an electoral campaign in the *bassi,* the miserable slums of Naples.

In the Paris region, the racist reflexes of many French workers with respect to Arabs, Portuguese or Africans—on whom they are only too happy to shunt off the lowliest and most unpleasant jobs—are notorious. Not long ago a leader of the French Communist Party, Léon Mauvais, devoted an article, marked by great loftiness of thought, to the necessity for communist militants to understand that the foreigners are workers like themselves, to whom they ought to open their arms in brotherhood. But the practice is very often quite different: it is no longer possible to keep track of the number of fights between inhabitants of communist districts and those of the shantytowns.

This situation is the inevitable result of the transformation of society. Yesterday, poverty and often misery were the lot of most people; revolt was inevitable, and its success at least partially assured. Today, in the large developed countries, poverty has become the province of a minority, and it hardly has the means to make itself heard. The foreign workers are often unfamiliar with the language of the country in which they work, are fearful more than anything else of deportation which would cost them their livelihood; they keep very quiet, in spite of the exhortations of the leftists who urge them to rebel. It is much the same with elderly men, widows and the physically handicapped, who constitute the remaining membership of the "silent poor," the scandal of a comfortable, well-fed world. A correspondent of *Le Monde,* recently analyzing fiscal statistics, revealed that there were some Frenchmen who earned 320 times more than others.

The revolt against this situation is less the work of the tired communist parties, which are the prisoners of their old formulations and which have lost all capacity for renovation, than it is of intellectuals and young people, unwilling to give up the notion, underlying Marxism and its descendants, that it should be possible to make this world both less absurd and less unjust. Their protest takes diverse and sometimes disconcerting forms. It is tempting for the defenders of the established order to reduce the revolt of the young to certain outward signs: drug use and sexual anarchy, slovenliness in matters of hair style and dress. But apart from the fact that these demonstrations of

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discouragement and protest can also be accounted liabilities of a society incapable of providing its young people with an outlet for their thirst for dedication and adventure, it is useless to hide the fact that the dispute, in Europe as in America, is above all a reflex of disgust, and is often the work of the most outstanding young people. To treat it with contempt, to see in it, as the French Minister of the Interior does, nothing but the effect of the intrigues of Communist China, to think that it can be stamped out by force—these attitudes are due to the moral blindness that has in the past toppled so many élites that believed themselves safely in the saddle for all eternity.

Although it has not reached the dimensions of the divorce now taking place in the United States between part of the intelligentsia and the "silent majority," the alienation of a not-inconsiderable portion of the European élite from the established order constitutes a divisive element that is all but universal. Certainly there has always been a conflict of generations, and it is a law of life that the young refuse to take account of the defeat of the hopes which their parents often nourished before them. All the same, it is the first time that this feeling of alienation, of not belonging to the national community—once the fate of the industrial proletariat, according to Marx's brilliant diagnosis—best characterizes dropouts from the ruling class. They simply refuse to serve its ideals and purposes. The revolt of May 1968 in France, when so many middle-class youths were to be seen fighting beneath the red or black flag, testified to the depth of this crisis. What many people wanted to reduce to a psychodrama did in fact act as a safety valve for accumulated passions and rancors; but the causes of the turmoil did not disappear with its temporary halt. For that matter, a few minutes' conversation with business leaders—government officials are further removed from reality—are all it takes to discover just how aware they are of the vulnerability of the social system.

IV

Regional antagonisms based on economic inequality, the revolt of the young based on morality—these are not the only signs of division in Europe today. Europe still bears the scars of the ideological rivalries which at the time of the Prague coup, the Hungarian revolt, or the Berlin blockade led it to the brink of a new war. And the Warsaw Pact has its own internal contradictions

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just as the Atlantic world has. The Berlin Wall is still there, and all those who have had occasion to go to East Europe have learned that the Iron Curtain is not just a metaphor. To be sure, the Western tourist obtains a visa easily but the converse is much less true. One must see with one's own eyes that no-man's-land, bristling with observation posts, that separates Hungary from Austria, the trenches filled with water at the frontiers of Rumania or Bulgaria, designed to prevent potential fugitives from hanging onto the undersides of cars, or the electrified fence that surrounds Albania, to measure the distance still to be covered before the freedom of movement which is written into all the constitutions becomes a reality.

In most of the people's democracies the state's grip has relaxed considerably and as long as people don't ask too much they are free to live more or less undisturbed; but it remains none the less true that since the invasion of Czechoslovakia everyone has known what the limits of the "liberalization" in progress are. In the West, too, freedom is far from being total: the communist party is outlawed in several countries; Greece, Spain and Portugal are still dictatorships, indifferent to the rights of man that their governments, on joining the United Nations, vowed to respect.

The rough law of the division of the world between American and Soviet spheres of influence remains almost as tenaciously alive with respect to Europe as it was 20 years ago. The barbed wire is perhaps a bit rusty, and it is easier to get through it, at least in one direction, but it is still there. And behind it are stationed, face to face, immense armies, capable, thanks to their nuclear equipment, of volatilizing the planet. As it was in the past, one camp's truth is the other's error. It is the system, totally indefensible in logic or in equity, of the Peace of Augsburg of 1555: *cuius regio, eius religio*. Every subject must practice the religion of his prince, and woe to him who speaks out in too dissonant a voice. All this because the hazards of war and diplomacy caused the troops from the East and the troops from the West to meet along a certain line, and because the entry of nuclear arms into the picture destroyed all hope of shifting this line.

On the Western side, we have increasingly come to believe that the only way to lessen the practical effects of this division would be to create—openly making the best of it—conditions which will some day perhaps make it possible to overcome it.

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De Gaulle was in the lead: by going to Moscow, Warsaw and Bucharest, by recognizing the Oder-Neisse Line, by opposing the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the multilateral nuclear force, and by coining the slogan "détente-entente-coopération." President Johnson followed with his October 1966 speech on "bridge-building," where he, too, put détente ahead of reunification. West Germany's Willy Brandt drew the proper conclusion from this evolution by going to meet his East German counterpart, Willy Stoph, on the latter's home ground, and later by making the trip to Moscow.

Only time will tell whether this policy, which has already led the U.S.S.R. to set aside the bogey of German revanchism, so often evoked to keep its allies in line, will lead to a relaxation of tensions between the states of the East and West. All that can be said for the moment is that the policies previously followed never led to such an end, and that they would have little chance, if it were decided to follow them again, of leading to it in the future. The support given by the socialist countries most concerned over their independence—Jugoslavia and Rumania—to the proposal for a conference on European security shows, in any case, that they expect to obtain from the détente the consolidation of their freedom of action; at the same time they fear that a return to the cold war would lead Moscow to meddle more and more in their affairs in the name of the alleged necessities of common defense against imperialism.

In concluding the treaty with Bonn, which obliged them to exert strong pressures on Herr Ulbricht to get him to renounce his demand for the recognition in due form of his republic, the Soviets were certainly aware of the risks implied for the cohesion of their bloc by the disappearance of the bugbear of revanchism. They doubtless thought that the priority given by Bonn to its relations with the U.S.S.R. over those it could enter into with the other members of the Warsaw Pact would offset, at least in part, the effects of this shift in emphasis. It pleased them, moreover, to be able to decrease their military presence in Central Europe at a time when they were stepping up their efforts in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East and along the Chinese frontier. The prospect of being able to absorb German credits and technical know-how into their economy likewise attracted them. But it is probable that they also hoped to loosen somewhat the cohesion of Western Europe by detaching from it the

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Federal Republic. Bonn in turn saw its efforts to free itself from the orthodox and conservative line of the Atlantic alliance speedily rewarded.

Those who are most suspicious of Germany must, in this matter, give credit to Chancellor Brandt, who had hardly signed the treaty when he spoke out in no uncertain terms about the need for European integration and the Atlantic alliance. In the final analysis it depends on the attitude that the Western leaders, notably Messrs. Heath and Pompidou, will now take. Either the Moscow treaty marks, as the Soviets hope, the beginning of an increase in the divisions of Europe; or it is the start of a dynamic policy which would show by Britain's entry into the Common Market that at least one corner of our universe is managing to resolve the tensions responsible for the wars of yesterday, and to eliminate them today.

I do not claim that the birth of a united Europe would immediately cancel out all the divisive factors reviewed in these pages. But the psychological shock it would provoke would help convince the various disputing parties of the vitality of that part of the world where they were born, and of its capacity for finding new and original solutions common to all developed societies.

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# DARKNESS IN HAITI

*By Robert D. Crassweller*

HAITI is in many ways a true social relic. Having lingered almost intact for more than a century and a half, this unfortunate country to a great extent *is* the past; its every ancient curiosity remains as precisely visible as a well-preserved archaeological artifact.

It is a land that may be seen under many aspects. Beauty is one of them, the beauty of mountain and sea, and the clouds and lights and mists that move over these. Exoticism is another. Colorful almost beyond description for the northern observer, everything in it is unfamiliar, fused out of dream-stuff into a wild semblance of reality. Poverty is still another, poverty more extreme than anywhere else in the hemisphere, more extreme than imagination, almost.

These are all proper angles of vision, but they reveal less of the nature of things than does the concept of division. In everything except the historical process itself there is a sundering, a discontinuity. Haitian geography, the frame of the national life, is as perverse and disruptive as anything outside the Indonesian archipelago. The long southern peninsula, the somewhat shorter northern peninsula, the middle area that separates rather than unites them, and the large island of Gonave in the bay of the same name, are continuous only in a formal sense. The straight-line distance from Port-au-Prince, the capital, to Jacmel on the southern coast, is a mere 40 miles. A road between the two centers exists, but only for a jeep or a Land Rover. Part of it consists of the rocky bed of a shallow stream, followed at the traveler's peril if sudden rains swell the flow of water, and the trip requires the better part of a day.

There is division among the people. If the intellectual élite is enlarged to include all those who can read and write, it still numbers less than 50,000, and the gulf between this generously defined élite (regardless of its own internal differences) and the illiterate others is very nearly a total barrier. There is division between city and countryside. All power, political endeavor, money and social standing, and about 10 percent of the population are in the few cities, very largely in Port-au-Prince, for this is one of the least urbanized nations in the world; in the country-

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side are 90 percent of the population and, with the fewest of exceptions, nothing whatsoever of power, political endeavor, money or social standing; and city and countryside meet only through the exploitation of the latter by the former. There is division in society, between those of lighter and those of dark skin, and between those few who can speak the refined and classical French of the socially elect, and those who speak only Creole. There is division even within the countryside, between a few *grands dons,* the peasants who have city connections and a bit of cash, and the typical peasants who have hardly more than their breath and the skins they were born with.

The root explanation of errant Haiti probably lies in the circumstances of the independence of which it is so proud. As a colony, St. Domingue had been one of the marvels of the world. It accounted, prior to 1789, for 40 percent of the entire foreign trade of France; by itself it outproduced the combined British possessions in the New World tropics; its traffic of ships, like the theatrical performances that may stand as the symbol of its abundant cultural life, numbered in the thousands annually. But the daughter of Africa, thoroughly seduced by Paris, was badly mistreated as well, and broke the relationship in a violent spasm. In 1804 Haiti became the first independent country in Latin America, and the first state in the world established through the revolt of slaves. There had been no time for tutelage in the arts of government, no sustained relation between ruler and ruled other than plantation slavery, no opportunity for the slow osmosis of acculturation. There was only the sharp stroke of violence, the destruction of the works of the hated French, and fold upon fold of isolation painstakingly gathered around the infant state.

By 1820 the founders of the nation—L'Ouverture, Dessalines, Pétion, Christophe—had all passed away and Haiti was becoming what it remains today, a peasant society of freeholders and renters and squatters bound by necessity to their small plots, a society imbued with the animist faiths of ancient Africa, poor, traditional, immobilized.

During the nineteen-year interval (1915–1934) in which the country was occupied by the U. S. Marines, the basic pattern of society was not altered and the old order, modified here and there, reasserted itself with surprising rapidity as soon as the alien military departed.

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II

Then in 1957, with the advent of François Duvalier, the division that is characteristic of the nation was brought to a level of perfection never before attained. This rather short, mild, soft-voiced physician, harmless and even unattractive in appearance, vague in personality, bears within himself a genius for tyranny that has astounded the world; within a few years he had introduced several stratagems and institutional innovations that must surely be almost without precedent in the history of politics. Traces of cohesion in the governmental structure, and bits and pieces of an institutionalizing tendency visible in certain governmental departments that were developing a minor degree of autonomy under previous régimes have been swept away along with everything else by the wave of personal power with which Duvalier has inundated every former locus of strength and authority, public and private alike.

The army is the most important and informative example. From the time of its creation as an effective institution during the marine occupation, the army had stood at the central focus of national life; even under Duvalier it receives, together with the other security forces referred to below, between 60 and 70 percent of all government funds (education, in comparison, receives about eight to nine percent). Controlling telephone and telegraph communications between the capital and outlying areas, running the national airline, extending its chain of command into every hamlet through its police functions, the army was the only organized, structured body in the country, and for years it exercised ultimate political as well as police authority. None of this now remains. By a score of devices, by calculated discharges and appointments (as many as 70 officers have been dismissed at one time), by setting individuals and groups against one another, by enticements and bribery and violence, by the exile of even some of the officers who led the Duvalier movement within the army, Duvalier has splintered and outmanœuvred the officer caste and reduced it to a corps of servile supporters. Every professionalizing tendency has been heavily suppressed; the Military Academy has been closed for years.

The President has caused the entire national arsenal, including the heavy weapons, to be stored in the basement of the National Palace, so that the beautiful, clean-lined white capitol is

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less a civil structure than a fortress. The present National Palace is the fourth of its kind; all three predecessors were blown up by the explosion of munitions stored in the basements.

*The bizarre is linked to the violent, the comical to the tragic. On June 8, 1967, somewhat before midnight, Duvalier summoned 19 senior staff officers, including the Chief of Staff, to the National Palace, where they were loaded into a truck and taken to the dreaded Fort Dimanche, the scene of many horrors. At the rifle range adjacent to the fort they could see, in the macabre illumination of truck headlights, that 19 stakes had been planted in the ground and that 19 brother officers were already bound to them. The newly arrived staff officers were each given a rifle with a single bullet in the chamber. By order of the President, who attended and commanded in person, they were forced to raise their rifles and shoot their helpless colleagues. It was done without the wasting of a single bullet.*

But the most important steps in the attrition of the armed forces were probably the successive creations of countervailing centers of military and police power loyal only to the President, and so lacking in organization that no opposition could coalesce around them. The first, whose assembling was begun in 1958, was the *tonton macoute,* named from the bogeymen of Haitian legend, recruited generally (although not invariably) among the toughs and outcasts of Port-au-Prince. Violent, often illiterate, men of no other prospect in life, many of them committed to a philosophy of strong black nationalism, they were given guns, access to rackets and oppressions, immunity and carte blanche, provided only that they would obey the orders of Duvalier without question or scruple. This they have done gladly. The Presidential Guard, with perhaps 700 members, traditionally an élite unit, was made into a second center of personal military power through selective promotions and a new semi-autonomous status. Reporting now not to the General Staff but to Duvalier, barracked on the grounds of the National Palace, with the basement armory under its control, the Guard is by this time largely an extension of the President. A third center has been formed by means of a special battalion, numbering about 500, and supplied with the most modern weaponry, which also reports directly to Duvalier and is barracked on the National Palace grounds. Finally, there is the Civilian Militia. Less secret than the *tonton macoute* and somewhat more presentable, the militia was given blue denim uniforms and directed to support the President in whatever might be necessary. The *tonton macoute* and the militia were later combined into the *Service Volontaire Militaire.*

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The traditional army remains, but in a state so corrupted, broken apart and psychologically eroded from within that it is hardly more than the shadow of an institution.

As with the army, so has it been with individuals of high political standing. That the electoral opposition would be dealt with harshly was to be expected. But the President has also handled his civilian supporters in the same rough style as the army and the politicians. There is a kind of visible turning inward on his part, an evident constriction, a narrowing of life. It is as if Duvalier, having extracted whatever he could from his enemies and from rich nonpoliticians, has finally turned on close associates, plucking them bare after first exalting them.

The civil service has never exhibited much vitality, and now hardly exists as a coherent body. In practice, Duvalier has simply replaced experienced administrators with large numbers of devoted followers, giving new emphasis to the old truth that governmental employment in Haiti is not a matter of public administration but a form of national income distribution. The legislature has been reshaped as a unicameral body whose only purpose, like that of the two legislative houses formerly maintained by Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, is to approve bills unanimously, for the appearance of the thing. The cabinet no longer meets as a body because the suspicious President does not wish its members to have even that minor degree of access to each other; in the physical separation of all his advisers lies his own security. The Roman Catholic Church had its Archbishop expelled in 1960, on the comic charge that he had contributed $7,000 to communist students. Many Church officials and priests have been replaced with indigenous appointees whose politics are deemed sound; and excommunication has not disturbed the passive mien of the President. The press survives by printing praise and editorials composed in the National Palace. The university has been overpowered, the National Union of Haitian Students and the stubborn association of secondary school teachers have been broken up, and public education itself is more chimera than reality. The influential National Bank Employees Association has been infiltrated and corrupted. The labor unions, never a major element in this most unindustrialized of countries, are dormant.

A final division—the last one possible, it would seem—caps the long process by which public life has been broken apart: the

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rupture of the President's family. His son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel Max Dominque, long a man of influence and violence, was an intimate associate of the 19 officers who were executed in the dark of the night at Fort Dimanche. He was sent into exile at that time, the victim of a feud that has separated the family into hostile cliques. All his children were sent abroad during the latter part of 1969, where they and their spouses and followers doubtless maintain their factions and manœuvrings, concentrating keen eyes upon the opportunities that the day of succession will offer the most strong, cunning and unscrupulous.

What is strange in these phenomena is their peculiar intensity under Duvalier, their thoroughness rather than their fundamental essence, for the latter runs true to Haitian precedent. There has been a tendency among Americans to view Duvalier in the same way that Trujillo at the other end of Hispaniola was often regarded, as an aberration imposed by violence and sustained by little else. This is simply not true. Both dictators should be seen as very much the product of their history and their environment. They are both exceptional men, but exceptional within a tradition and milieu that reveal no qualitative historical discontinuity. That this is probably attributable in part in Haiti to personality deformation among wide numbers of the public, including failure of identification, too vivid a tension between dominance and submission, unresolved Oedipal problems and a tendency to paranoia—attributed by some to the prevailing patterns of child-rearing—only deepens rather than diminishes the psychological and sociological truth of these assertions.

As it always has been in the Dominican Republic, power in Haiti is traditionally personal. Only now, it is even more personal. The government is the chief executive's extension, and its resources are his resources, to use as and when he wishes for jobs, bribery, tactical advantage. Standing alone, the President lasts, in Rémy Bastien's splendid phrase, "as long as he can manage to keep the opposition divided, and the opposition is the whole conscious population minus one citizen—the President."[1]

## III

Like public life, the Haitian economy reveals few changes that are not associated with retrogression.

[1] Rémy Bastien, "Vodoun and Politics in Haiti," in "Religion and Politics in Haiti." Washington: The Institute for Cross-Cultural Research, 1966, p. 57.

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Any reference to any economic subject in Haiti should be prefaced with a cautionary note. Statistics here have an unreal, even a surreal, quality that would be difficult to match in any other country. Figures from the published national budget, like all other statistics, owe more to art than to economics or accountancy, and less to the art of realism than to the art of Aesop. The budget exists only to comply with a constitutional formality, and it is balanced to the last *gourde* by the easy device of adding or taking away wherever necessary, with an abstract and Olympian detachment. But the scanty and unreliable evidence available all points in one direction—downward. The national monetary reserve, after repeated withdrawals, was reduced by 1968 to approximately $700,000, a figure so low as to induce incredulity. The national debt, $4 million in 1946, is now more than $52 million. In August 1966, the International Monetary Fund permitted Haiti to withdraw $1.5 million on an emergency basis, a most unusual transaction. Various government obligations to foreign creditors are unpaid. No new investment of any consequence is flowing into the economy, whether from abroad or from any domestic source. The pay of government workers is months in arrears. Per capita gross national product, whatever the truth of the statistics may be, is so low that only a handful of nations, almost all in Africa, present a picture so stark and tragic. Agricultural productivity per capita declined by 25 percent between 1952 and 1964. Sugar exports to the United States in 1968 amounted to only 27,300 tons, which was almost 674,000 less than the comparable figure for the Dominican Republic. In sum, there is hardly any money for anyone. There is no well-being.

*The driver of the taxi in the capital sits at the wheel of his* publique, *a car so advanced in decrepitude that its very appearance on the streets excites curiosity and admiration as well as revulsion. The standard fare between any two points in Port-au-Prince is 12 cents, and gas costs 60 cents a gallon. Small wonder that the driver often asks for his payment in advance so that he may purchase a quarter of a gallon en route, lest he not arrive. Nor any wonder that he turns off the ignition of the wretched vehicle and coasts down every tiny slope, coasts even for a gas-free 75 feet on a level street.*

*Out in the country the Vodun ceremonies honoring Guede, the god of death, are well into their course in the hour following midnight. The priest who leads the rites holds in his hand the chicken whose neck has been wrung, a chicken seemingly contrived of bone and skin and feather, with no intimation of flesh, a bird nourished on dust and gravel, whose rickety body pronounces a tiny indelible judgment on all the hardness and privation of Haiti.*

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Interspersed here and there in the long decline have been periods of forward momentum, hesitant and soon arrested; but the ebbing of man's endeavor over a period of almost two centuries cannot be mistaken. In the year of the storming of the Bastille, half a million slaves and a few thousand French planters in colonial St. Domingue produced plantation exports on the order of approximately $75 million, a figure that is about twice the value of the export wealth created today by a population at least eight times as numerous as it was then. Of what other country in the world can it be said that its productive achievements are now but a small fraction of what they were 180 years ago?

These characteristics of Haiti, seen in its internal perspective, are not dissimilar to its circumstances as part of the world community. The tradition of isolation and of abandonment by the rest of the world, born in the year of independence and nurtured by the separateness and pride that the great event inculcated among the élite, encountered no substantial reversal during the nineteenth century. Aid from the outside is minimal. The United States suspended both diplomatic relations and aid for a time beginning in 1963, due to the extreme internal repression taking place then, and also to the tendency of previous aid simply to disappear, as if an ocean liner had plunged to the bottom, leaving only an oil slick and a brief pillar of air bubbles.

On occasion, during recent years, Haiti has even refused to grant diplomatic immunity to U.N. research ships and personnel while they pursued a regional fisheries project within territorial waters. No country in the Hemisphere seems to be more cut off from others in every respect; more self-contained. In this, as in the internal phases of the state, the nation imitates its master—Duvalier, the most self-contained of men.

## IV

However, constructive change is neither impossible nor totally absent in Haiti. The Agricultural and Industrial Development Institute, for example, after functioning for several years, has shown some progress in the region around Aux Cayes in the south; the small irrigation project in the Artebonite Valley has shown results; a small Development Bank has been functioning for a few years; and Haitian export of manufactured goods to the United States, unchanged in value between 1962 and 1967,

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almost doubled in 1968. But positive change or growth hardly exists at this time. Nor is it conceivable that any substantial degree of such change can occur during the incumbency of the present régime. Everything is stilled until events bring forth a new government, and, one hopes, a new direction and a new commitment to human achievement.

When that moment comes, however, there will be difficulties that are almost incalculable.

The first among these must certainly be the existence and the characteristics of the folk religion, Vodun, whose flexible orthography includes such other acceptable spellings as Vodu, Vodou, Voudon, Vaudoun, Vaudou, Voudoun, Vaudauc, Vodoun, and in English, Voodoo. Its significance lies in its encompassing quality, not as a religion only, but as a system of concepts covering and explaining all human and supernatural activity, the bridge between the known and the unknown, between pattern and anarchy. Harold Courlander perceptively analyzes it:

> "If [Vodun] has had more meaning to most Haitians than Christian doctrine, it is because Christianity has seemed to offer only doctrine and guidelines to behavior, whereas Vodoun offers doctrine, social controls, a pattern of family relations, direct communication with original forces, emotional release, dance, music, meaningful socializing, drama, theater, legend and folklore, motivation, alternatives to threatening dangers, individual initiatives through placation and invocation, treatment of ailments by means of herb lotions and rituals, protection of fields, fertility, and a continuing familiar relationship with the ancestors."[2]

It is, quite literally, an explanation for all life and for all things, living and dead.

Jérémie Bréda offers a young Haitian student's explanation:

> "You whites walk out in the morning and a butterfly crosses your path, and you think it's pretty and forget it. But for some of us that butterfly would have significance that affects the entire day, even maybe an entire life. All events are connected—it's a different world."[3]

With its home in the peasant countryside and the peasant heart, and its attractions for higher circles only grudgingly admitted, Vodun first engaged the sympathetic attention of the intellectual élite about four decades ago. The *mouvement folk-*

[2] Harold Courlander, "Vodoun in Haitian Culture," in "Religion and Politics in Haiti." Washington: The Institute for Cross-Cultural Research, 1966, p. 21.

[3] Jérémie Bréda, "Life in Haiti: Voodoo and the Church," *The Commonweal*, May 24, 1963.

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*lorique* began to flourish, and with it the conviction that Vodun was the core of the national tradition and the Haitian mystique. It lent itself to the surge of primitive art for which the country soon became world famous, and to the speculations of a legion of anthropologists, sociologists, musicologists and folklorists; and with this development Vodun's fluid penetration of every circle of Haitian life was complete.

Politics had long since received the stamp of the African cults. Vodun is said to have been linked to abortive slave revolts as early as 1757, and it certainly was an important element of cohesion among the insurgent slaves who established the nation. It was opposed by L'Ouverture, Dessalines and Christophe, who sought to establish a national state on European lines, and Vodun triumphed over all of them. Their successors came to terms with the local gods and spirits. A few heads of state, notably the rather fantastic Emperor Soulouque, were open adherents.

It was left for Duvalier, however, to reap the full harvest of political potential that Vodun represents. His long studies of the popular faith convinced him that it was the ground upon which the joint edifice of church and state might be constructed under an architecture of absolute power, and his courtship of Vodun was open. It was the courtship, however, of a man who seeks not a true love but a *mariage de raison,* and it may be, as Rémy Bastien has suggested, that it is the President's absence of true belief, rather than devotion, that has enabled him to reduce the *houngans,* the Vodun priests who form a very loose countrywide network, to political subservience.

Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that Vodun has been assimilated into the power of the régime, and that the effects of this upon public affairs, regardless of the manner in which Haitian life evolves, will be long felt. And the fact also remains that Vodun, thus solidly established on every level, has become a profoundly conservative influence whose pervasive presence and total incompatability with modern modes of thought will infinitely complicate the construction of any new sociopolitical or cultural order. That task, difficult in any event in the face of Vodun's presence, is all the more intractable because so little is known of the sociology of the folk faith.

The relationship between peasant and land is a second troublesome aspect of Haitian life. Ever since Pétion and Boyer established a national pattern of small holdings through land dis-

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tribution to the military veterans of the wars of independence and otherwise, the agricultural design has become, through inheritance and necessity, a pattern of increasingly tiny divisions and subdivisions. Haiti's rudimentary form of agriculture has proven so far to be stoutly resistant to every progressive measure. No new land is available, and the old mountainside plots refuse to submit even to the plow, let alone to complicated machinery.

Hardly less impenetrable a problem arises with language. Education in Haiti is a necessity so urgent that it would be impossible to overemphasize its priority; but education in what language? Ninety percent of the population speaks only Creole, a language without any adequate dictionary or written grammar or principles of spelling or advanced course materials or literature. It is also a language that leads to a closed world; and it is itself composed of regional dialects whose social precedence, and therefore whose wide acceptability, are subject to prestige factors that are difficult to assess and implement. Should education be in this language that divorces nine-tenths of the people from all contact with public and official life? Or should it be encouraged in French, despite the fact that few peasant children can comprehend a paragraph of it? Or should both languages be abandoned, as has been urged rather wishfully, in favor of Spanish?

The fanaticisms that are born of race have risen to new prominence in recent years, bringing further stress to another traditional problem. When President Lescot, the last of the line of mulatto presidents, was overthrown in 1946, black consciousness came into its own, taking its provenance not only from politics but also from the emotional strength of négritude that was conceived in the 1930s, the important Bureau d'Ethnologie that was founded in 1941, and from the many intellectuals who had already spent years combing the intricacies of Vodun for the true, black Afro-Haitian cultural legacy, the authentic and legitimate thing. Under Duvalier, who believes that he invented black power, this process of racially based nationalism has passed into obsession; négritude is strong, and Haiti has been ordained by God to follow the destiny it seeks under Duvalier; social forces that will be difficult to reconcile with progressive change have been let loose.

Perhaps as a consequence of all these severe problems, as well as of other deficiencies in the public order, one finds in Haiti large apathy and indifference that in themselves constitute a separate

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problem, and a rigid barrier to change. At the top, the government is not really interested in changes of any kind. President Duvalier believes, probably with a sincere conviction that goes beyond the Bible on his desk and the picture of the Pope on his wall, that the spiritual is more important than the material, and that mental waves have an effectiveness denied to most scientific innovations, whose effect on the people may be negative. Those among the vast black majority who might be expected to pursue entrepreneurial interests have generally not done so, for the pattern of values of black Haiti, long adjusted to very conservative craft traditions and to the modest marketing operations maintained entirely by peasant women, is not in the least inclined toward business and commerce, both of which imply a faint disrepute.

Finally, a very basic truth: The culture of Haiti is in all possible respects so unlike that of the Western world from which assistance in the processes of change must come that the transmission of that change will inevitably be hindered by a thousand obstacles as yet hardly even suspected. Haitian society is not the transitional variety with which the American and European assistance technicians are familiar, but truly a traditional society. Its devotion to the land—as the source of nourishment, as the root of sanctity and symbolism—carries memory back to an order of value and consciousness buried deep in the past. Religion and music testify to the continuity of centuries, a continuity that has survived tribal destruction and the dispersal of people and culture. It is a cultural continuity in which the norms are those of coöperation rather than of individualism, characterized by the group solidarity that is implicit in the musical superimposition of chorus and leader, singing both simultaneously and independently, and in the group songs whose performers achieve both spontaneity and unity. It is a cultural continuity unreceptive to mechanical arts, as every user of the telephone system in Port-au-Prince realizes as soon as he attempts to dial one of the numbers listed in the current telephone directory, printed in 1954; a culture that has adapted itself to conditions in which even animals of burden find no place or purpose.

The unique personality of the country seems to be compounded of the curiosities of personality observed in individuals of every rank. The President himself, at the top, finds such an affinity in

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the number 22 that he scheduled his election for a September 22, and his inauguration for an October 22, and has attributed to his own *ouanga à mort*—death curse—the assassination of President Kennedy on a November 22. On the lower rungs of the social order stand the working women who sell to passersby on the streets of the capital vegetables or meat cooked on small charcoal grills. The space around each of these little installations erected in back of the sidewalks has been scratched clear of all grass or green growth so that the lady of the grill may stand and work on bare dirt, mud or dust as the case may be. Why? Because the bare dirt represents cleanliness and order to her, and the grass does not.

Logic and reason, and cause and effect, appear in shapes that the non-Haitian will hardly recognize, as if they were things seen in vaguest outline through a depth of clear shimmering water, transformed weirdly into parodies of themselves.

*The European diplomat in Port-au-Prince called at the laundry on his way home to pick up his shirts that had been promised for the day before. They had not been washed.*

*"But why not?" the diplomat asked in some heat. "After all, you promised they would be ready yesterday."*

*"Yes," the laundryman replied with patient equanimity, "and if you had called for them yesterday, they would have been done on time."*

## V

It is difficult to discuss U. S. policy toward Haiti except in terms of negatives, a reflection of the larger negativism that has marked Haitian life for two centuries. The question of priorities is hardly intelligible in an environment in which it seems to be necessary to do everything simultaneously because nothing has been done hitherto. In theory, total national reconstruction, a fresh beginning, is called for; and little that has been achieved since independence and the days of the legendary founders of the state would be helpful in that effort.

One must start with several admissions, whose cumulate effect is to limit very materially the range of possible accomplishment in Haiti.

Given our almost total lack of sound information about what goes on in the country, we must assume at the outset that Haiti is not an environment within which the United States as a nation, or individual Americans in substantial numbers, can perform effectively. It would be difficult to find anywhere a society

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more resistant to American norms, American understanding, American practices, American aspirations.

And, as indicated above, it must be recognized that the Duvalier government is not a weird aberration that will some day disappear, leaving no trace. It is merely another Haitian government, only much more so, concentrating all that is demeaning and socially destructive in what has gone before. The future is unlikely to produce a clear political mutation.

From these assumptions it follows that however justified American hopes for democratic polities elsewhere in the Caribbean may or may not be, they have nothing in common with Haitian realities. Good government is too much to hope for in the decades ahead, and it will be necessary at best to settle for adequate government, free of the deepest blemishes and wildest excesses.

And a final assumption: while the Duvalier government remains in power, there is little that the United States should attempt beyond the maintenance of its present policy of correct and rather distant relations, and watchful waiting from afar. The influence that the United States can exert in Haiti at the present time, as events in this decade have clearly demonstrated, scarcely exists. The Haitian social order is too diffuse and unsophisticated to generate those sources of leverage that can often be grasped by foreign powers. Diplomatic isolation, denial of aid, measures of boycott—what do these things really matter to a nation almost self-contained on a subsistence basis, and to a government whose almost sole concern is for the retention of internal power?

Under these circumstances, the basic postulate of American policy should be the rigorous avoidance of any deep and unilateral involvement of the United States in Haitian affairs. Whatever must or can be done from the outside should be entrusted to some form of joint institutional or international endeavor; the multilateral approach is essential.

What international agency would be best equipped to aid Haiti? A challenge of this kind might generate fresh vitality in the Organization of American States (OAS). And in fact, the technical and diplomatic Mission that the OAS now maintains in Haiti, working both with the government and by itself to improve and modernize the environment, is the most interesting recent development within the OAS, as well as an unheralded

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and little-noted innovation in regional statecraft. The concept of the Mission goes back to July 1967, when a small group of no more than four specialists was put together to assist the Haitian government in education, tourism and natural resources, and to establish a presence on the part of the regional organization. The Mission, proceeding with discretion, took hold; by the summer of 1970 its membership increased to 14, divided among three task forces. The first of these concerns itself with transportation and other forms of infrastructure. The second has sectoral responsibilities in such fields as agriculture, industry and tourism. The third maintains liaison with the government in regard to fiscal matters, taxation and public administration. The membership of the Mission is multinational, and includes specialists from Chile, Brazil, Panama, Mexico, Bolivia, Argentina and the United States.

All parties concerned seem satisfied with the programs of this pathbreaking body, and its assignments are slowly being broadened. Work is progressing on the preparation of capital projects. This preliminary activity may quite possibly lead to greater involvement on the part of the Inter-American Development Bank, and to the appearance of the World Bank; this would be constructive, for the World Bank in particular has tended to view Haitian ventures warily.

Finally, as in the case of Cuba, planning within regional bodies and within the State Department should be directed to the assimilation of Haiti into a design of Caribbean functional relationships and purposes that may be termed a Caribbean Community. When the Duvalier government ends, the work of the OAS Mission that has been described could serve as a helpful introduction to the more permanent associations and forms of the Community. Haiti has too long dwelt apart from the rest of the Caribbean; it has too long absented itself from the councils of the region, whose influence would set in motion currents of thought that might wash away old encrustations of myopia and passivity. The opening of Haiti to the full impact of regional life might not produce immediate and tangible economic effects; quite possibly there would be little benefit in that aspect for some time to come; but certainly in the social and psychological and political domains—in the domain of human purpose and will and activity—the full participation of Haiti in a Caribbean Community at the earliest moment possible would bring new life to the oldest of the Caribbean nations.

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# THE EROSION OF SURFACE NAVAL POWER

*By Paul Cohen*

THE effectiveness of merchant ships in ocean transport—and of surface naval vessels to protect them or to blockade them as the circumstances require—was the foundation on which Great Britain built her empire, on which the United States bases the credibility of her international commitments and by which the U.S.S.R. hopes to expand her role in Africa and Asia. That foundation continues to erode under an irresistible tide of technology, the key expressions of which are the submarine and the missile.

To many this is an unbelievable assertion, doubly so because its consequences for international relations as they are currently constituted are so massive and, in general, so detrimental. The skeptics, who know from experience that most evaluations of the future occur more slowly than claimed, or not at all, are inclined to wait for results. In this case results could best come from the test of battle. And if the balance between the various forces which are deployed on the oceans lies elsewhere than where "tradition" (an increasingly sometime thing) has placed it, the resulting surprises could lead to ill-considered remedies. These could be as divergent as surrender of a major goal, or nuclear war—if the latter is a remedy. Thus, an understanding of the various technical changes which have occurred since the launching of the *Nautilus* is inescapable if the planning of foreign policy, and of naval building programs, is to be realistic.

That large surface vessels—merchant as well as naval—will no longer survive the onslaught of the submarines, surveillance systems, homing weapons, and the rest of the paraphernalia of twentieth-century military technology is a proposition with a massive precedent: the fate of the battleship. Who, among the official hierarchies of both Allied and Axis fleets, believed before the fact that this supreme symbol of naval power would perish because it was not, to the same degree as its enemies, a creature of the new technology?

As if the technical issues were not in themselves sufficiently complicated, their interpretation in a particular theater can be

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radically modified by geographic and political aspects. In a narrow sea like the Mediterranean, for example, surface fleets may have to deal with submarines, shore-based aircraft, and perhaps with a revived and longer-range form of coast artillery—surface-to-surface missiles. Yet, if a naval contest were to occur in that sea, the most important factor might be the Turkish position on traffic through the Dardanelles. That is why it is clearer to discuss the problem in a narrower framework—the shifting balance between large surface ships and submarines.

As the years go on, the likelihood strengthens that, in spite of the most strenuous anti-submarine efforts carried on with the most exotic of available equipment, a submarine fleet of relatively moderate size—perhaps several hundred vessels—can destroy or drive into port any present-day surface navy and merchant fleet. That does not necessarily mean our submarine fleet, for it is armed primarily with anti-submarine weapons. Not all submarine navies, though, design for our hierarchy of missions.

Admitting that the contingency described here is within the bounds of military technology, can we comfort ourselves with the illusion that such a maritime disaster could be fended off by threatening a resort to nuclear war? When those nations which can deploy large submarine fleets also possess nuclear warheads and the missiles to carry them, whom can we threaten? If the stakes are less than total, if they involve, in some distant corner of the world, a blow to our pride or a loss to our pocketbook, will we not be forced to the same restraint we have shown in Korea and Vietnam? The threat of nuclear war could be invoked with limited danger to us when a grossly unequal balance existed between American and foreign nuclear power. It was the basis of the sanctuary in which our naval forces largely operated during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. This sanctuary has of course been to our enormous benefit, but it has also served to confuse us with a false sense of omnipotence at sea.

Today only one nation has in being a submarine fleet of sufficient size to be a major threat. However, as other claimants to world influence expand their operations, they will inevitably discover, if they do not already know, that submarines are a key element in their power base. And submarines, even nuclear submarines, are not all that difficult to build in quantity. Germany built about 1,100 full-sized diesel-electric submarines, in addition to hundreds of one- and two-man submarines, during World

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War II. Not until near the end of the war did she begin to utilize fully the then available mass production techniques. Although nuclear attack submarines, in their current stage of design, average several times the weight of a diesel-electric, there is no material or technical reason to prevent a major industrial nation from building scores of them per year. Pound for pound, submarines place less stress on a country's production capabilities than do airplanes. Such treaties as today control the tonnage and quantity of submarine fleets are of the moment, not for eternity.

Technology continues to demonstrate its universal availability. The means to obtain U-235 and plutonium become cheaper and more widespread by the year, and so do the means to deliver the warheads. Red China is detonating its nuclear bombs and launching its satellites on a schedule our own intelligence has predicted. Russia has become a nuclear power on a scale as vast as that of the United States. France has exploded its fusion bombs to an audience of submarines from several nations. Like Britain, she has demonstrated her ability to construct nuclear power plants. Japan and Germany are building excellent diesel-electric submarines and have each constructed a nuclear-powered ship. Both have the capability, should they care to exercise it, to construct nuclear-armed missiles. In another decade there should be at least half-a-dozen countries capable of maintaining both an effective submarine force and a nuclear capability.

In that era, suppose that an enemy decides to cut our maritime communications in some selected sector of the world, or over all the oceans. Suppose our newspapers begin a catalogue of disasters, reporting this carrier sunk in flames, that task force shattered to some stranded remnants, the liner *United States* cut down while at a full 40 knots, Lloyds of London closed, no American merchant ship on the high seas. Suppose that the enemy has carefully refrained from using nuclear weapons, or from threatening American territory. What he wants is a free hand abroad, in some area in which his internal lines of communications can suffice. (For he can no better send his merchant ships through our submarine blockade—provided we can mount one—than can we send ours through his.) In our chagrin, in our shame at abandoning our allies, in our fear of living in dingy poverty on what our own land can supply, would we then call for mutual suicide by attacking the enemy with nuclear weapons? Even our allies might not appreciate the gesture.

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The threat under discussion is therefore not the nuclear missile submarine but rather the conventional attack submarine used in its classic roles—to destroy merchant ships and naval vessels, to hunt and fight other submarines, to mine and scout in enemy waters. And it need not be driven by the nuclear reactor-steam turbine plants which are currently the most economical means of propulsion for large submarines.

The newest attack submarines of the United States and the U.S.S.R. are indeed large—the size of light cruisers. However, the spectacular underwater feats of World Wars I and II were invariably accomplished by submarines displacing less than 2,000 tons. These could operate not only on the high seas, but also in waters too confined or shallow to be comfortable for today's giants. A hard core of submariners continue to believe that, in this respect, not much has changed, and that the most useful attack submarines are closer to the dimensions of the past than the present. Submarine design, which underwent an earthquake in the mid-fifties with the introduction of nuclear power, is again in a period of change. As submarines become smaller, the number of feasible propulsion systems becomes larger. They begin to include fuel cells or turbines fed by liquid hydrogen and oxygen, primary batteries, and other systems of quite enough endurance to give anti-submarine forces a severe case of the staggers.

It is now all too easy to envision a situation in which a naval war would remain tightly limited, essentially to an all-submarine war. If bulk cargo crossed contested oceans, it would do so in cargo submarines. If planes were flown over these waters, they would take off from bases with local fuel supplies.

## II

The main purpose of this article is to describe the technical evolution which has produced this situation rather than to detail its economic or political consequences. Mention of a few gross manifestations may be in order, however, to put the technical issues in perspective. For countries like Japan and England, which must import major portions of their food and raw material, the new equilibrium point between submarine and surface power is merely aggravating an old and well-known weakness. Although the United States is not as dependent on imports as these extreme cases, our dependence on foreign oil, on foreign

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iron ore and other raw materials is growing ominously, year by year. In food, however, we are as yet basically self-sufficient.

Although Japan and England, which are dependent for their daily bread on ocean shipping, can build submarines as well as anyone, to use them offensively opens their countries to a form of retaliation almost as serious as nuclear bombardment. The economy of the United States would be crippled, but probably not destroyed, by a successful blockade. Such an outcome is less certain for the U.S.S.R. and Red China, which as yet still maintain some rough balance between their people's expectations and the productive capabilities of their own territories.

Whether the United States gains or loses from the new equilibrium, it must recognize the situation and choose a course of action, however discordant with past programs and traditions, that will capitalize on the continuing developments in underwater and associated technologies, in which it is a leader.

Overall anti-submarine capability is losing ground to submarine capability because, on balance, the latter is benefiting to a greater degree from a variety of expanding technologies. Among these, specifically, are navigation, long-range communications, satellite and undersea surveillance techniques, underwater propulsion systems, life-support systems and homing weapons. Perhaps the cruelest blow to more traditional forms of naval power is the consistent ability of the submarine to benefit on balance from sensor developments, even when these are ostensibly anti-submarine in motivation. Any sensor which can detect a submarine can more easily detect a surface ship.

As the anti-submarine forces survey the performance of the modern submarine, and review the weapons that might be used to counter it, they are forced by lack of alternatives to place more emphasis on active sonar. The concept of blunting the power of the submarine with active sonar arose well before World War II. Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet describes how:

> In the decade that followed the [Washington Conference of 1921–2] the British, having failed to secure the abolition of the submarine, pushed forward experiments with countermeasures. . . . By far the most important experimental work of the period was . . . Asdic (active sonar). . . . In 1935 Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was concluded. . . . In signing this agreement [which permitted Germany to build up to 45 percent of British tonnage in submarines, and up to 100 percent at a future date] the British were influenced [by their belief] that Asdic was the "answer" to the submarine. . . . The concession allowing

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Germany to build submarines was, therefore, not thought to be a very great risk. . . .[1]

Without question, the active sonars of this period are far more powerful and numerous than a quarter-century ago (and even more so the passive sonars of the submarine). Lavish use of active sonar energy, however, has demonstrated many embarrassing side-effects. Because of the far greater intricacy of sound propagation in the sea than of radar waves in the atmosphere, it is less likely that active sonar will eliminate submarines than that radar will eliminate planes.

If the submarine remains restricted, as in the past, to the use of passive sonar, it can now apply to these passive data a variety of digital computer techniques, and a vast store of oceanographic information. It can hear the active emissions of surface ship sonar scores, even hundreds, of miles away, and can frequently determine from them a good deal about the surface ship's position. In World War II, with its capability to run submerged on battery for only a few hours, the submarine was happy if such information helped it slip away undetected. There was little it would or could have done offensively with such information. Today, no longer restricted to a short-range torpedo as a weapon, it has a substantial number of options.

Surface ships were always in contact with the atmosphere. Essentially, they have no more use for life-support systems today than they had in Magellan's day. At the end of World War II, a submarine could stay submerged only about 18 hours, perhaps 24 as a maximum. Today, submarines can cross the Arctic under the winter ice without ever coming within hundreds of feet of the surface. After two months of continuous submerged patrol, the atmosphere in an American nuclear submarine is purer than the air in most large American cities.

Surface ships can use either nuclear propulsion or conventional fossil fuel propulsion, sometimes with only marginal effects on their efficiency. The advantages of one method of propulsion over the other are sufficiently immersed in the issues of long-term logistics that analysts can frequently make cases for both systems, and for the same ship.

About nuclear propulsion for the submarine there is no debate. It has improved underwater performance by orders of magni-

[1] Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, "The Submarine and Sea Power." New York: Stein and Day, 1967, p. 111 and 118.

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tude. Indeed, it can be argued that, for certain tasks and regions, the submarine does not need the indefinite endurance of the nuclear reactor, and can sufficiently thwart the surface ship with a variety of other propulsion schemes that are greatly in advance of the diesel-electric engine rooms of World War II. The ability of a submerged nuclear submarine to outrun a destroyer has now lost some of its ability to shock. Suppose some upstart submarine does the same without a shred of nuclear technology.

Fifty years ago it was said that the invention of the gyrocompass (in 1911) had made the submarine a practical device. A submerged submarine could not navigate accurately until the gyrocompass gave it a good indication of true North. Surface ships could always navigate by a variety of techniques—by the magnetic compass, by the stars (when visible), and later by Loran, Omega, Transit, and the other radio navigation-satellite techniques available to anyone who can stick an antenna into the atmosphere. To a surface ship, precise inertial navigation—of the kind the Polaris and space programs have created—is icing on the cake. To the submarine, every increase in navigation accuracy enhances its ability to execute new missions submerged.

The submarine did not operate submerged in World War II. Half the torpedoes fired in that war were fired with the submarine on the surface. Probably no torpedo has ever been fired in anger with the submarine at more than about 100 feet in keel depth. The periscope and the snorkel, instruments which forced the submarine to operate at 10 knots or less, permitted most of the submarines to submerge to a depth of about 60 feet or so, with a tell-tale pipe still extending to the surface. The world does not yet grasp what a truly submerged submarine can do under wartime conditions.

A number of ocean surveillance and communication systems —some of planetary scope—now exist. They are not all of United States manufacture. The Russian reconnaissance satellite Cosmos 318 was launched January 9, 1970. By a variety of techniques, such systems can or soon will reveal the position of surface task forces, merchant convoys and even single ships. The days are probably gone when, as in World War II, nearly half the German U-boat patrols failed to find targets and when most Allied convoys were never attacked at all. Chief among the new surveillance systems are satellites armed with a variety of sensors; a growing number of bottom-mounted sonar arrays which have

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great difficulty in tracking quiet submarines (but which give clear tracks on noisy surface ships); and planes of considerably greater endurance and scan rate (against surface ships) than those which flew in World War II.

Military communication networks are also evolving on a planetary scale. The new sensors, whether they be on an ocean bottom miles below the surface or in orbit several hundred miles above the earth, are now generally coupled to ground stations that examine and compare data from enormous regions. Once a target is located on this planet's surface its coördinates, coded perhaps into a single digital word, can be sent quickly to planes and surface ships. Getting such information to a submerged submarine is more difficult—but still much easier than it was in the past. In terms of the engineer's measure of communication capacity—bits per second—recent technology has added far more to the capacity of surface ship communications than to that of submerged submarines. But, for the submarine, capability has gone from near zero to a significant amount, and tactically it has been the gainer in this competition. The bulk of this technology is open to the world.

Undoubtedly a naval war of any magnitude would also involve a war of sensors, with each side attempting to destroy or neutralize the instruments which are causing it most inconvenience. The likelihood is that this would blunt but not avert the effects of these new methods of surveillance.

The most threatening of submarine-launched weapons, at least to surface ships, is the long-range homing missile. The non-homing torpedo was (and remains) highly effective against slow and unalerted ships. Torpedoes mounting homing heads may be able to attack a wider variety of targets (and may also be quite vulnerable to decoys). Neither form of torpedo is much faster or of markedly greater endurance today than those of the past. Torpedoes remain relatively ineffective against targets at long range and against craft of shallow draft, such as hydrofoils and air-supported vehicles.

Not so the air-flight missile, whose range can match or exceed that of any sensor on the submarine, and which has a vast indifference to the below-water draft or defenses of the target. There is no intention here to imply that the submarine-launched homing missile represents a weapon without a defense. A world which is attempting to blast intercontinental ballistic missiles

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with super-powered laser beams will not shrink from grappling with a low-flying, barely sonic air-flight missile. Whether feasible or not, however, the equipment to guard against submarine-launched missiles will become one more expensive layer of defense around ships already overburdened by a multitude of enemies. One covert factor in the demise of the battleship was the fact that, by the beginning of World War II, about one-third of its displacement was in armor plate and in passive defense measures against torpedoes.

The destruction of the Israeli destroyer *Elath* by Russian-built Styx missiles and the immediate Israeli acceptance of reality by shifting their own meagre naval building program to missile-armed patrol craft are actions which have caused quite different responses in this country. The actual sinking has stimulated the United States Navy into intensive investigations of defensive systems. The manner in which the Israelis extracted their five missile-carrying patrol boats from a French shipyard has been much admired, but the significance of the decision that led to their construction has gone largely unnoticed. The Israelis have obviously been impressed with the effectiveness of the missile as a naval weapon.

The larger meaning of the *Elath* incident, which is the Israeli policy decision regarding the use of missiles in their new construction, brings to mind an ominous parallel. In 1921, after years of the most urgent pleading, Colonel William Mitchell was permitted by the Congress to test his theory that planes could sink capital ships, and succeeded in sinking a cruiser and a battleship captured from Germany with aircraft-dropped bombs.

The implications of this test were not generally accepted. It is true enough that no single demonstration can show beyond dispute the balance between complex weapons systems, particularly when the training, motivation and actions of the men on both sides remain basic to the outcome. To place more weight on the lessons of the past than on the preaching of contemporary prophets is more often right than wrong. Dozens of naval building programs based on peacetime logic have ended in wartime fiascoes. Even when the future is read correctly, and the conclusion accepted, enough time and resources to carry it out may be lacking. Such was the case with the German Navy just prior to World War II when, in war games carried out in the Baltic, it became clear that 300 U-boats would be required to defeat the

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convoy system in a war with Great Britain. Immediately after Munich, plans were laid to achieve this number by 1945. But history did not wait.

Billy Mitchell died unhonored and unvindicated. Perhaps his ghost jogged Congressional memories and made Admiral Rickover's path much easier than it might have been. But Mitchell's immediate effect on our building programs for capital ships and planes was meagre.

In 1941 the United States still owned an armada of battleships for the Japanese to sink at Pearl Harbor; and the British, Japanese and Germans, each in their fashion, experienced the repeated destruction of the key symbols of their naval strength.

III

If it is true that the submarine, with its new armament and technology, now holds the upper hand, what action is indicated? What the Israelis have done will not necessarily serve the United States. The means of the Israelis are small, they are unhindered by a large investment in conventional equipment, and they have a limited geography to deal with.

The naval commitments of this country center about the protection of our ocean commerce on a global scale. If the surface navy sinks under the burden of its several defenses against different weapons, for what purpose do we shift our building programs to produce more attack submarines? We must still move goods between continents.

Cargo airplanes face some sharp limitations, particularly if the transport of jet fuels by surface tankers is interfered with. If submarine tankers replace the surface tankers, the potential for the aircraft is to a degree restored, but it will take considerable analysis to determine to what degree.

A few years ago, the cargo plane accounted for approximately one-half of one percent of all transoceanic cargo movements. Cargo planes are growing rapidly in size, with gross weights of over 700,000 pounds already realized, and with gross weights of 900,000 pounds under serious study. A 450-ton ship was of quite respectable size to a Salem merchant in the Federalist period. But oil tankers today can carry 250,000 tons.

We can probably build enough cargo planes to handle a small percentage of our transoceanic freight shipments, that is, as long as unlimited supplies of carefully refined jet fuel are available

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at all air terminals. If the reality of an effective submarine blockade is granted, and the area we wish to succor is suffering from a savage fuel shortage, the concept of the cargo plane as the savior of ocean commerce fails without need for a cost analysis.

Hydrofoils and air-cushion machines will probably become much larger and faster platforms than they are. Like the plane, however, they consume expensive fuels prodigiously. And although they may be more or less invulnerable to conventional torpedoes, submarines (not our own) now carry weapons capable of dealing with them.

The only viable substitute for the merchant ship is the nuclear-propelled cargo submarine. In the case of the petroleum products and other fluids which make up more than 60 percent of all ocean-borne cargo, and of the granulated products like food grains and ores which make up perhaps another 10 to 20 percent, submarine transport will cost more than surface transport, but not significantly more by the standards of blockade economics. If gasoline refined from crude delivered by tanker costs, say, two cents more per gallon than if delivered by surface ship, or if bread made from submarine-carried wheat costs a penny more per loaf, the increase is little more than that of a year's normal inflation. The submarine has at least a chance of getting through, not at a steady 25 knots along an optimum great circle course, but by dodging and hiding and slinking along at whatever speed leaves it undetected.

Dry cargo presents, of course, some special difficulties, for which many ingenious and small-scale solutions should be developed, à la airplane cargo techniques. At first glance the problems of loading and unloading submarines with packages of various shapes and sizes call for a degree of back-breaking physical labor that the docks have not seen for generations. Submarine transport costs for dry cargo, with its low average density, will be higher, relative to surface ships, than for the bulk cargoes mentioned earlier. How high depends on many factors as yet unknown, such as the packaging techniques that are used and the degree to which unloading terminals must be protected from air strikes. The first cargo submarine on record, the *Deutschland,* handled only dry cargo, and was a great economic success.

Possession of a fleet of cargo submarines does not eliminate the need for a fleet of attack submarines of sufficient size to deal with the enemy's submarines, to interdict his surface shipping

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and to cover whatever oceans the battle may spread into. In a world which shares essentially the same technology, there is no substitute for numbers. To attempt to compensate for this lack by reliance on superior performance can bring its own subtle frustrations. This Navy now builds essentially one kind of attack submarine, and in such small numbers that it attempts to crowd into each one virtually all the capability that the technology of a particular design year permits. The result is a vehicle of such gigantic proportions that its very size is interfering with its performance in missions which, particularly in limited wars, will continue to be important. During his invasion of Scapa Flow, and his subsequent sinking of the *Royal Oak,* Commander Prien twice grounded his U-boat, and got it off. What would he have done, in those narrow channels, with a craft having 10 times the displacement of the U-47?

Far more units than can be practically envisioned in terms of cruiser-sized submarines are needed. If designs can be considered that are uninhibited by such traditions of nuclear submarine construction as have arisen since the mid-fifties, and if missions and capabilities are matched, small attack submarines that will be useful in the closing decades of this century are distinctly feasible. "Small," however, does not mean midget. By the standards of the seventies, the submarines of World War II were small.

Such suggestions are specifics. The generality is that the large surface vessel—the mainstay of conventional naval and merchant power—has become vulnerable beyond salvage to a variety of weapons of which the submarine, armed with air-flight missiles, is king. To the several nations which, in the remainder of this century, can achieve the twin goals of (1) a significant nuclear capability and (2) a large submarine fleet, these conditions present an opportunity to paralyze our nuclear strength and to place large sectors of the world's populations under intolerable economic pressure.

The evils that can arise from international frictions are varied, and so must be the remedies. Few forms of naval warfare have been used more frequently than the blockade, and none, in the past quarter-century, has been as greatly favored by technical developments. The opportunity is now open to hold a good part of the world hostage by blocking its surface fleets. Someone will eventually grasp it. This country, dependent on ocean transport, must have a remedy in hand.

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# IN THE TWILIGHT OF THE FRANCO ERA

*By Stanley G. Payne*

THE importance of southern Europe to the balance of power in world affairs has been underlined by the continuing crisis in the Middle East, the growth of Russian power in the Mediterranean and President Nixon's diplomatic journey in the autumn of 1970. The earlier renewal of the Spanish-American military pact, followed by Nixon's visit to Madrid, once more called attention to the role played by the Spanish government. At the same time, the future of the Franco régime has raised more questions than at any time in the past two decades, if only because of the fact that Franco himself entered his seventy-ninth year at the close of 1970 and in the preceding year took the unprecedented step of officially designating a successor, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, as heir to the Spanish throne.

The Franco régime has been in power for more than 30 years and is the longest-lived one-man dictatorship in the world (with the possible exception of the Tubman government in Liberia, depending on one's political definitions). Perennial statements of surprise over its survival have in recent times given way to a kind of acceptance of its durability. So many people have so often been mistaken in predicting the imminent demise of the régime that such voices are now heard less frequently, even though Franco's days are now obviously limited.

During the past decade both Americans and other West Europeans have had much more contact with Spain than at any other time in the past. Even though the immense majority of such contacts are superficial, they have to some extent increased knowledge of Spanish affairs on the common level. Franco of course still remains a bugbear for the leftist intelligentsia throughout the Western world, and even professional scholars often remain dominated by the ideological passions of the 1930s. However, the expansion of research during the 1960s on the politics and government of modern and contemporary Spain, particularly in the United States, has made much clearer the background, origins, development and structure of the Spanish régime.

It is now generally understood that Franco's "fascism" has endured because it is not, and never was, particularly "fascist." Rather it is a pragmatic authoritarian system, without very

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clearcut ideological boundaries, that has been characterized by a limited but undeniable pluralism. Spain's spectacular economic development in the 1960s, during which the country had one of the two highest industrial growth rates in the Western world, has brought major social changes and led to an annual per capita income currently in the neighborhood of $700–800. Spain is still the second poorest country in Western Europe, but it is by no means a "poor" or "have-not" country by present global standards.

All this is leading to a new era in Spanish affairs, and the question is inevitably posed whether, despite Franco's obvious political success, the Spanish régime can become in the 1970s the first major non-communist dictatorship able to institutionalize itself and survive the passing of its founder. One of the major difficulties is that, unlike communist states, the Franco régime lacks a major political organization on which to base leadership and ideology and mobilize support. The nominal state party, the Falange, was originally a fascist movement of the 1930s, catapulted to prominence by the Spanish Civil War and the fascist wave in Europe at that time. Yet the Falange was never in a dominant position within the Spanish state, but always served as a convenience of Franco for political organization and ideological reference. The downgrading of the Falange began when the fascist era in Europe waned in 1942–43 and has continued at varying rates ever since. At one time nominal affiliation to Falangist groups was nearly one million out of a total Spanish population of little more than 25 million. No official statistics are available for the years since 1962, but it seems doubtful that active membership is currently more than a few hundred thousand.

In a pluralistic dictatorship, the Falangist party had perforce to be denied a monopoly of patronage and so was never able to fatten its ranks by making membership a necessary prerequisite for state employment. Many state officials, particularly in local government, are or have been Falangists, but this is not true of a majority in any major branch of employment or administration. The genuinely fascist aspects of Falangist doctrine became an increasing embarrassment after 1945, as the régime deëmphasized political ideology altogether. The very name of the Falange came to be considered undesirable and during the 1950s was largely replaced in official terminology by that of *Movimiento*

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("The Movement"), an appelation conveniently ambiguous. The original Twenty-Six Points of the official Falangist program were replaced by a vague and watered-down statement of the "Doctrine of the Movement" in 1958. The Falange had never had a major paramilitary organization, and with the decline of the party's organizational work and youth activities it became increasingly difficult to recruit membership. Falangism was also deprived of major potential influence in Spanish society by strict state control of the national syndical system, from which radical Falangism was largely rooted out.

The last attempt to revitalize the Movement occurred in 1966–67, when Franco introduced a new Organic Law that established a reorganized National Council of the Movement as a sort of consultative senate within the Spanish state system. This was prompted by Franco's need to provide some kind of institutionalized political support for the régime at a time when it was being liberalized with an eye to the post-Franco succession. Without some sort of body on which to rely as a kind of defender of the faith, it was feared that the modest liberalization program might become unbalanced and even get out of control. Hence the Organic Law provided for the indirect election by local and provincial Movement councils of 108 members for the new National Council. The latter has no legislative function per se but may recommend new measures and is entrusted with jurisdiction over complaints of *contrafuero*—a traditional constitutional term meaning in effect changes or abuses that might threaten the norms or structure of the régime itself in terms of its own principles. Thus for the first time the Movement has been institutionalized as part of the Spanish state, yet in a secondary capacity that does not confer active authority. This has been intended to protect the Movement from withering away and enable it to play a stabilizing role in the evolution of the régime.

## II

Since 1957, attention has increasingly been drawn to a new element within Franco's pluralistic state system—the key leadership of new figures who are either members of or are associated with the semi-secret Catholic secular institute, Opus Dei. During the past decade Opus Dei has been at the center of political speculation in Spain and the amount of publicity given the "Opus faction" has increased considerably since the establishment of the

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present Spanish cabinet in October 1969, when 10 of the 19 seats were given to men who are either members of or are in varying ways associated with Opus Dei.

No aspect of Spanish life in the past quarter-century has provoked so much controversy as Opus Dei. This is due to two main factors: the apparent influence gained by some of the outstanding members of the institute, and the relative secrecy surrounding the organization and membership of Opus Dei itself. This lay association was founded in 1928 by an Aragonese priest, P. José María Escrivá de Balaguer, but only began to grow significantly after the Spanish Civil War. By the 1960s it had spread to nearly all parts of the Roman Catholic world, including Catholic society in the United States. Opus Dei is, as its members and spokesmen always stress, a religious, not a political, organization. It is devoted to the advancement of the Catholic religion and especially to regaining influence lost by the Church in secular society. This in turn leads to emphasis on achievement by members in practical affairs so as to regain a position of strength for Catholic values. Since it is a secular institute, the greater part of Opus Dei's membership consists of laymen. There are three categories: clerical members who have taken the priestly vows; laymen pledged to poverty, chastity and obedience but otherwise pursuing ordinary careers in the secular world; and ordinary laymen who take vows of the order but are free to marry. There is also a separate category of "coöperating" supporters who are not actually members of the institute.

That Opus Dei has become influential in Spain during the past fifteen years is indisputable, yet it is very difficult to measure the exact size and scope of that influence. Its membership cannot be calculated with precision, nor can its wealth. The association operates the only private university in Spain, many smaller schools and training programs, and numerous cultural and religious facilities. Some of its members have become especially prominent in Spanish government, education and finance.

This has led to great resentment on the part of other elements in Spanish affairs, ranging from Falangists at one extreme to the left-wing opposition on the other. Moreover, there is much opposition to Opus Dei in some other parts of the Church. Many Jesuits see Opus Dei as an undesirable rival, while laymen in Catholic Action are hostile to what they regard as its competition. The fact that the identity of Opus Dei members and inter-

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ests is often kept secret only adds to the suspicion and paranoia that the association has aroused. This sometimes reaches ludicrous dimensions, as during the past year when Opus Dei opened a training program for cooks and household servants in Madrid as part of its program to reach the lower classes; it was immediately charged with training a corps of espionage agents to spy on élite Spanish families in their own homes.

Opus Dei spokesmen respond vigorously to their critics, denying that the institute qua institute has a political organization or even an overall political position. They deny that the fact that Opus Dei members or sympathizers hold the dominant positions in the Spanish cabinet means that Spain has an "Opus Dei government," insisting that members of Opus Dei who achieve prominence in government or any other secular activity represent their own political views and not those of Opus Dei. They point out that the bulk of Opus Dei members are not élitists but come from the ordinary middle and lower classes. It seems indeed true that there is no direct "political arm" of Opus Dei and that genuine diversity of political opinion does exist within the institute.

Yet it is obvious that since 1957 a special political élite associated with Opus Dei—if not an Opus Dei political group—has become the strongest single sector in Spanish government. The term most often applied to these men is "technocrats," referring to the fact that Opus members have occupied the key economic posts during the main period of the régime's economic planning since 1959. Chief among them is the current Minister for Economic Development, Laureano López Rodó. The term "technocrat" is a bit excessive, since the economic administrators associated with Opus Dei do not hold to formal principles of technocracy per se, but rather to variants of modern economic neoliberalism that make use of planning and mild government intervention. They have presided over the great upsurge of the Spanish economy in the 1960s. Moreover, the vice-president of the Spanish government and chief counselor to Franco, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, is strongly sympathetic to Opus Dei, though not a member of the institute.

What this amounts to is a powerful constellation of interest and influence in the Spanish government, but it is not at all equivalent to an "Opus Dei government." Nearly half the cabinet members have no association at all with the institute, and some

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of them are in fact hostile to it. It is, however, clear that Franco and Carrero Blanco have found among some of the more talented Opus Dei laymen government administrators who are both technically more capable and politically more acceptable than either old-style Falangists or even conservative Christian Democrats. While the political philosophy of some individual Opus Dei members may be comparatively liberal, the government Opus Dei group seem to espouse a loose doctrine of pragmatic, pluralistic modernizing authoritarianism, capable of accommodating change while preserving the basic structure of the Franco régime, to continue, presumably, even after Franco's demise.

Reports of conflict between Opus Dei ministers and Movement ministers can easily be exaggerated. The future of the régime does not necessarily rest on the outcome of a power struggle between the two influences. For one thing, as explained above, the Opus ministers lack any autonomous base of direct political support. They are essentially administrators, if not precisely technocrats, summoned to do a job by the head of state and dependent upon him (and their relative success) for their authority. Moreover, the reputation for honesty and efficiency enjoyed by the Opus Dei group has been compromised by the "Matesa scandal," a major case of corruption or at least maladministration uncovered in 1969, in which a Barcelona industrial firm pocketed tens of thousands of pesetas falsely claimed for export-import credits. This has brought the indictment of two former cabinet members and the resignation of a leading Opus Dei figure from a key position in the Bank of Spain.

While the leaders of the remnants of the Movement do have an organized base of sorts, they have little authority and have not been entrusted with most key positions of leadership for more than a decade. Spanish government under Franco has always relied on a careful balance of diverse forces. A major problem of the succession will be to maintain an equilibrium, but neither the governmental elements of Opus Dei nor the leaders of the Movement are in a position to force the issue.

## III

In the Spanish system, a limited pluralistic régime is faced by a fractionalized opposition. The Spanish opposition may be divided for purposes of analysis into three different categories: the "collaborationist opposition," the "a-legal opposition" and the

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illegal opposition. The collaborationist opposition, or pseudo-opposition, consists of comparatively small sectors of those elements that participate in government under the Franco régime. For example, there are two small circles of dissident "left Falangists" that vigorously criticize the régime for having downgraded the Movement and for not having pursued a radical social and economic program. The Carlist sector of Spanish monarchism is divided into several groups and some of these are occasionally sharply critical. Even a few of the more liberal intellectual members of Opus Dei, such as Rafael Calvo Serer, take exception to the governmental Opus Dei group. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that these elements of the "collaborationist opposition" have little weight in Spanish affairs.

The sectors that Juan Linz of Yale University has labeled the "a-legal opposition" are somewhat more important. They consist mainly of several different groups and cliques of Christian Democrats and dissident monarchists, supported by a few elements of the financial community and aristocracy. Their informal political activity is usually tolerated because many of those involved either have been earlier associated with the régime or have ties with those so associated. Another reason that the government rarely moves against them is that their political work seldom takes the form of overt acts against the régime. Yet the "a-legal opposition" is of some importance for it contains capable leaders and potentially appeals to influential sectors of society.

The situation of the illegal opposition is quite different. This consists primarily of the working-class revolutionary groups—communists, socialists and anarchists—and the regional nationalists in Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia. All overt activities by these elements—who in a free political marketplace would probably gain considerable support—are simply repressed. None of the more than a dozen clandestine parties in this sector is large or well-organized. The most resourceful is the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), thanks to Russian money and technical assistance, but it does not have a large following.

A full roster of opposition groups would list 25 different clandestine or semi-secret parties or groups, but would also be misleading. The opposition is weak, uncertain and thoroughly divided. Its three main sectors still remain largely if not completely exclusive and each in turn is sharply split by multiple

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schisms and antagonisms. The regionalists, for example, are not merely distinct from most other elements of the illegal opposition but are themselves split between middle-class liberal and working-class revolutionary groups in each region. The Russian-dominated Communist Party of Spain is flanked by Maoist and Castroite groups. Thus, after more than three decades of authoritarian rule, the opposition groups are still in no position to exert effective pressure against the régime, and there is little indication that they will be able to do so in the near future.

Possibly more important at the moment than any one sector of the opposition is the cultural climate prevailing in the larger universities and among the broader, active elements of the intelligentsia. Not the least of the paradoxes of Spain during the last years of the Franco era is that a country which has lived for more than three decades under a right-wing dictatorship has an intelligentsia that is to a considerable degree leftist. Since the easing of censorship in 1966 it has been possible to publish Marx, Marcuse and Che Guevara with little hindrance. Falangist demagogues seeking to regain influence vie with leftist intellectuals in diatribes against capitalism. The most scholarly studies of comparative politics are rarely translated but cheap, journalistic anti-American propaganda abounds (seemingly on occasion with the encouragement of the régime). Superficial, propagandistic anti-capitalism and attacks on liberalism have become commonplace in Spanish publications; serious investigations of the reality of life under leftist régimes rarely appear.

This condition, typical of current fads among the intelligentsia throughout the world, is half-tolerated by the régime simply as a means of letting the intelligentsia blow off steam, so long as it is not specifically directed toward Spanish politics. The intelligentsia has never been able to achieve any effective influence in Spanish affairs since the Civil War, and has become vocal to any degree only during the past decade, as the prosperity of the 1960s permitted greatly expanded cultural activity. It should be noted, however, that the greater number of the public disturbances within Spain during the past few years have been the work of the radical student intelligentsia. Though all outbursts have been effectively suppressed, and though efforts by student radicals to establish contacts with other clandestine groups have not achieved notable success, the ferment is increasing and should make political stability more tenuous during the 1970s.

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Perhaps the best-organized, most important and successful sector of the opposition is not any of the political groups but rather the autonomous "Workers' Commissions." These are ad hoc representative structures of local factory workers organized more or less spontaneously entirely apart from the official state syndical system. The leaders are affiliated with a variety of groups—communist, anarchist, socialist, Christian Democrat—but in some cases have no explicit political identity at all. At this stage, their goals are strictly economic and trade unionist, and in a few districts the Workers' Commissions have proved so effective that employers have preferred to deal with them rather than with the official syndicates. The relative cohesiveness of the Madrid subway and construction workers' strikes in 1970 testifies to the efficiency of the Commissions, which may well become one of the two or three most powerful pressure groups of the decade. At present, however, they are handicapped by their semi-clandestine status and lack of national, as distinct from local, organization.

IV

The future of the régime is less dependent, however, on the activity of the opposition than it is upon key factors within the government itself at the time of Franco's eventual demise and on general international conditions outside the government's control. The first of these factors is the successor himself, Juan Carlos de Borbón. This handsome, vigorous prince has been educated in Spain since 1954. He has not received the broad, balanced training and wide-ranging education which would constitute a fully adequate background for a head of state. He is currently operating under a considerable handicap as Franco's hand-picked heir waiting in the wings, for he still has no genuine influence or authority over affairs. Though he is receiving large amounts of publicity and attends many ceremonial functions, he is denied genuine experience for his future task and is largely cut off from key political groups. He is in no sense a popular figure, but rather the butt of common jokes among the politically conscious throughout Spain as a naïve incompetent used as a mere prop by Franco.

These sneers would seem to be unjust and exaggerated. Prince Juan Carlos is clearly an untried element, but on occasions when he has been freer to speak his mind he has indicated awareness

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of the fact that the régime must continue to change and to liberalize itself. He has also indicated a concern to establish broader personal contacts with important Spanish groups, though this has been made difficult both by the limitations imposed on him by the present government and by the hostility of the more moderate sectors of the opposition.

The constitutional laws of the Spanish government require that Franco's successor first must swear to uphold the basic principle of the Movement, and Juan Carlos has already done this in the official ceremony that established him as Franco's successor. Thus he will be faced with the problem of assuring continuity of an authoritarian régime while trying to extend its liberalization, a most difficult political task. The two goals are equally important; if there were signs that continuity of the régime was not to be safeguarded, Juan Carlos might find his authority in danger during the immediate post-Franco period. If creative changes are not pursued, it might eventually become impossible to hold the lid on.

Historically, the two most important institutions in Spain have been the Church and the army. The Franco régime has always been basically a military dictatorship, but only in the sense that it was originally established by military rebellion. Though the army hierarchy enjoys a special relationship with the government, it has no direct political authority. Indeed, one of the paradoxes of Spain in the Franco era is that the army is now less politicized than it was during much of the earlier part of the twentieth century. Just as the régime's goal has been to depoliticize Spanish society at large, encouraging people to take their minds off public issues and making little effort at civic mobilization, so the officer corps and NCO's have been urged increasingly to concentrate on professional duties. This is clearly what the great majority prefer. Consequently the army as a whole has no "political position," leaving that to the government.

None the less, the top commanders of the Spanish army constitute the most important power élite in the country. They are in no way independent, being always subject to veto or dismissal by Franco, but he has always treated the army command with special consideration. When a group of senior military leaders present a strong front, they can often impose changes, as in the establishment of a 60-day "state of exception" in the winter of 1969 that briefly suspended constitutional guarantees after stu-

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dent and other disorders threatened to go too far. Conversely, when in early 1970 an important military figure made a public speech on his own demanding new social changes that smacked of demagogy, he was summarily dismissed by Franco.

The army command has always been fully loyal to the régime, and Franco has taken care with senior appointments to see that they remain that way. While a few senior officials favor moderate liberalization, the army chiefs are in general the main hard-liners behind the régime. In a post-Franco succession they would presumably take a strong stand against things "getting out of hand." Should the military commanders face a vacuum of civilian leadership or an opposition unwilling to work for a step-by-step transition they might feel forced to assume a more direct role. However, no figure in the military hierarchy has remotely the prestige or authority of Franco. Should military leaders decide to intervene after his passing, their nominal monopoly of force will not guarantee success unless they also retain internal unity. Whether the army leadership can remain firmly cohesive without Franco as their commander-in-chief is a moot point.

Support from the Church is not of such immediate importance, but is of great indirect and symbolic value. Part of the younger clergy are hostile to the régime, and since 1960 the Church hierarchy has shown increasing concern to distinguish its public role from that of the state and avoid an excessively close clerical embrace. The value of the union of Church and State is increasingly questioned in Catholic circles. In general the Church is even less a political institution than is Opus Dei, and the hierarchy is not eager to be associated with political disputes, hoping that a satisfactory resolution of Spain's future can be achieved without requiring direct Church involvement.

The context of international affairs during the next few years will have considerable effect on the shape of the Spanish political transition. Perhaps the greatest single talent that Franco has had as chief of state has been for adapting to changing conditions on the international plane, more often than not using these to reinforce the régime's domestic position. The last two decades of relative tranquillity have not been due merely to authoritarian control and economic expansion, but also to the reinforcing pressures of the cold war and the general climate of political stability in Europe as a whole. There is some doubt

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that these same trends will continue into the 1970s. If, as current indications portend, Soviet power continues to increase in the Mediterranean and the political structure of, for example, Italy begins to deteriorate, this may well have the dual effect of encouraging the leftist opposition while prompting the hard-liners to resist liberalization.

The future development of Spain will to some degree hinge on the country's association with the West European Common Market. "Europeanization" of the economy has been a major goal of the Opus Dei technocrats since the reforms that began in 1959. Entry into the Common Market would almost undoubtedly hasten the process of liberalization, making it nearly irreversible. In world perspective, it would also discourage the "neutralist" policy with which the régime has occasionally toyed in recent years. However, most of the West European Left shows no sign of terminating its ostracism of the Spanish régime, and the veto by the social democrats in the smaller Common Market countries seems as firm as ever.

In the mid-1960s there was some reason to believe that the demise of Franco might lead to the restoration of a constitutional monarchy that would restore liberal democracy to Spain, an outcome at that time seemingly favored by broad trends in the Western world. Now that liberal democracy has been rejected by some of the most active sectors of the intelligentsia, both inside and outside Spain, this seems rather less likely. For many years there appeared to be a good chance that Franco would be succeeded by the liberal heir to the Spanish Bourbon dynasty, Don Juan. Franco precluded this by seizing the initiative and instituting Don Juan's régime-educated son, Juan Carlos, as the official successor. Had Don Juan, rather than his son, had an opportunity to step in cleanly, the chances of national political conciliation would have been greater.

Much will depend on the precise circumstances attending Franco's demise. A direct overthrow either from inside or outside the government seems almost out of the question. The situation might be complicated by a lingering illness that left the head of state incapacitated, but the succession laws apparently provide for the transfer of powers to the legally designated heir in such circumstances. In any event, careful management by top government officeholders and by Juan Carlos will be necessary to make the transition a success. Much will also depend on the

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selection of a prime minister as acting head of government, either by Franco before his demise or by Juan Carlos immediately after assuming power as head of state. If such an executive is named by Franco beforehand, the prime minister would himself preside over the continuity of government, since under Spanish constitutional laws his early removal by Juan Carlos would be quite awkward.

The role of the opposition will then become much more important, and the indications are that a major part will be played by the communists. An immediate attack on the régime is unlikely, but six months or more after the transition is effected increasing pressure can be expected from the opposition. Should this get out of hand, leading to violence by, for example, student terrorists or Basque separatists, a new repression might be expected. If, however, the emerging opposition is well organized, peaceful and intelligently led, Juan Carlos and other government figures would probably be willing to extend further measures of liberalization and democratization. It is in this secondary, post-Franco phase, rather than in the initial steps of transition, that the fundamental structure of the Spanish régime is most likely to be called into question.

Non-communist authoritarian régimes have been notably incapable of perpetuating themselves after the death of the strong men who founded them. The three limited examples are the Pilsudski régime in Poland, that of Dollfuss in Austria (both of the latter having been overthrown from outside rather from within) and the current government of Portugal. These happen to be the twentieth-century European régimes which, together with Horthy's Hungary, are most similar to Franco Spain. The success of the Portuguese system in surviving the physical collapse and subsequent death of Salazar would appear to increase the chances for the Franco régime's continuation. Spain is a much more complex and difficult country to govern than is Portugal, but the present outlook is for continuity rather than upheaval in the Spanish system.

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SOVREMENNYE BURZHUAZNYE TEORII O SLIIANII KAPITALIZMA I SOTSIALIZMA: KRITICHESKII ANALIZ. Edited by M. B. Mitin. Moscow: Nauka, 1970, 243 p.

This book contains the report of a conference sponsored by the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R. on the theory of U.S.-Soviet convergence. The main targets for criticism are Raymond Aron, John Kenneth Galbraith, Adolf A. Berle and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

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THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Robert Jervis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 281 p. $8.50.

This study explores the many intricate patterns in which nations manipulate other nations' political and strategic expectations, thus deriving advantages in the formulation of their own strategies and policies. (Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard.)

THE PATHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP. By Hugh L'Etang. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1970, 215 p. $6.95.

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EXERCISES IN DIPLOMACY. By Sir Percy Spender. New York: New York University Press, 1970, 303 p. $8.50.

A careful, step-by-step account of the creation of ANZUS and the Colombo Plan, by one of the major architects of both. Some of the character sketches of the main participants are excellent, particularly that of Dulles.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: TENSIONS AMONG THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNTRIES. By Jack N. Behrman. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 194 p. $8.50 (Paper, $4.95).

An original and somewhat disturbing analysis of the impact of multinational business enterprises on governments. The author concludes that, generally, the business enterprises determine economic patterns by pursuing their own interests while governments lag behind.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. By Wesley L. Gould and Michael Barkun. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 338 p. $9.75.

An effort to examine the main problems of international law in terms of systems theory. While the methodology is somewhat unfamiliar, the substantive conclusions reached by the authors are not.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ACTORS: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. Edited by Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, 272 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.50).

This book brings together some excellent articles on the United Nations and the EEC. The authors fail, however, in their efforts to build a common analytical framework for the two institutions, apart from belaboring the truism that they share the quality of "international actorness."

THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES. Edited by Evan Luard. New York: Praeger, 1970, 247 p. $11.00.

Seven specialists compare the approaches to frontier disputes of the League of Nations, the United Nations and regional organizations and then examine the relative merits of mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION: ITS WORK FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. By G. A. Johnston. London: Europa Publications, 1970, 363 p. 63s.

An excellent monograph on the history, structure and activities of the ILO, by a British scholar.

## *General: Military, Technical and Scientific*

POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT. By Paul and Ann Ehrlich. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1970, 383 p. $8.95.

A powerful work, exploring the impact of the population crisis on the environment. Even though the authors may somewhat exaggerate the Malthusian peril, their book is one of the most thoroughly researched and persuasively argued polemics currently available. Good bibliographies accompany each chapter.

STRATEGY FOR TOMORROW. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 377 p. $7.95.

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The author argues forcefully for superiority in strategic weapons, maritime superiority, continued emphasis on research and development, sounder intelligence and shorter lead time between blueprint concept and finished weapon. In its general approach, the book warns against what the author sees as the futile hope for a brave new warless world.

THE WARTIME JOURNALS OF CHARLES A. LINDBERGH. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, 1,038 p. $12.95.

Despite the intelligence, integrity and grace of style that emerge from these 1,000 pages, it is difficult to escape the overall impression of boundless political naïveté. In his early reactions to Hitler, for example, Lindbergh sometimes sounds almost like Albert Speer, another brilliant technician seduced by the spectacle of ruthless political power.

THE YEARS OF MACARTHUR. VOLUME I: 1880–1941. By D. Clayton James. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 740 p. $12.50.

This excellent first volume of a projected two-volume biography is definitely one of the leading works to have appeared thus far on the controversial General. The research is thorough, and judgments are balanced and without prejudice. The author's model, in terms of style and format, seems to be Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Here the author does not quite make it.

PENTAGON CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR. By Seymour Melman. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970, 290 p. $8.50.

A passionate indictment of what the author describes as the expansion of the Pentagon into all aspects of American life. Unless this process is reversed, he feels, a garrison-like society is around the corner. A strong polemic, but in places generating more heat than light.

DECISIONS OF ROBERT S. McNAMARA: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. By James M. Roherty. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970, 223 p. $7.95.

In his efforts to construct a general theory of civil-military relations, the author is only partially successful. The most valuable parts of the book are two first-rate case-studies, one on the decision not to build a manned bomber and the other on the decision to build a nuclear carrier.

PIECES OF THE ACTION. By Vannevar Bush. New York: Morrow, 1970, 366 p. $8.95.

This is a salty biography, written with humor and optimism. The author spans 60 years in easy and often charming prose. Science plays a large role but does not dominate the book. Wise things are said as well about teaching, teachers and political leadership in America.

THE SCORPION AND THE TARANTULA: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL ATOMIC WEAPONS, 1945–1949. By Joseph I. Lieberman. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 460 p. $8.95.

In this fine case-study of the failure to control atomic weapons in the immediate postwar period, the author maintains that the responsibility for this tragedy falls equally upon the United States and the Soviet Union. A conscientious and persuasive piece of work.

THE SEA AGAINST HUNGER. By C. P. Idyll. New York: Crowell, 1970, 221 p. $7.95.

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This excellent book by a distinguished oceanographer demonstrates that the sea alone cannot save the world from hunger. It can, however, if sensibly harvested, become a valuable ally in the battle.

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMANISM. By William G. Carleton. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970, 300 p. $12.50.

There is no real common theme to these 18 essays, but some of them truly captivate the reader with their humanity and wisdom. "Kennedy in History" and "Letter to a New Ph.D." are particularly engaging.

THE ROAD FROM WAR: VIETNAM 1965–1970. By Robert Shaplen. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 368 p. $7.95.

The author's authoritative reports on the Vietnam war, originally written for *The New Yorker,* comprise the essence of this book. Each essay conveys a sense of poignant immediacy and detail, and the book as a whole reveals the tragedy of the war in perspective.

THE PROTRACTED GAME. By Scott A. Boorman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 242 p. $7.50.

An imaginatively argued hypothesis that the Chinese game of *wei-ch'i,* or *go,* provides valuable insights for a deeper understanding of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary strategy.

DECISION-MAKING FOR SPACE: LAW AND POLITICS IN AIR, SEA, AND OUTER SPACE. By Irvin L. White. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1970, 277 p. $6.50.

This monograph sets forth the main legal and political problems in outer space and the main legal rules covering international air and sea. It also attempts to explain why national decision-makers either accept or reject these rules. A solid study.

ABEL. By Louise Bernikow. New York: Trident Press, 1970, 347 p. $7.95.

The author attempts to uncover the human being under the mask of the "master spy." Aside from a few lapses into maudlin sentimentality, she succeeds admirably. On one level, the book is a fascinating spy story; on another, a sophisticated, often quite moving inquiry into the problem of human identity.

THE POLITICS OF GRAND STRATEGY. By Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 409 p. $12.50.

This scholarly work on Anglo-French military and naval conversations before World War I illustrates the primacy of domestic politics and bureaucracy in the determination of alliance policy, even in times of great stress and danger.

ON THE SEAS AND IN THE SKIES. By Theodore Roscoe. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1970, 690 p. $14.95.

A history of U.S. naval aviation. Though overlong and written in a self-consciously "adventure-story" manner, the book packs in an impressive amount of valuable information.

UNARMED AND UNAFRAID. By Glenn B. Infield. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 308 p. $7.95.

An informative book on aerial reconnaissance, shedding new light on the technical aspects of the U-2 episode, the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam war.

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THE DAMNED ENGINEERS. By Janice Holt Giles. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 409 p. $6.95.

The heroes of this fast-paced account of the Battle of the Bulge are the American combat engineers. Well researched and well written.

## *General: Economic and Social*

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1971 BUDGET. By Charles L. Schultze with Edward K. Hamilton and Allen Schick. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970, 192 p. $2.95 (Paper).

A remarkably interesting demonstration of how the apparently pedestrian task of making the budget in fact involves major policy choices, not only about who gets what in the economy but about the defense posture of the United States quite a few years in the future. Though the figures refer to the current fiscal year, the discussion of the issues is of continuing relevance. The author was Director of the Budget, 1965–68.

NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Robert E. Baldwin. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970, 210 p. $6.95.

The best book yet on nontariff barriers and related practices that interfere with international trade, such as subsidies and taxes. Strong on economic analysis, this study by a Wisconsin professor with governmental experience is also valuable for its descriptive material and suggestions about the kinds of international agreements that would improve matters.

COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. By Samuel Pisar. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970, 558 p. $17.50.

This comprehensive treatise on doing business with Russia and Eastern Europe is in some respects a superior "how to" book and in others a balanced and sensible discussion of policy issues, obstacles to trade, communist attitudes, recent experience, etc. The author, an American lawyer based in Europe, concludes by proposing a "code of fair practices" for the future. About half the book is on legal matters.

THE GOLD WAR: THE STORY OF THE WORLD'S MONETARY CRISIS. By Gordon L. Weil and Ian Davidson. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 245 p. $6.95.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM, 1964–69: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION. By Stephen D. Cohen. New York: Praeger, 1970, 201 p. $13.50.

BANKERS' DIPLOMACY: MONETARY STABILIZATION IN THE TWENTIES. By Richard Hemmig Meyer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 170 p. $8.00.

The political aspects of international monetary affairs are generally acknowledged but rarely well written about. These three quite different books help a little. Weil and Davidson give a readable account of recent events that explains the economic issues but adds little to what the newspapers said about its political aspects. Cohen, an economist with Treasury and banking experience, gives a sober account of negotiations about gold, the dollar and Special Drawing Rights with emphasis on the fact that control over money is power. Meyer, who has more documents to go on than the others, looks at the behavior of major central bankers in certain episodes in the twenties in an interesting political and psychological way.

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APPROACHES TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES: THE BÜRGENSTOCK PAPERS. Edited by George N. Halm. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 436 p. $12.50.

A wide range of views and the high level of expertise make this a most important contribution to the lively current discussion of flexible exchange rates. The papers were arranged by C. Fred Bergsten, George N. Halm, Fritz Machlup and Robert V. Roosa.

L'EUROPE FACE À LA RÉVOLUTION TECHNOLOGIQUE AMÉRICAINE. By Pierre Vellas. Paris: Dunod, 1969, 192 p. Fr. 16.

A departure from the common prescription that Europe must unite to overcome the technological lead of the United States. Thinking that prospect unlikely, this French economist stresses the possibilities of different forms of international coöperation. He also analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of Euratom, OECD, the Concorde project, work on space and communications and other efforts of the recent past.

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: IN HONOR OF E. S. MASON. Edited by Jesse W. Markham and Gustav F. Papanek. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 422 p. $9.95.

Since Edward S. Mason of Harvard taught so many excellent economists, it is not surprising that this book should be a great deal more interesting than the usual *Festschrift*. About half the pieces deal with international issues.

THE POPULATION PROBLEM. By Arthur McCormack. New York: Crowell, 1970, 264 p. $7.95.

A Catholic priest who emphasizes positive measures for dealing with growth, welfare and hunger concludes that "in certain areas of the world a population-restriction policy is urgently needed."

TRADE, TARIFFS AND GROWTH: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. By Jagdish Bhagwati. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970, 371 p. $12.50.

Collected papers by an M.I.T. professor who is one of the best experts in the field.

## *The United States*

THE POLITICS OF UNREASON. By Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 547 p. $12.50.

This is the best and most comprehensive historical study of right-wing extremism in America currently available. The authors examine the sociopolitical bases of this phenomenon from 1790 to the John Birch Society and conclude that "the American population is still highly vulnerable to political extremism; the American political system is less so, but scarcely fail-safe."

NO HAIL, NO FAREWELL. By Louis Heren. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 275 p. $6.95.

This excellent, rather sympathetic appraisal of the Johnson Administration by a leading British journalist retells the hard facts of the Johnson years in easy prose.

THE PRESIDENT STEPS DOWN: A PERSONAL MEMOIR OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER. By George Christian. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 282 p. $6.95.

LBJ's last hundred days, recounted by his former press secretary. Though chatty, the book affords some intimate glimpses. The tone is affectionate, but not cloying.

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THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY. By George E. Reedy. New York: World Publishing Co., 1970, 205 p. $6.95.

A concerned and skeptical look at the Presidency, which the author describes as "the American Monarchy." Removed from human reality, the President must bear "the burdens of Sisyphus." These may crush him unless "this thing is made human again." The author's diagnosis has the ring of truth, but his prescriptions for curing the malaise are at best vague.

THE PENTAGON PROPAGANDA MACHINE. By Senator J. W. Fulbright. New York: Liveright, 1970, 166 p. $4.95.

This book comprises a series of speeches given by the author on the Senate floor in December 1969. In essence, it is an exposé of the Defense Department's high-powered public relations activities which extend to the Army's support of war movies such as John Wayne's "The Green Berets." A timely and disturbing book.

ODYSSEY OF A FRIEND: WHITTAKER CHAMBERS' LETTERS TO WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., 1954–1961. Edited by William F. Buckley, Jr. New York: Putnam, 1970, 303 p. $6.95.

These letters reveal the brilliant and tortured mind of Whittaker Chambers even more clearly than "Witness." Unfortunately, the book is marred by a lengthy and highly polemical preface by Ralph de Toledano which stands in striking contrast to the profoundly human content of the letters it is supposed to introduce.

SOVETSKAIA ROSSIIA I SSHA, 1917–1920. By Ludmila Gvishiani. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia," 1970, 327 p.

The author traces U.S.-Soviet relations during the early years of the Bolshevik régime and concludes that Lenin's attitude toward the United States was a great deal more positive and friendly than his view of the other capitalist powers.

VNESHNEPOLITICHESKIE DOKTRINY SSHA. By Iu. M. Mel'nikov. Moscow: Nauka, 1970, 495 p.

The essence of this study is an appraisal of the foreign policy of President Kennedy which, in the author's view, ushered in a period of improved and more realistic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL ETHICS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONQUEST. By John M. Swomley, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 250 p. $6.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A revisionist history of American foreign policy since 1939. The author maintains that "it has been in the interest of military and financial circles to make war and to garrison other lands, quite as much for the expansion of American control as for the destruction of Fascism and the containment of Communism."

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1921–1922. By Thomas H. Buckley. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970, 222 p. $8.50.

The author of this meticulously researched monograph takes the reader step by step through the arduous negotiations of the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. The assessment of the arms limitation agreements that emerged from the Conference is balanced and realistic.

AN END TO POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE CAUCUS PAPERS. Edited by Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe. New York: Basic Books, 1970, 324 p. $7.95.

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Ten dissident political scientists attack the basic assumptions of the discipline as presently taught in the United States. All the authors represented here urge a new, more normative and more politically committed political science.

POWER AND COMMUNITY: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. Edited by Philip Green and Sanford Levinson. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970, 396 p. $10.00 (Paper, $2.45).

A dozen essays held together by the authors' common concern that American political science has been either irrelevant to the vital issues of the times or has tended to support the political status quo in the United States. The authors helped to found the Caucus for a New Political Science within the American Political Science Association.

WHO NEEDS THE DEMOCRATS, AND WHAT IT TAKES TO BE NEEDED. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Garden City: Doubleday, 1970, 86 p. $4.95.

A shotgun critique of the Democratic Party, written in obvious haste. The book glitters in a superficial way, but is very much lacking in depth.

THE PEACE CORPS. By Robert G. Carey. New York: Praeger, 1970, 274 p. $8.95.

A good straightforward description and analysis of the Corps' record to date. The author's attitude in general is friendly, though mildly critical in places.

CONGRESS AND CONSCIENCE. Edited by John B. Anderson. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970, 192 p. $4.95.

Six Congressmen explore the relationship between politics and ethics in a number of different fields. The book adds an interesting perspective to the subject.

ACADEMIA IN ANARCHY: AN ECONOMIC DIAGNOSIS. By James M. Buchanan and Nicos E. Devletoglou. New York: Basic Books, 1970, 187 p. $5.95.

A critique of university establishments and student rebels from the vantage point of two discerning economists. The result is an original and perhaps overlooked contribution to the debate currently taking place in academia.

THE GREENING OF AMERICA: HOW THE YOUTH REVOLUTION IS TRYING TO MAKE AMERICA LIVABLE. By Charles A. Reich. New York: Random House, 1970, 399 p. $7.95.

The author demonstrates great empathy with the youth revolution. He asserts that it is the only constructive alternative to the "wasteland of the corporate state." His vision of American youth is romantic to the point of reverence. This makes the book as a whole a passionately stated half-truth.

## *The Western Hemisphere*

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: A STUDY IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By R. Harrison Wagner. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, 246 p. $7.95.

The economic policies of the United States toward Latin America between World War II and the coming of the Alliance for Progress are traced in craftsmanlike detail, with particular reference to the effect of American domestic considerations.

LATIN AMERICA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT OR REVOLUTION. By Andre Gunder Frank. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, 409 p. $8.50.

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A paean to revolution in the Hemisphere, and a mélange of polemics, passion and quarter-truths.

RACE AND CLASS IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Magnus Mörner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 309 p. $10.00.

Thirteen papers of professional quality assess race relations, slavery and social classes in selected countries and time periods.

INTERVENTION AND NEGOTIATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REVOLUTION. By Jerome Slater. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 254 p. $7.95.

A valuable addition to the growing literature on the controversial American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The approach is judicious, the tone temperate and the research soundly based.

CRUCIFIXION BY POWER: ESSAYS ON GUATEMALAN NATIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE, 1944–1966. By Richard Newbold Adams. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970, 553 p. $10.00.

A distinguished social anthropologist analyzes in depth the circumstances of peasant life, development and evolution, using the structure and concentration of power on the national level as a framework. A rewarding study.

BOLIVIA: THE UNCOMPLETED REVOLUTION. By James M. Malloy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970, 396 p. $11.95.

The author believes that Bolivia has been continuously in a revolutionary situation since 1936. Political and economic events are traced to 1964, with emphasis upon the "will, capacities and orientation of the active contestants."

THE VARGAS REGIME: THE CRITICAL YEARS, 1934–1938. By Robert M. Levine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 270 p. $9.00.

A well-documented investigation of the politics and ideology of the first Vargas government and its corporatist and developmentalist policies, in the total context of Brazilian life.

ORDER AND PROGRESS: BRAZIL FROM MONARCHY TO REPUBLIC. By Gilberto Freyre. New York: Knopf, 1970, 422 p. $12.50.

Brazil's famous social historian adds to his luster with a work delineating all facets of his country's transition to republican forms. The treatment, extending to approximately the era of World War I, illuminates the persistence of traditional social forms and practices.

## *Western Europe*

THE REBIRTH OF EUROPE. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, 434 p. $8.95.

An intelligent and comprehensive survey of Europe since the last war. The author, at home in Europe and America, covers economic and cultural as well as political developments.

THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE. By Louis Armand and Michel Drancourt. New York: Atheneum, 1970, 256 p. $5.95.

A suggestive sketch of what a united Europe could do to respond to the cultural and economic challenges of contemporary technology, by two well-known Frenchmen.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR EUROPE? THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By Gordon L. Weil. Bruges: College of Europe, 1970, 324 p. Belgian Fr. 300.

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An analysis of the uneven, and, on the whole disappointing, beginnings of a common foreign policy for the European Communities. In what fields and under what circumstances can Brussels speak for Europe's Six? An informative study, by a close American observer.

THE POLITICAL DIARIES OF C. P. SCOTT 1911–1928. Edited by Trevor Wilson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 509 p. $12.00.

Portions of the hitherto unpublished diary and correspondence of the *Manchester Guardian*'s famous editor. Friend and critic of Lloyd George, Scott was close to the British Government, and his accounts reveal the reactions of a liberal mind to leading men and events. An important source, especially on the style of British policy.

THE RULES OF THE GAME IN PARIS. By Nathan Leites. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 355 p.

An American political scientist attempts to evoke the subtleties and nuances of French political life by assembling characteristic utterances from French life and literature. A bold and excellent idea, but the reach is greater than the grasp —by far.

VINGT ANS DE VIE POLITIQUE, 1918–1938: DE CLEMENCEAU À DALADIER. By Georges Bonnet. Paris: Fayard, 1969, 286 p. Fr. 20.

The rather garrulous, superficial recollections of a leading French politician who in 20 years of public life saw much and understood little.

MÉMOIRES: 1920–1940–1945. By General Beaufre. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1969, 514 p. Fr. 22.80.

Eloquent and informative recollections of a French general who before and during the Second World War played a major role in military and political affairs.

LA SOCIÉTÉ BLOQUÉE. By Michel Crozier. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970, 251 p. Fr. 21.

Important essays on French society and sociology, by a leading French sociologist, reflecting his scholarly pursuits and his "frustrations as a citizen." He includes his judicious manifestos on the student revolt of 1968 and the referendum in 1969.

MODERN CAPITALIST PLANNING: THE FRENCH MODEL. By Stephen Cohen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 310 p. $8.50.

More stimulating than many studies of French planning, this one stresses the way it is shaped by "the power structure of the modern capitalist political economy" and what possibilities there are for future change.

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: 1968. Edited by Charles Posner. Baltimore: Penguin, 1970, 317 p. $1.95 (Paper).

A useful potpourri of chronology, firsthand narrative and sympathetic analysis of what the several authors like to call *le joli mai*. The central assumption is that France will never be the same again and that May 1968 prefigured something of the future.

STUDENT POLITICS IN FRANCE: A STUDY OF THE UNION NATIONALE DES ETUDIANTS DE FRANCE. By A. Belden Fields. New York: Basic Books, 1970, 198 p. $7.95.

An American political scientist studies the national organization of French students. Completed before the May 1968 upheavals, the book nevertheless sheds some light on subsequent events.

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THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY: RIGHT RADICALISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. By John David Nagle. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 221 p. $8.50.

An American political scientist examines the neo-Nazi party in the wider context of Bonn politics.

THE GERMAN RESISTANCE TO HITLER. By Hermann Graml and others. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 281 p. $7.95.

Four incisive studies of different aspects of the German Resistance, ranking among the best in English.

VOM REICH ZUM WELTREICH: HITLER, NSDAP UND KOLONIALE FRAGE 1919–1945. By Klaus Hildebrand. Munich: W. Fink, 1969, 955 p. DM. 96.

In a massive work, based on vast, hitherto unused archival material, a young German historian analyzes admirably the place of colonial aspirations in Hitler's shifting policies.

DIARY OF A MAN IN DESPAIR. By Friedrich Percyval Reck-Malleczewen. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 219 p. $6.95.

The reflections of a German conservative who detested the Nazis and saw in them the products of 1789, of industrial capitalism, of mass man—and of all the other bugbears that German conservatives have traditionally lamented. A fascinating mixture of courage and conventional prejudice, leading to martyrdom, for the author was executed by the Nazis in 1945.

FREIKORPS UND REPUBLIK, 1918–1920. By Hagen Schulze. Boppard: Boldt, 1969, 363 p. DM. 36.

A meticulously documented monograph on the military forces, known as the Free Corps, organized in Germany after the November revolution with the approval of the socialist government and the Western Allies with the aim of suppressing uprisings of the radical left and defending the eastern borders after the disintegration of the German Army.

MIRACLE DE LA SUÈDE: UN PAYS PAUVRE DEVIENT RICHE. By Tyra Ferlet. Paris: Arthaud, 1969, 325 p. Fr. 25.

A popular study of life in contemporary Sweden, covering various aspects from industry to nudity.

GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITÄT. BAND VI, 1939–1945. By Edgar Bonjour. Basel: Helbing, 1970, 430 p. Swiss Fr. 38 (Paper, Swiss Fr. 25).

This volume of the authoritative history of Swiss neutrality deals with controversial national policies during the Second World War. By a leading Swiss scholar.

MUSSOLINI'S EARLY DIPLOMACY. By Alan Cassels. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 425 p. $12.50.

A scholarly and original study of the first four years of the Duce's foreign policy. They were not as restrained as had once been assumed.

## *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*

SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE, 1945–1970. By Thomas W. Wolfe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 534 p. $15.00.

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This is an important contribution to the history of the cold war in Europe, especially through its detailed and well-documented examination of the Soviet position and viewpoint. The core of the book deals with the decade and a half of Khrushchev's rule and that of his successors; the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion is the crisis of the story. As one would expect from Mr. Wolfe, ample attention is paid to military and strategic matters.

AN EMPIRE LOSES HOPE: THE RETURN OF STALIN'S GHOST. By Anatole Shub. New York: Norton, 1970, 474 p. $10.00.

An extensive, well-informed and largely personal report on developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1960s. The author, an able American journalist, was in the area for most of the period. The burden of his impressions is reflected in the title and subtitle.

POLITICAL TERROR IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS. By Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, 172 p. $5.95.

A concise but thoughtful discussion of the functions of terror at various stages in the gaining, maintenance and consolidation of power.

RUSSIA AND THE WORLD: A STUDY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By Sir William Hayter. New York: Taplinger, 1970, 133 p. $4.95.

Reflections by the former British Ambassador in Moscow on the "conservative" as against the "revolutionary" components in contemporary Soviet foreign policy.

RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST: A CONTEMPORARY CHRONICLE, 1953–1966. By Isaac Deutscher, edited by Fred Halliday. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 360 p. $7.00.

A welcome selection of the late Isaac Deutscher's articles and essays on current affairs from 1953 to 1966.

THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: A SUPERPOWER DILEMMA. By Roman Kolkowicz and others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 212 p. $9.00 (Paper, $2.95).

An effort by several authors to elucidate the elements in the Soviet approach to strategic arms limitations: Soviet-American strategic relations, nuclear proliferation, the China factor and Soviet policy toward Europe.

LE CONFLIT SINO-SOVIÉTIQUE ET L'EUROPE DE L'EST. By Jacques Lévesque. Montreal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1970, 387 p.

A serious analysis of the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict upon Soviet relations with the East European states, more particularly Poland and Rumania. The author is professor of political science at the University of Montreal.

STALIN UND DER AUFSTIEG HITLERS. By Thomas Weingartner. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970, 302 p. DM. 38.

A valuable study of Soviet and Comintern policy toward Germany during the crucial years from 1929 to 1934.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA: FROM STALIN TO BREZHNEV. By J. A. Naik. Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970, 201 p. Rs. 24.

An Indian scholar's analysis of the course of Soviet policy toward his country, chiefly in the last three decades.

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SOVIET POLICY IN WEST AFRICA. By Robert Legvold. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 372 p. $13.00.

A study of Soviet interest in and policy toward Guinea, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal in the years from 1957 to 1968.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA 1918–1968: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY. Edited by Stephen Clissold. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1970, 313 p. $12.00.

A useful volume of Soviet, Comintern and Latin American documents, with explanatory notes and an extended introduction.

VLASOV. By Sven Steenberg. New York: Knopf, 1970, 230 p. $7.50.

An account of the story of General Andrei Vlasov, a Soviet war hero who defected and attempted to organize a movement for the overthrow of the Stalinist régime. The author was a Wehrmacht officer and interpreter in German-occupied Russia.

LENIN'S CHILDHOOD. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 67 p. $4.95.

A tantalizing fragment, posthumously published, of what was intended to be a major biography of Lenin.

LENIN SUOMEN VAIHEISSA. By V. Smirnov. Helsinki: Otava, 1970, 210 p. 15 Fmk.

Lenin took refuge in Finland some 20 times during 1905 and 1917, and Smirnov's account brings together what information is accessible concerning these episodes.

INVOLUNTARY JOURNEY TO SIBERIA. By Andrei Amalrik. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, 297 p. $6.95.

The courageously nonconformist author of "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" reports on his imprisonment, trial and exile to Siberia in the mid-1960s. Not surprisingly he has since been rearrested, tried and imprisoned.

THE DIARY OF A DIPLOMAT IN RUSSIA, 1917–1918. By Louis de Robien. New York: Praeger, 1970, 318 p. $8.50.

This is a most interesting day-by-day report on the Russian Revolution in 1917–1918 as observed through the diary of a young French official in the Petrograd Embassy. The author was an old-fashioned aristocrat, but perceptive and articulate.

KARL RADEK: THE LAST INTERNATIONALIST. By Warren Lerner. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, 240 p. $7.95.

A solid political biography of one of the most intelligent and witty, if occasionally frivolous, of the Old Bolsheviks, who perished in the great purges.

THE MARXIAN REVOLUTIONARY IDEA. By Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton, 1969, 240, p. $5.95.

Interesting essays on Marxian theory, its role as ideology and its place in communist revolutions.

GEORG LUKÁCS: THE MAN, HIS WORK AND HIS IDEAS. Edited by G. H. R. Parkinson. New York: Random House, 1970, 254 p. $7.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A welcome set of essays on various facets of the thought of a leading Marxist theoretician.

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CITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION. By Chauncy D. Harris. Chicago: Rand McNally (for the Association of American Geographers), 1970, 484 p. $9.95.

The leading American student of Soviet geography offers a valuable study of the "economic functions, size relations, distributional patterns, and growth" of the some 1,247 cities and towns of the U.S.S.R.

DEUTSCHE UKRAINEPOLITIK 1918. By Peter Borowsky. Lübeck: Matthiesen Verlag, 1970, 316 p. DM. 44.

A monograph on German policy in the Ukraine in the months of the Rada and Skoropadsky régimes, with appropriate emphasis on economic and agricultural affairs.

KOMMUNISMIN KRIISI. By Antti Kovanen. Helsinki: Otava, 1970, 110 p. 12 Fmk.

A well-known leftist journalist's account of the current status of the communist movement in Finland and abroad. The author served as a correspondent in Moscow from 1957 to 1960.

CROATIA: LAND, PEOPLE, CULTURE. VOLUME II. Edited by Francis H. Eterovich and Christopher Spalatin. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970, 568 p. $17.50.

This second volume of an ongoing series includes articles on Croatian history before 1918, various linguistic and cultural developments, some chapters on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Croatian migration to the United States and Canada.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: INTERVENTION AND IMPACT. Edited by I. William Zartman. New York: New York University Press, 1970, 127 p. $6.95.

Papers by Jan Triska, Vernon V. Aspaturian, William E. Griffith, Andrew J. Pierre, Andrew M. Scott and the editor, dealing with the impact of the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia on contemporary international relations.

DEMOCRACY AT GUNPOINT: THE GREEK FRONT. By Andreas Papandreou. Garden City: Doubleday, 1970, 365 p. $7.95.

This is an important but quite vehement and controversial book. The author, a Harvard-trained Greek political figure now in exile, gives his intimate and in places highly informed view of Greek politics in the 1960s. He is very hostile to U.S. policy; the CIA is a principal target.

## *The Middle East*

POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD: THE ROLE OF IDEAS AND IDEALS IN POLITICS. By Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 298 p. $11.00.

A comprehensive treatment of political ideologies, including nationalism, constitutional democracy, Islamic reformism, Marxism and "Arab socialism." The author develops a thesis of a new social democracy which he considers suited to the Arab future.

COMMUNISM IN THE ARAB EAST. By M. S. Agwani. New York: Asia Publishing House (for the Indian School of International Studies), 1970, 259 p. $7.50.

An Indian scholar's informative study, using many Arabic sources, which concentrates on the communist parties rather than on Soviet policy.

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MIDDLE EAST OIL: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROVERSY. By George W. Stocking. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970, 485 p. $15.00.

A distinguished economist's impartial and readable account of past and present problems faced by the industry and by producing countries, presented against the background of political events.

THE SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS. By Richard P. Mitchell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 349 p. $10.25.

Definitely the best book on the religious-political movement which challenged—and was outlawed by—both the old régime in Egypt and the new military government after 1952.

THE GAME OF NATIONS: THE AMORALITY OF POWER POLITICS. By Miles Copeland. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970, 318 p. $6.95.

An insider's unorthodox and occasionally hilarious story of the cryptodiplomacy by which American agents and Abdel Nasser allegedly played the "game." Separating fact from fiction is difficult. Read at your own risk.

GENESIS 1948: THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. By Dan Kurzman. New York: World Publishing Co., 1970, 750 p. $12.95.

A Herculean attempt to recreate the events surrounding the birth of Israel, at all levels of society on both sides of the conflict. It is popularized history, consisting mainly of vignettes and dramatic episodes, but information gained in many interviews adds to its value.

JERUSALEM, KEY TO PEACE. By Evan M. Wilson. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1970, 176 p. $5.95.

A tempered combination of personal reminiscence, capsule history and recommendations for a settlement in Jerusalem by a former U.S. diplomat who was Consul General there during the 1960s.

BONN AND JERUSALEM: THE STRANGE COALITION. By Inge Deutschkron. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1970, 357 p. $13.95.

A fact-filled account of the difficult course of postwar relations between two countries separated by the chasm of genocide. By a German-born Israeli journalist.

## *South and Southeast Asia*

ASIA AWAKES: A CONTINENT IN TRANSITION. By Dick Wilson. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970, 460 p. $10.00.

Transformation of the material, technological, social, intellectual and organizational bases of the societies of Asia, the "least homogeneous" of nations, inevitably occasions violence and fluctuations in policy and direction. The author concludes that despite some progress, "we have a long way to go before we acquire a minimally realistic assessment of Asia."

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN ASIA. Edited by Edward W. Weidner. Durham: Duke University Press (in coöperation with the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration), 1970, 431 p. $12.00.

The distinctive roles, and modification of roles, of Asian administrators under conditions of rapid change and development. Political and cultural aspects are emphasized as well as those that are strictly administrative.

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EMERGING SOUTHEAST ASIA: A STUDY IN GROWTH AND STAGNATION. By Donald W. Fryer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970, 486 p. $8.95.

More effective trade, aid and regional coöperation is advocated to meet Southeast Asia's pressing problems of food production and overpopulation.

UNDER TWO MASTERS. By N. B. Bonarjee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 317 p. $4.00.

A general estimate of rule in India as experienced by a civil servant who served many years in high posts, first under the British Raj, then in independent India.

DEFENCE WITHOUT DRIFT. By P. V. R. Rao. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970, 349 p. Rs. 30.

A former Indian Defence Secretary aims to provide the Indian public with adequate facts to enable it to understand current defense needs and problems and to judge the quality of efforts being made to solve them.

THE POLITICS OF PAKISTAN: A CONSTITUTIONAL QUEST. By Richard S. Wheeler. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 346 p. $11.00.

The author shows how Islam, controversies between East and West Pakistan and between central and provincial authorities have resulted in the failure to establish a stable constitutional order.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ACTION. By Arthur F. Raper and others. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 351 p. $12.50.

A report on a decade of sustained and impressive efforts by the Academy for Rural Development at Comilla, East Pakistan, to improve the social and economic lot of the Bengalis.

THE VIETNAMESE IN THAILAND: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By Peter A. Poole. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 180 p. $8.00.

The legal, political and cultural status of the estimated 70–80,000 Vietnamese refugees in Thailand, many of whom desire to remain there, the prospects for their assimilation and how they affect Thai relations with North and South Vietnam.

THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR: CAMBODIA AND LAOS. By Wilfred G. Burchett. New York: International Publishers, 1970, 204 p. $5.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A journalist long known for his leftist views asserts that the U.S. incursions into Cambodia and Laos in 1970 represent "a logical extension of policies followed by the United States . . . deliberately planned to 'fill the power vacuum' created by the collapse of French colonialism."

BURMA. By F. S. V. Donnison. New York: Praeger, 1970, 263 p. $8.00.

A former Indian Civil Service officer presents a dismal view of Burma, pointing to the ineffective rule of military dictatorship, the prevailing disunion and internal strifes and hardships. His outlook for the future is equally gloomy.

## *East Asia and Pacific Ocean*

THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA. By Immanuel C. Y. Hsü. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 830 p. $14.50.

A masterful work of scholarship tracing political, intellectual, social and economic changes that have affected every phase of Chinese life from 1600 to now and how they were precipitated, to a large degree, by influence from abroad.

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LIN PIAO: THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF CHINA'S NEW RULER. By Martin Ebon. New York: Stein and Day, 1970, 378 p. $10.00.

A brief biographical sketch of the man Mao has chosen to be his successor, followed by 20 of Lin's writings during 1940–1969 selected to show his military and political views.

CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Jerome Alan Cohen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, 380 p. $10.00.

Thirty specialists in various disciplines explore the possibility of interpreting Communist Chinese law. Problems confronted include accessibility of materials, modern Chinese legal terminology and difficulties in translating Japanese, Soviet and Nationalist Chinese studies on the topic.

AMERICAN ATTITUDE AND POLICY TO THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN CHINA (1911–1921). By Nemai Sadhan Bose. Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1970, 282 p. Rs. 35.

A Jadavpur University professor labels as hypocritical the support and sympathy for Chinese republicanism which were professed by Taft and Wilson. He claims that their prime concerns were American stability, prosperity in trade and investment and unimpaired missionary activities.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESULTS OF LAND REFORM IN TAIWAN. By Martin M. C. Yang. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970, 555 p. $12.00.

The role of land reform in improving Nationalist China's agricultural production, rural living conditions and the raising of cultural levels since 1954.

CONTEMPORARY AUSTRALIA: STUDIES IN HISTORY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS. Edited by Richard Preston. Durham: Duke University Press (for Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1969, 587 p. $13.00.

Nineteen Australian and American scholars provide an interesting survey of Australia's economic and labor policies and of the problems arising from political ideology, federalism, civil rights and external influences.

AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN. By William Macmahon Ball. Melbourne: Nelson, 1970, 172 p. Austr. $1.95.

A critical appraisal of relations between the two countries from Federation in 1901 to war and the Occupation in 1941 to 1952, also of later developments in trade and politics to 1967. A large use is made of original documentary sources.

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC. Edited by Charles Osborne. New York: Praeger, 1970, 580 p. $18.50.

A useful encyclopedic compilation covering all aspects of life, followed by vital statistics and other basic information, mostly in tabular form.

NEW GUINEA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. By Peter Hastings. Melbourne: Cheshire (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1969, 320 p. Austr. $4.95.

A journalist's overall view of New Guinea, its political development and its relations with its neighbors, especially, of course, with Australia which underestimated the ease with which Western political and social institutions could be implanted in a Melanesian setting.

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TRADITION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN SAMOA. By David Pitt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 295 p. $8.50.

How, despite the weakness of European contributions, Samoans have themselves generated and strengthened their local economy and improved their status.

## *Africa*

POPULATION, MIGRATION, AND URBANIZATION IN AFRICA. By William A. Hance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 450 p. $15.00.

An excellent volume. Professor Hance asserts that there *is* a population problem in Africa, that the land cannot support the needs of the population, despite comparatively low densities in most areas of the continent.

AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANS. By G. Mennen Williams. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969, 218 p. $5.95.

The former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs surveys the continent, highlighting its problems and accomplishments. He calls for a greater U.S. investment in African economies in order to assure the stability and effectiveness of African political systems.

THE AFRICA READER: COLONIAL AFRICA. Edited by Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson. New York: Random House, 1970, 264 p. $7.95 (Paper, $1.95).

THE AFRICA READER: INDEPENDENT AFRICA. Edited by Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson. New York: Random House, 1970, 428 p. $10.00 (Paper, $2.45).

These two volumes of readings offer an excellent overview of African society and politics. While the readings on the colonial period include writings both of Europeans and Africans, the volume on independent Africa includes essays written exclusively by Africans.

COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870–1960: VOLUME 2: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF COLONIALISM 1914–1960. Edited by L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 563 p. $17.50.

This second of a projected five-volume series on the history of colonial Africa includes 14 original essays by eminent Africanists. Most of them consider general themes rather than study specific territories. A Hoover Institution publication.

POLITICS IN NORTH AFRICA: ALGERIA, MOROCCO, AND TUNISIA. By Clement Henry Moore. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 360 p. $4.50 (Paper).

A comparative study of the three Maghreb countries, containing useful information along with much theorizing on political development.

THE COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL: THE MOROCCAN POLITICAL ELITE—A STUDY IN SEGMENTED POLITICS. By John Waterbury. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 367 p. $10.00.

A scholarly treatment of the influence of traditional patterns of behavior on contemporary Moroccan politics, particularly how this has resulted in factionalism and immobilism among the nation's political élite.

LIBYAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A CASE OF PLANNED DECOLONIZATION. By Adrian Pelt. New Haven: Yale University Press (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1970, 1,016 p. $35.00.

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The former U.N. Commissioner in Libya during the transition to unification and independence (1950–52) bases this ponderous work, which comes close to being definitive, on both documents and personal experience.

ETHIOPIA: THE MODERNIZATION OF AUTOCRACY. By Robert L. Hess. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 272 p. $8.95.

A general overview of both history and contemporary politics.

RESOLVING CONFLICT IN AFRICA: THE FERMEDA WORKSHOP. Edited by Leonard W. Doob. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, 209 p. $7.50.

In 1969 a session was held in Fermeda, Italy, with participants from Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, with the aim of finding ways of resolving border problems among the three countries. This volume includes assessments of these sessions by participants.

*NONALIGNED BLACK AFRICA: AN INTERNATIONAL SUBSYSTEM.* By George W. Shepherd, Jr. Lexington (Mass.): Heath (for the Center on International Race Relations), 1970, 151 p. $10.00.

A survey of the African role in international politics by a University of Denver political scientist.

THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONHOOD. By Tom Mboya. New York: Praeger, 1970, 278 p. $7.50.

Mainly speeches of the late Kenyan political leader made during the period 1961–67.

THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT KENYA 1963–8. By Cherry Gertzel. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, 180 p. $6.75.

Parliamentary and party politics in the period are well covered in this volume by a political scientist at the University of Zambia.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AFRICA. By D. S. Pearson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 213 p. $5.25 (Paper).

A description of the setting and some of the basic features of the process of economic development in East Africa as well as a consideration of some general theoretical questions involved.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE TROPICAL AFRICAN FRONTIER. By Thomas R. De Gregori. Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969, 531 p. $15.00.

An economist at the University of Houston argues that the diffusion of ideas, not the investment of foreign capital, generated technological and economic development in Africa.

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA. By D. J. Murray. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 393 p. $13.00.

A somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of political life in Rhodesia. Adopting a group-politics perspective, the author analyzes politics there in terms of six occupational sectors and changes in their interrelationships.

REFUGEES SOUTH OF THE SAHARA: AN AFRICAN DILEMMA. Edited by Hugh C. Brooks and Yassin El-Ayouty. Westport: Negro Universities Press, 1970, 307 p. $13.00.

Papers originally presented in connection with St. John's University's 1967 Symposium on Refugees, together with short comments and critiques.

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# SOURCE MATERIAL

*By Donald Wasson*

## I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 10022. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.:* Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York, 10016. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 91st Congress, 2nd Session. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

### Africa

INDUSTRIALIZATION, foreign capital and forced labour in South Africa. N.Y., 1970. 102 p. (70.II.K.8.) $2.00.

### Asia and Pacific Ocean

SOUTH Pacific Commission. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, on H.J. Res. 1162, Apr. 29, 1970. Washington, 1970. 25 p.

UNITED States involvement in Southeast Asia. Report, Select Committee on United States Involvement in Southeast Asia, House, pursuant to H.Res. 976, Jl. 6, 1970. Washington, 1970. 164 p. (H. Rept. 91–1276.)

VIETNAM policy proposals. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 3000 [and others], Feb. 3–Mar. 16, 1970. Washington, 1970. 405 p.

STUDENT views toward United States policy in Southeast Asia. Hearings, Ad Hoc Committee of Members of the House of Representatives, May 21–22, 1970. Washington, 1970. 277 p.

AMERICAN prisoners of war in Southeast Asia, 1970. Hearings, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 29–May 1, 1970. Washington, 1970. 148 p.

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany H. Con. Res. 454, Feb. 16, 1970. Washington, 1970. 21 p. (S. Rept. 91–705.)

INVESTIGATION of the My Lai incident. Report, Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, House, under authority of H.Res. 105, Jl. 15, 1970. Washington, 1970. 53 p. (Com. Print.)

A REVIEW of the inequitable monetary rate of exchange in Vietnam. Report, Committee on Government Operations, House, Je. 25, 1970. Washington, 1970. 16 p. (H. Rept. 91–1228.)

REFUGEE and civilian war casualty problems in Laos and Cambodia. Hearing, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, May 7, 1970. Washington, 1970. 107 p.

THE TRANSFER of power 1942–7. Vol. I: The Cripps Mission, January–April 1942, ed. by Nicholas Mansergh and E. W. R. Lumby. London, HMSO, 1970. 928 p. $25.20.

### Developing Nations

POPULATION program assistance; aid to developing nations by the United States, other nations, and international and private agencies. Washington, Agency for International Development, 1969. 163 p.

PEACE Corps Act, amendment. Act, approved July 24, 1970. Washington, 1970. 3 p. (91–352—S. 3430.)

OUTFLOW of trained personnel from developing countries to developed countries; report of the Secretary-General. N.Y., 1970. 131 p. (E/4820.)

LEVELS of living and economic growth: a comparative study of six countries 1950–1965. Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1969. 153 p. (69.IV.9.) $2.00.

INDUSTRY and trade in some developing countries. London, Oxford Univ. Press (for the Development Centre of the OECD), 1970.

Brazil: industrialization and trade policies, by Joel Bergsman. 281 p. Mexico: industrialization and trade policies since 1940, by Timothy King. 160 p. Pakistan: industrializa-

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tion and trade policies, by S. R. Lewis, Jr. 214 p. A comparative study, by Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky and Maurice Scott. 512 p.

UNIDO's industrial investment promotion programme. Vienna, U.N. Industrial Development Organization, 1969. 18 p. (ID/31.)

INDUSTRIAL location and regional development: an annotated bibliography. N.Y., 1970. 165 p. (70.II.B.15.) $2.50.

DISTRIBUTION of income and economic growth: concepts and issues. Geneva, U.N. Research Institute for Social Development, 1970. 80 p. (70.IV.8.) $1.00.

ADMINISTRATIVE aspects of planning: papers of a seminar. N.Y., 1969. 431 p. (69.II.G.2.) $4.75.

### DISARMAMENT

ABM, MIRV, SALT, and the nuclear arms race. Hearings, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 16–Je. 29, 1970. Washington, 1970. 624 p.

### EASTERN EUROPE

ECONOMIC developments in countries of Eastern Europe. A compendium of papers submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, Joint Economic Committee, Apr. 23, 1970. Washington, 1970. 634 p. (Jt. Com. Print.)

ROMANIA on the way of completing socialist construction: reports, speeches, articles, by Nicolae Ceauşescu. Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1969.

*Vol. I.* July 1965–September 1966. 584 p. *Vol. II.* September 1966–December 1967. 571 p. *Vol. III.* January 1968–March 1969. 865 p.

### ENVIRONMENT

MINERAL resources of the sea. N.Y., 1970. 49 p. (70.II.B.4.) $1.00.

REPORT of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. N.Y., 1970. 194 p. (G.A. Official Records, XXV, Suppl. 21.) $4.00.

OUTER Continental Shelf. Hearings, Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., Dec. 17, 1969–Mar. 4, 1970. Washington, 1970. 295 p.

SOLAR distillation as a means of meeting small-scale water demands. N.Y., 1970. (E.70.II.B.1.) $2.00.

INTERNATIONAL Biological Program. Hearing, Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S.J. Res. 89 and H.J. Res. 589, Feb. 9, 1970. Washington, 1970. 83 p.

——. Report, Jl. 30, 1970. Washington, 1970. 7 p. (S. Rept. 91–1043.)

FEDERAL Oceanic and Atmospheric Organization. Hearings, Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Commerce, Senate, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., on S. 2802 [and others], Mar. 23–May 4, 1970. Washington, 1970. Pt. 2.

THE UNITED States-Japan Cooperative Program in Natural Resources; five year report 1964–1969. Washington, Department of the Interior, 1970. 65 p. 70¢.

### FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

INTERNATIONAL financial institutions. Report, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, to accompany H.R. 18306, Jl. 14, 1970. Washington, 1970. 53 p. (H. Rept. 91–1300.)

TO AUTHORIZE the United States to participate in increases in the resources of the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Hearings, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, on H.R. 16891, Apr. 16–17, 1970. Washington, 1970. 305 p.

——. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 3628 and S. 3543, May 6, 1970. Washington, 1970. 88 p.

FOREIGN bank secrecy. Hearings, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking and Currency. Senate, on S. 3678 and H.R. 15073, Je. 8–11, 1970. Washington, 1970. 350 p.

### INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUCCESSION of states to multilateral treaties; studies prepared by the Secretariat. Geneva,

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U.N. International Law Commission, 1970. 97 p. (A/CN.4/225.)

REPORT of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States. N.Y., 1970. 126 p. (G.A. Official Records, XXV, Suppl. 18.) $2.00.

REPORT of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 13 July–14 Aug., 1970. N.Y., 1970. 68 p. (G.A. Official Records, XXV, Suppl. 19.) $1.00.

THE GENEVA Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war . . . by governments participating in hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, May 1970. Washington, 1970. 81 p. (Com. Print.)

### OUTER SPACE

FOREIGN policy implications of satellite communications. Hearings, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 23–30, 1970. Washington, 1970. 212 p.

SPACE program benefits. Hearing, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Senate, Apr. 6, 1970. Washington, 1970. 379 p.

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